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Dissertation Summary 
Innovation is one act whose biggest risk comes from not doing the act. Dr. 
Reithofer, the CEO of BMW AG, precisely devises an answer to the famous question as 
to why his company innovates saying that: “because doing nothing was even a bigger 
risk”. Companies deliberately choose to incur the risk of innovation to avoid a much 
bigger risk of not doing so. The innovation process, however, continues to evolve for 
businesses, calling for aggressive changes such as self-cannibalization (Sood & Tellis, 
2013; Thurow, 2000), “glocalization” of operations (Svensson, 2001), and, more 
importantly, pushing beyond organizational boundaries in open innovation models. 
Recent models of shared value creation (Porter & Kramer, 2011), open source 
technologies (Dooley & O'Sullivan, 2007), and distributed innovation (Cash, Earl, & 
Morison, 2008) highlight the fact that company’s ultimate innovation outcomes depend 
not only on its capability to innovate, but indeed on others’ capabilities as well. 
Acknowledging the supply chain as the evolving unit of competition (Capaldo, 2007; 
Ketchen & Hult, 2007), it also represents a necessary “innovation ecosystem” (Adner, 
2006) that must be properly managed for reaching the desired innovation outcome. 
This dissertation sheds light on several hopes and fears from supply chain 
innovation in three distinct papers. Paper one introduces the concept of Process 
Innovation Propagation as an appropriation technique helping to extract the most returns 
out of a process innovation by exporting to supply chain partners. Paper two devises and 
empirically tests knowledge properties that best lead to radical and incremental supply 
chain innovative capabilities. Lastly, paper three conducts an exploratory study that 
introduces factors affecting a firm’s optimum supply chain innovation strategy. The 
dissertation makes a strong argument that supply chain innovation is most prominently 
governed by power asymmetry that may either help or hurt innovative performance. A 
more elaborate summary on each of the three papers follows. 
The first paper introduces the concept of Process Innovation Propagation (PIP) as 
a novel way to appropriate returns on process innovations through passing them to supply 
chain partners. The transfer process depends on power advantage to persuade partners to 
adopt an innovation because the propagator enjoys either: (1) market power advantage 
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through dependence asymmetry, or, (2) expert power through proficiency in one or more 
areas of expertise irreplaceable by the receiver. In either case the propagator collects 
innovation returns by operational improvement along the supply chain, such as process 
synchronization and integration, and/or improved image and reputation as in the case of 
propagating green practices and socially responsible initiatives. 
The paper proceeds to develop the three overarching elements of PIP: partner 
selection, innovation properties, and governance structure. PIP partners are to be selected 
according to their strategic fit, which is characterized by strategic similarity, 
interdependence, and incentive alignment. Two innovation properties are discussed as 
relevant to PIP, including vertical transferability and the degree of technicality. Finally, 
formality of the relationship and managerial attitude comprise the supply chain 
governance structure, which arguably affects PIP success. The PIP novelty is threefold. It 
suggests external appropriation through using other firms as opposed to solely depending 
on internal capabilities. PIP also directly challenges the preclusive component of 
generative appropriability (Ahuja, Morris Lampert, & Novelli, 2013). It also introduces a 
new channel for collecting innovation rents through supply chain operational benefits and 
market image. 
Rather than appropriating returns on existing ideas, the second paper addresses 
the challenge of creating new ideas in joint endeavors with supply chain partners. It takes 
a capability building perspective to characterize supply chain knowledge properties that 
help build collective radical and incremental innovative capabilities. Two hierarchical 
component models (second order reflective-formative models) are devised for human and 
organizational knowledge properties that are argued to drive supply chain radical and 
incremental innovative capabilities, respectively. Being an element of any relationship, 
power exercise is acknowledged for its moderating effects on each of the two links. 
This paper uses a two stage PLS technique to empirically test for the hypothesized 
relationships. Results show that human related diversity is an effective abstraction that 
can explain supply chains’ abilities to produce radical innovations. Counter to 
expectations, however, diversity in people and skills seems to create more problems of 
coordination and intra-team conflicts than provide a wide spectrum of ideas helpful for 
idea generation. The second order organizational construct, organizational capital 
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domination, did not succeed as a higher-level abstraction. One of its components, 
however, organizational knowledge gap, significantly inhibits incremental innovative 
capabilities of supply chains. Companies with discrepancies in size find coordination 
problems due to conflicting procedure, governance structures, and organizational 
cultures. Finally, results show that power exercise against supply chain partners will not 
help incremental innovations, and significantly hurt radical ones. 
After addressing hopes of appropriation and building innovative capabilities with 
supply chain partners, paper 3 proceeds to deal with the main fear from supply chain 
innovation, that is, loss of competitive knowledge. The risk of horizontal leakage of 
knowledge (to competition) is inherent in vertical sharing (with supply chain partners). In 
this context, the unintended knowledge spillover problem becomes each firm’s deliberate 
choice whether to leak its partner’s knowledge to that partner’s competition. The paper 
adopts a game-theoretic perspective in an exploratory study of supply chain knowledge 
exchanges to address whether a firm should ‘cooperate’ by readily sharing its knowledge 
and protecting that of its partner, or ‘defect’ by doing the opposite. Because each player 
must choose one of two alternatives the relationship between the two players can be 
modeled as a 2×2 game, in which each player chooses (simultaneously) whether to 
cooperate or defect. 
The paper starts by highlighting a broad class of symmetric and asymmetric 2×2 
games that can model the knowledge-sharing dilemma among supply chain partners in 
the context of joint innovation projects. Different firm preferences are modeled along two 
dimensions: collaboration motive and power advantage. The paper continues to address 
long-term relationships by investigating the effect of game repetition on firms’ choices 
and outcomes using MATLAB simulation. The simulation explores the effects of firm 
type, opponent type, strategy type (nice versus mean), and payoff structure on repeated 
innovation interactions (or equivalently, long-term relations). 
The three aforementioned papers are given in the next three sections, followed by 
concluding remarks in section 5. 
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CHAPTER I. Process Innovation Propagation: 
Appropriating Supply Chain Innovation Returns  
ABSTRACT 
This paper introduces the concept of Process Innovation Propagation (PIP) as a 
power-based appropriation mechanism that departs from conventional strategies of 
protective appropriation. PIP is defined as collecting returns from process innovations 
through passing them over to supply chain partners. The transfer process is based on the 
two mediated sources of power which pre-exist in a buyer-supplier linkage prior to joint 
innovation endeavors: market and expert, and is novel in: (1) suggesting external 
appropriation through using other firms as opposed to solely depending on internal 
capabilities, (2) directly challenging the preclusive component of generative 
appropriability, and, (3) collecting innovation rents through supply chain operational 
benefits and market image. Acknowledging its significant potential as a profit-enhancing 
mechanism, PIP is distinguished as a new construct and propositions regarding its 
elements and antecedents are developed based on a thorough analysis and synthesis of the 
literature. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Synchronizing the innovation process within supply chains serves as a key source 
of competitive advantage (Cecere, O'Marah, & Preslan, 2004). Firms are accordingly 
incentivized to share process innovations with supply chain partners, hoping to improve 
the overall operational performance, in terms of efficiency, responsiveness and quality. 
Doing so, however, may entail repercussions of intellectual property loss, through 
common suppliers and divided loyalties. A corresponding dilemma, therefore, arises 
regarding how to capitalize on supply chain partners to appropriate maximum value from 
process innovations, with minimum loss of competitive edge. Firms realize the 
importance of innovation “openness”; yet attempt to appropriate commercial returns from 
their innovative efforts (Dahlander & Gann, 2010). Accordingly, in this paper we take a 
step to resolving this dilemma through the concept of “process innovation propagation” 
(PIP), attempting to build a comprehensive theory around it regarding its elements, and 
viability conditions. 
PIP is defined as a power-based appropriation mechanism for an existing process 
innovation through transferring it to one or more supply chain partner(s). Firms that 
propagate to suppliers process innovations, such as statistical process control, just in 
time, or green initiatives, are able to reap more benefits from these innovations through 
an enhanced supplier performance, be it in lead time reduction, higher quality or more 
efficient production, and/ or an enhanced company image, for example by achieving a 
‘green supply chain’ reputation. The concept of PIP is new in departing from the 
conventional view of appropriation based on secrecy and intellectual property protection, 
and promoting sharing of ideas to maximize value by considering adopting units outside 
the boundaries of an organization.  
The concept of PIP is relevant and timely in addressing three evolving facts: (1) 
an increasing importance of innovation as a source of competitive advantage (Cefis & 
Marsili, 2012; R. M. Grant, 1996); (2) a move away from the “myopia of protection” to 
capitalizing on external innovation sources (Laursen & Salt, 2006); and, (3) 
acknowledgement of supply chains as the new units of innovation and competition 
(Adner, 2006; Ketchen & Hult, 2007; Porter & Kramer, 2011). Appropriating value from 
existing innovations is of paramount importance to firms (Ahuja, Morris Lampert, & 
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
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Novelli, 2013). Firstly, innovations have become a pre-requisite for existence and 
success. Moreover, companies strive to maximize return on their vast, high-risk 
innovation investments of technological, human, and financial resources. Firms can 
appropriate “generative” value from innovations by seeking improved versions, and by 
deriving related (or unrelated) inventions from existing ideas (Ahuja et al., 2013).  
PIP extends the concept of generative appropriability (GA) by moving beyond the 
boundaries of one firm, to acknowledge the potential of supply chain partners to 
capitalize on innovations. Although PIP supports the cumulative component of GA 
through expanding the scope of a process innovation, or adapting it to be implemented in 
a supply chain partner firm, PIP works directly against GA’s preclusive component, 
which emphasizes excluding external parties from benefiting from an innovation, through 
intentionally allowing supply chain firms to profit from the propagated innovation. This 
is particularly significant given the increasingly dis-integrated structures of supply 
chains, rising move towards outsourcing, and more reliance on supply chain partners for 
strategic activities and knowledge exchanges. 
PIP depends on power advantages to secure innovation returns. Supply chain 
power is the ability of a partner to induce another to do what it would otherwise not do 
(Dapiran & Hogarath-Scott, 2003; Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981). Power acts as an 
initiator for creating new adopters who may otherwise be resistant to changes and as a 
guard against opportunistic behavior that may harm the innovation owner. Although trust 
may replace power in eliminating opportunism (Ireland & Webb, 2007), it fails to 
overcome organizational inertia against innovations, which may be caused by risk 
aversion or simple resistance to change (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Chain integrators, such 
as Ford, Toyota, Wal-Mart and Dell, enjoy market power and/or expert power 
advantage(s) that succeeds to influence suppliers to comply to directives regarding new 
process adoption. By striving to maintain business with a giant integrator, or perceiving 
technological lead, less-powerful suppliers conform to new processes, resulting in higher 
innovation performance for integrators, suppliers, and in turn the supply chain as a whole. 
Being a power-driven mechanism, PIP challenges conventional formal 
appropriation means, while extending strategic, informal means. In PIP process 
innovations are openly shared as opposed to licensed. Propagators acknowledge the fact 
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
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that formal appropriation, such as the usage of patents, generally fails with process 
innovations (Teece, 1986). Protected by their power advantage, propagators readily share 
their knowledge and may even invest more resources, e.g., training teams, to encourage 
partners’ adoption. PIP extends strategic appropriation mechanisms by combining 
secrecy and time to market, on a dyadic buyer-supplier level, as well as innovation 
complexity (see section 3.4). When a power advantageous firm propagates an innovation 
to a supplier, it can compel that supplier to maintain confidentiality, and negotiate 
exclusive rights to the innovation for an initial period of time, securing time to market 
advantage. Although PIP is expected to enhance innovation performance and profitability 
of all parties involved, we here focus on PIP as an appropriation mechanism, 
emphasizing appropriation to the propagator. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 relates relevant literature on 
innovation appropriation. Section 3 builds the theoretical background of PIP on selecting 
the right partner, and innovation, and on factors that may affect the success of PIP in 
generating rents. Finally, concluding remarks are discussed in section 4. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Innovation and Appropriation 
Innovation is a key form of organizational knowledge creation defined as the 
“embodiment, combination or synthesis of knowledge in original, relevant, valued new 
products, processes or services” (Luecke & Katz, 2003; Nonaka, 1994). The term 
“innovation” tends to be quite encompassing for any organizational change that is “new”, 
where the degree of newness may highly vary from new to the world to merely new (or 
even perceived as new) to an adopting unit (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Garcia & Calantone, 
2002; Johannessen, Olsen, & Lumpkin, 2001). No attempt to our knowledge has been 
made to indicate changes, new to an adopting unit, that would yet not qualify as 
innovations (see Bantel and Jackson (1989) for a review). Several researchers have 
attempted to define, describe and classify innovation; notably product versus process 
(Utterback & Abernathy, 1975), radical versus incremental (Dewar & Dutton, 1986), 
open versus closed (Chesbrough, 2003a, 2003b), and autonomous versus systemic 
(Teece, 1996).  
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
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Innovation has almost become the base for organizational survival (Cavusgil, 
Calantone, & Zhao, 2003). Companies invest millions of dollars to come up with new 
ideas to enhance their processes or products and distinguish themselves from 
competition. Realizing the vast and increasing importance of innovation, companies are 
willing to invest resources and incur risks, attempting to develop new products and adopt 
new processes. Bearing these costs, however, managers strive to appropriate maximum 
value from inventions or ideas (Teece, 1986).  
Appropriation has traditionally been associated with innovation protection and 
confinement. The corresponding economics of the rent view argues that by protecting 
knowledge against expropriation and against imitation, firms are better able to collect 
rent streams from innovations and are even more incentivized to invest further in 
innovations (Liebeskind, 1996). Accordingly firms have been adopting appropriation 
strategies that focus on excluding other companies from benefiting from an innovation 
and confine rents from an innovation to its owner. These appropriation strategies may be 
legal (formal) such as patents, trademarks, trade secrets and copyrights; or strategic 
(informal) such as secrecy, sales and service efforts, lead-time (time to market), learning 
and design complexity.  
2.2 Formal and Informal Appropriation 
The choice of formal versus informal strategies depends on several factors such as 
industry, firm size, innovation type (product versus process) and the involvement of 
partner(s) in the development process. In an early study it was found that both the usage 
of patents as a protection mechanism and their effect on the rate of innovation depend on 
the industry (Mansfield, 1986). The significant effect of industry has been confirmed in 
later studies (Arundel & Kabla, 1998; Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Cohen, Nelson, & 
Walsh, 2000). More specifically, it has been found that appropriation strategies 
remarkably differ between service and manufacturing industries, as the two sectors 
innovate differently (Leiponen & Byma, 2009). Formal proprietary rights also tend to be 
favored by firms involved in product innovations, as process innovations, which are 
likely large-scale, would enjoy the natural protection of scale economies; and are more 
difficult to patent (Gooroochurn & Hanley, 2007; Teece, 1986).  
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
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Firm size also acts as a significant differentiator for the choice of appropriation 
mechanism (Holgersson, 2013). Small firms tend to prefer informal appropriation 
strategies as they may lack the resources for legal innovation defense (Cohen et al., 
2000), or because they simply do not perceive formal strategies, mainly patenting, as 
efficient protection for the competitiveness of innovations (Arundel, 2001). Moreover, 
inter-firm cooperation drives a choice for informal appropriation, namely speed to 
market, particularly when the cooperation is horizontal which is usually the case for 
product innovations (Leiponen & Byma, 2009). Despite being preferred in several 
situations, informal appropriation mechanisms have generally received little attention in 
the literature (Leiponen & Byma, 2009).  
2.3 Generative Appropriation in the Supply Chain 
Appropriation, as discussed above, has been mainly concerned with its primary 
dimension, defined as the individual share of the value that a firm can capture from a 
given (new) invention by commercialization/ licensing (Ahuja et al., 2013; Ritala & 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). This has been extended to include a second dimension 
that acknowledges value, as opposed to share, maximization from an idea or innovation. 
This is referred to as “generative appropriation” (Ahuja et al., 2013). Realizing the fact 
that excessive secrecy/ protection may impede value creation, firms may prefer a smaller 
portion of a growing pie to a bigger part of a potentially shrinking pie (Jacobides, 
Knudsen, & Augier, 2006). Knowing that bounded rationality limits the ability to predict 
possible risks, firms are shying away from full protection attempts and acknowledging 
the innovation potential from collaboration (Ireland & Webb, 2007; Lavie, 2006). 
Accordingly, the focus is shifting to value creation, which is arguably best 
achieved through supply chain partners. Supply chain firms own complementary assets 
required for the commercialization of an innovation (Teece, 1986). On the one hand, 
investing in appreciating complementary assets may secure future appropriation, by 
stimulating a need from innovators and imitators (Jacobides et al., 2006). On the other 
hand, the complete value chain represents an innovation ecosystem that may define 
primary appropriation for an innovator (Adner, 2006) and create shared value (Porter & 
Kramer, 2011). By combining innovative capabilities and complementary assets from the 
value chain, synergies are created, allowing for future appropriation opportunities. 
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
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3. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT: PROCESS INNOVATION 
PROPAGATION: PIP 
3.1 Foundations of PIP 
Process Innovation Propagation (PIP) is defined as appropriating returns from 
process innovations by exploiting power advantages to export innovations to supply 
chain partners. Table I-1 distinguishes between PIP and other related constructs. Process 
innovations may be well transferrable to supply chain firms, and owners of these 
innovations perceive direct benefit from sharing the ideas with partners, and persuading 
adoption (Aitken, Childerhouse, & Towill, 2003; Srai & Gregory, 2008; Walker, Di 
Sisto, & McBain, 2008). From logistics innovations to green initiatives, propagation 
creates direct economic value for the innovation owner.  
Accordingly, innovation owners use their power advantage to push through 
transferrable process innovations, and ripple the benefit. An innovation is defined as a 
change that is new to the adopting unit. As such, a propagator necessarily lies within the 
supply chain and propagates to a supply chain partner. The owner may have obtained an 
existing innovation externally (from a third party) or developed it in-house. Propagating 
its “Retail Link” system, Wal-Mart enjoyed a significant productivity enhancement 
through the resulting order-of-magnitude supplier investments in the system (Schrage, 
2002). Similarly, McDonald’s exported its green initiatives to its suppliers, creating a 
“sustainability” image that has greatly benefited the company (Gunther, 2011, 2013).  
Although PIP is distinct from joint R&D (see Table I-1), it entails adaptation 
efforts to apply an idea to a new adopter. In other words, in PIP supply chain partners do 
not collaborate to develop an innovation as in co-creation processes (including supplier 
involvement/ integration in NPD), but a propagator seeking appropriation may 
collaborate with the receiver to re-apply an existing innovation and adapt it to the new 
unit of adoption. New adopters continue to experience implementation problems with 
existing innovations, performing changes and reviews to the organizational procedures as 
part of almost any innovation implementation process (R. B. Cooper & Zmud, 1990). 
Implementation is in fact a managerial challenge comparable to that of initial invention 
(Leonard-Barton, 1988). Accordingly, inter-firm teams work together to modify the new 
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
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technology to adapt it to existing organizational structures (Majchrzak, Rice, Malhotra, 
King, & Ba, 2000). Appropriate interaction between the source and receiver helps 
overcome implementation issues for a smoother technological adaptation (R. B. Cooper 
& Zmud, 1990). This adaptation, however, is merely regarded as a stage in the 
implementation course, as opposed to being a stand-alone co-creation process, regardless 
of how discontinuous it may be (R. B. Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994).  
PIP appropriates returns on an innovation owner by providing operational benefits 
and/ or enhancing the innovator’s image. Sharing process innovations, which improve 
operations (flexibility, responsiveness or cost), spreads the benefits to supply chain 
partners, enhancing the performance of the whole supply chain (Subramani, 2004). 
Supply chains have become the actual units of competition as organizational boundaries 
between supplier and buyer have blurred due to multiple functional interfaces and 
relation-specific investments (Dyer, Cho, & Chu, 1998). PIP allows for harmonization of 
buyer and supplier processes, which highly avoids wasting resources (Lasch & Janker, 
2005). This chain-wide integration synchronizes processes throughout the chain, 
improving the focal company’s overall performance (Van-der-Vaart & Van-Donk, 2008).  
Moreover, a firm’s supply chain has become part of its innovation ecosystem, 
where full benefits are only possible through enhancing the whole system’s performance 
(Adner, 2006). This necessarily drives efforts of each firm to develop its partners’ 
innovation capabilites, which in turn translates into operational value for the whole chain, 
including the innovator. Obtaining a satisfactory share that justifies sharing the 
knowledge depends mostly on the innovator’s power advantage. 
PIP can be also regarded as a very effective marketing strategy. Exporting green 
practices to suppliers creates a positive “green” image for the propagator (Walker et al., 
2008). Green initiatives are extended upstream and downstream to create a “green supply 
chain” reputation that ultimately leads to economic performance (Rao & Holt, 2005; 
Vachon & Klassen, 2006). Moreover, firms may propagate innovations that minimize 
social risks. Chain integrators are inevitably held accountable for social risks incurred by 
members of their supply chains. Despite their attempts to shift blame, both Apple and 
Samsung were publicly held accountable for their suppliers’ severe working conditions, 
which were harsh enough to drive employee suicides (Chang, 2010; Evans, 2013; Shin, 
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
 18 
2012). Accordingly, chain integrators propagate social innovations to publicize a socially 
responsible image. From there we reach the central proposition of this paper, which is: 
P1: PIP enhances a firm’s profitability through appropriating value from 
existing innovations. 
Propagation is a power-driven process. A firm’s power is defined as its potential 
influence, or capacity to affect actions of another unit (Emerson, 1962; Fidler & Johnson, 
1984). Supply Chain power is, therefore, the ability of a partner to induce another to do 
what it would otherwise not do (Dapiran & Hogarath-Scott, 2003; Emerson, 1962; 
Pfeffer, 1981). It entails influence that can evoke desired actions from partners (Ireland & 
Webb, 2007). Innovation owners with advantageous power positions can initiate the 
propagation process, taking advantage of partners’ relative dependence to push through 
their innovations. Enjoying some power advantage allows an innovation owner to both 
persuade a partner to overcome internal resistance to change (Walker et al., 2008), and 
prevent the partner from acting opportunistically by misusing/ leaking the knowledge 
gained. Power can take different types and bases (French & Raven, 1968), from which 
we acknowledge that the two sources of mediated inter-firm power that pre-exist in a 
buyer-supplier linkage drive propagation and affect its success. These are: expert power, 
and/ or market power. 
Expert power refers to a firm’s perception that the innovation owner is 
knowledgeable and skillful in the innovation area (Busch & Wilson, 1976). The 
receiver’s perception that the innovation owner firm has greater knowledge in the salient 
area of the innovation pushes through the idea, incentivizing the receiver to accept it 
(Fidler & Johnson, 1984). Trusting the owner’s capability may suffice for adopting the 
innovation and following its owner’s directives. Market power constitutes the 
propagator’s relative advantage in replacing its partner. Replaceability refers to how 
easily and costly each firm can substitute the other for market transactions (Brown, 
Lusch, & Nicholson, 1995; S. K. Kim & Ping-Hung, 2003; Kumar, Scheer, & 
Steenkamp, 1995). The perception that the owner may exercise its market power (e.g., 
withhold business from partner) persuades the partner to implement the required change. 
Partner’s dependence on the innovation owner for knowledge and/ or market transactions 
also discourages any opportunistic behavior, and allows the owner to reach favorable 
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agreements on sharing benefits of the exported innovation (e.g., obtaining price 
reductions from supplier cost reduction innovations). 
P2: PIP is a power-driven process; the higher the power advantage of the 
innovation owner (expert or market power), the higher the success of PIP. 
The concept of “success” involves a fair degree of complexity making it difficult 
to define (Thomas & Fernández, 2008; Wilson, Desmond, & Roberts, 1994). Successful 
PIP can be regarded as the extent to which (managerial) objectives from the process are 
achieved (Balachandra & Friar, 1997). This encompasses transfer success of the process 
innovation, coupled with success of the innovation itself. The former is defined in terms 
of “the degree of institutionalization of the practice at the recipient unit” which involves 
implementing the innovation at the receiving unit, as well as internalizing it (Kostova, 
1999). Success of a newly institutionalized process innovation entails achieving 
performance improvement in comparison to other supplier (partner) relationships to 
which no process innovation has been propagated (Corsten & Felde, 2005). Note that the 
latter can be a subjective measure constituting managers’ perception of the level of 
success of the new process (Janeiro, Proença, & Gonçalves, 2013). Factors affecting PIP 
success can be conceptualized as moderators to the link between PIP and firm 
profitability. 
3.2 Classical Examples of PIP 
Toyota has started with JIT as an internal process that greatly improved the 
efficiency and reduced the inventory level in its operations, yet extended the system to 
other members of its supply chain making the innovation a supply-chain-wide innovation 
and realizing much more gains. Other companies that used to have JIT as an internal 
system only, later on after the arrival of the internet and Supply Chain Planning Software, 
extended JIT externally by demanding from suppliers to deliver inventory to the factory 
only when it is needed for assembly, making JIT manufacturing, ordering and delivery 
process even speedier, more flexible and more efficient, benefiting the initiator. In this 
way Integrated Supply Networks (Demand Networks) or Electronic Supply Chains have 
formed ("Summary of Just-in-time. Abstract," 2014). 
Similarly, the use of House of Quality and Quality Function Deployment has been 
propagated when it was first introduced in the US market as a new process innovation. 
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Companies realized that not only should they be telling their manufacturers or suppliers 
what quality characteristics are important to the customer to manufacture or supply them, 
but also they could persuade other members of their supply chains to adopt the technique 
themselves directly with customers. Kelsey-Hayes, one of Ford’s two biggest suppliers, 
was one of the first to build expertise on Quality Function Deployment (QFD) which it 
used in 1986 to develop a coolant sensor that fulfilled critical customer needs such as 
‘‘easy-to-add coolant’’, ‘‘easy-to-identify unit’’, and ‘‘provide cap removal instructions’’ 
(Prasad, 1998). One year later, in 1987, Ford introduced QFD training to its employees 
and started using it, easing the supplier’s job significantly (Omachonu, Ross, & Swift, 
2004).  
Another classical example for propagation is Boeing, which exported its 
concurrent engineering initiatives to its major suppliers, Rolls Royce and General 
Electric, and the process was then repeated at the next level up the supply chain, 
providing the companies with quicker component manufacturing, and minimum redesign 
(Backhouse & Brookes, 1996). 
3.3 Partner Selection for PIP: Looking for the Strategic Fit 
Exporting innovations to direct partners, such as tier-one suppliers generally 
presents higher potential opportunities, for a more pronounced effect on a company’s 
operations. However, partners that are more embedded in the supply chain, such as tier-
two and tier-three suppliers may also be synergetic candidates for PIP. By looking at the 
supplier network for instance, tier-two and tier-three suppliers can be part of a company’s 
supply base whose innovation is directly managed (Choi & Krause, 2006).  
Nevertheless, in cases where lower tiers are not directly managed by the focal 
company, an innovation can proceed to lower-tier suppliers by series of repeated PIP. 
Network flagships in GPN (global production networks) represent such a scenario, in 
which they exert pressure on smaller suppliers to adopt technological changes that 
enhance efficiency/quality of processes (Ernst & Kim, 2002). The innovation 
performance of “Lower tier” suppliers is managed through “Higher tier” ones that 
mediate the transfer, and gradually propagate repeatedly more sophisticated technologies 
(Ernst & Kim, 2002). This has additional implications on the choice of suppliers, which 
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are selected based on their ability to manage the rest of the supply network and ensure its 
stability in terms of synchronized processes (Bonaccorsi & Lipparini, 1994). 
Another implication is the significance of ‘repeated-ness’ in PIP, so that the real 
supply chain benefit is realized when the innovation is actually propagated more than 
once, either sequentially or in parallel. A propagator starts by offering the innovation to 
one member of the supply chain who gives it to another and the process is repeated. First-
tier suppliers, who receive an innovation from a primary propagator, act themselves as 
system integrators for tier-two and tier-three suppliers passing on the idea (Charlette & 
Sandra, 2000). Such an emphasis on re-iteration makes an innovation a supply-chain-
wide practice, extracting the most benefit out of a successful idea. Accordingly, a much 
more tightly tiered structure is obtained from hierarchical supply chains, resulting from 
PIP recurrence that is a series of process innovation diffusion throughout the whole 
supplier network (Kogut, 2000).  
In each PIP iteration a company targets the partner with the highest perceived 
strategic fit. Strategic fit is an encompassing term that has been used in the literature to 
refer to: (1) external fit, defined as alignment between an organization and its 
environment; (2) internal fit: alignment between two internal activities of the firm: e.g. 
governance structure and organizational strategy (Yin & Zajac, 2004), knowledge 
elements and strategy type (Hult, Ketchen, Cavusgil, & Calantone, 2006); alignment 
between sourcing strategy and dynamic capabilities (Murray, Kotabe, & Westjohn, 
2009); and, (3) inter-firm fit: alignment between two or more firms (e.g. alliance firms) 
(Douma, Bilderbeek, Idenburg, & Looise, 2000). Our definition of strategic fit mimics 
the latter, being the matching between strategies and interests of the innovation owner 
and its supply chain partner (innovation receiver) (Niederkofler, 1991). This 
compatibility qualifies the establishment of a close, long-term relationship, cultivates 
trust and commitment (Bronder & Pritzl, 1992), and facilitates the implementation of 
agreements (Cool & Dierickx, 1993; Ellram, 1990). Based on the literature, strategic fit 
in a dyad constitutes three dimensions: strategic similarity, interdependence, and 
incentive alignment. 
 
3.3.1 Strategic Similarity 
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Strategic similarity refers to the consistency between the innovator’s and the 
receiver’s competitive priorities. This can be conceptualized as how closely the two 
companies rank the importance of the different competitive priorities (Krause, Handfield, 
& Scannell, 1998). Competitive priorities that are directly tied to supply chain 
performance are speed, quality, cost and flexibility
1
 (Hult et al., 2006). To the extent that 
partners value these priorities similarly, they share strategic interests, and therefore, enjoy 
a high degree of fit. 
Process innovations are implemented to serve one or more of a company’s 
competitive priorities. JIT, for instance, serves both cost and speed of production. To the 
extent that suppliers valued cost and speed similar to the exporting firm, JIT was 
propagated successfully. Aligned competitive priorities harmonize the operation of 
propagated process innovations leading to the ex ante anticipated improvement. 
Therefore, the PIP partner should be selected according to its strategic similarity with the 
innovation owner
2
: 
P3a: Strategic similarity between supply chain firms is positively related to PIP 
success   
3.3.2 Interdependence 
Fit is based on mutual dependence (Ryu, So, & Koo, 2009). This is defined as 
firms’ mutual need to maintain a relationship with each other to achieve their goals 
(Mentzer et al., 2001). Interdependence is inherent in supply chain relationships. It 
represents “a prime force in the development of supply chain solidarity” and “motivates 
willingness to negotiate functional transfer, share key information, and participate in joint 
operational planning” (John et al., 2001). In a similar way, this interdependence is the 
main driver behind the concept of propagation. It is due to the fact that companies in a 
supply chain need each other to exist and are affected by each other in their success that 
propagation can help. Interdependence exists not only due to transactions that take place 
between two companies but also due to complementarity in processes (Togar M. 
Simatupang, Wright, & Sridharan, 2002), knowledge (Roper & Crone, 2000), resources 
                                                        
 
1
 Other less common competitive priorities may include product/service technology, and environmental friendliness 
(Krause et al., 1998). 
2 This argument assumes that partner’s valuation of priorities can be assessed. Partner’s valuation, however, is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
 23 
(Swink & Nair, 2007) and assets (Teece, 1986) as well as complementarity between a 
firm’s internal and external sourcing for R&D (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006).  
Nevertheless, interdependence varies in extent. Just the way more 
interdependence drives firms’ long-term relationship orientation (Ganesan, 1994), higher 
degrees of interdependence would also motivate companies to propagate their 
innovations through their supply chains. Higher degrees of interdependence will also 
enhance the joint benefit from a propagated innovation so that how much bigger the “pie” 
gets varies with how much interrelated and interdependent firms in a supply chain are. 
The interdependence dimension of fit implies higher complementarity, which makes the 
presence of each firm critical for the other to achieve its goals (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; 
Ryu et al., 2009). 
P3b: The higher the level of interdependence between two partners, the higher 
the success of PIP. 
3.3.3 Incentive Alignment 
Incentive alignment refers to “the degree to which chain members share costs, 
risks, and benefits” and match their motives (Togar M Simatupang & Sridharan, 2005). 
The existence of “matched” motives is the third integral dimension of strategic fit 
(Nielsen, 2010). Some researchers, and even executives, assume wrongly that firms 
naturally behave in a way that maximizes their benefit as well as that of their business 
partners. Taking the example of Cisco, which Narayanan and Raman (2004) argue is the 
“rule rather than an exception”, the company had to scrap about 2.5 billion dollars worth 
of raw materials causing it to bear a loss of 2.69 billion dollars that quarter because its 
partners did not act in a way that was in its best interest or even that of the supply chain. 
Cisco had rewarded its contract manufacturers for delivering goods quickly, and those 
manufacturers could negotiate lower prices from component suppliers than Cisco could, 
making both, contractors and component makers, “have everything to gain and nothing to 
lose by building excess inventory” without worrying about Cisco’s real needs (Narayanan 
& Raman, 2004).  
Although on the surface incentives might seem to be naturally aligned and 
benefits shared, in real life conflicts happen, such as supplier divided loyalty. The more 
inventory or transportation costs incurred by one supply chain partner, the more savings it 
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can cause another. The greater a member’s share in excess supply chain profits is, the less 
another would enjoy. Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) mention two ways of classifying 
causes of conflict among supply chain members. The first classification was proposed by 
Stern and Heskett (1969) as three types of causes: “differences between members' goals 
and objectives (goal conflict), disagreements over domain of decisions and actions 
(domain conflict), and differences in perceptions of reality used in joint decision making 
(perceptual conflict)” (Togar M. Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). The second was 
proposed by Etgar (1979) as “attitudinal and structural causes of conflict” where “the 
former stems from differences in the ways chain members acquire and process 
information about their chain - such as roles, expectations, perceptions, and 
communications” and “the later reflects a clash of opposing interests such as goal 
divergence, drive for autonomy, and competition for scarce resources” (Togar M. 
Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). 
If usual supply chain relationships require a certain level of incentive alignment, 
propagation in which a company would be giving away its innovation would require even 
greater levels of incentive alignment. Narayanan and Raman (2004) suggest three ways 
for aligning incentives of supply chain members: rewriting contracts, revealing hidden 
information and developing trust.  
Contracts should be designed to make sure that members of the supply chain will 
act, as much as possible, according to the benefit of the chain as a whole, not according to 
what would maximize individual firm’s shareholders’ value. Simatupang and Sridharan 
(2002) mention three ways of aligning incentives aimed to “to personalize or internalize 
responsibility for the attainment of desired overall profitability”. Each of these can be the 
basis for designing supply chain contracts. The first incentive alignment method is based 
on productive behavior, i.e. behavior-based, where “the steps of observable actions that 
lead to a specific mutual objective, rather than the attainment of the objective itself” are 
rewarded (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). The second is performance based “which 
means setting performance metrics to evaluate supply chain members and rewarding 
them based on outcomes of the most important activities” (Simatupang & Sridharan, 
2002).  
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
 25 
The third is “equitable compensation” where “the participating parties jointly 
agree on a single set of performance measures and on a gain sharing formula universally 
perceived as equitable” (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). A successful business model 
that is based on this third incentive mechanism is what is known as the “revenue chain”, 
where members of the supply chain share profits. These contracts prevail in the 
videocassette rental industry. Blockbuster gives its studios a share of the rental fees 
instead of paying a much higher up-front price on tapes. Blockbuster can now purchase 
many more tapes, meaning more potential rentals, which when combined with the 
drastically lower cost, leads to significantly higher profits; “for the movie studio, 
increased tape sales and the added revenue stream also result in more profit” (Cachon & 
Lariviere, 2001). Given how unrealistic it is to achieve a centralized control in a supply 
chain, even though it can be argued to be much more efficient, supply chain contracts 
achieve channel coordination for supply chains with decentralized decision making, 
through increasing the total profits, sharing risks among supply chain partners and 
allowing win-win conditions for all members (Cachon & Lariviere, 2001). To the extent 
to which behaviors, performances, and revenues are aligned with a partner, PIP will 
benefit the propagator.  
In propagation, companies have to bear some costs. Costs of transferring 
knowledge and adapting and implementing a new technology can be substantial. There is 
also the risk for the innovating firm, of having its knowledge leak to one or more of its 
competitors; and the risk for the adopting firm of not succeeding in achieving gains from 
the innovation after implementing the change. Therefore, just like the general case of 
supply chain coordination, propagation requires aligning incentives through contracts to 
make sure costs, benefits and risks are fairly shared (see Figure I-1). 
P3c: The higher the level of incentive alignment between two partners, the higher 
the success of PIP. According to P3a, P3b, and P3c: 
P3d: Strategic fit between supply chain partners is positively related to PIP 
success 
3.4 Innovation Selection for PIP 
3.4.1 Vertical Transferability of Process Innovations 
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
 26 
Innovation transferability, also referred to as transparency (Hamel, 1991), is 
defined as the ease with which an innovation can be transferred from one domain, or unit 
of adoption, to another (E. B. Grant & Gregory, 1997). An innovation is transferable to 
the extent to which it lacks both specificity, and tacitness. An innovation may lie 
anywhere along a continuum that ranges from non-transferability, e.g., of physical 
resources, to full transferability, e.g., of financial resources (Cerrato, 2009). The literature 
presents contradicting arguments on the effect of an innovation’s transferability on its 
appropriability. On the one hand, transferability is paramount to intra-organizational 
transfers of knowledge among functional units, subsidiaries, and management levels 
(Hult, 2003), which helps smooth coordination and exchanges. On the other hand, 
transferability implies easy imitation by competition, undermining the innovation’s 
ability to sustain competitive advantage for its owner, and driving more need for artificial 
protection (e.g., through legal mechanisms such as patents) (Barney, 1991; R. M. Grant, 
1996).  
Although horizontal transferability (to competitors) is undesirable for 
appropriation purposes, vertical transferability (to supply chain partners), which is 
challenging to achieve (Frenz & Ietto-Gillies, 2009), helps appropriation through PIP. It 
is, therefore, important to explore how vertical transferability can help appropriate returns 
from an innovation, without loss of competitive advantage. Accordingly, we will study, 
in isolation, the effect of each of the transferability elements, namely, innovation 
specificity, and tacitness, believing that each has a distinct effect on PIP success. For PIP 
to be successful, a company needs to effectively transfer an innovation vertically, while 
precluding horizontal diffusion. 
We define innovation specificity as its boundedness to a particular domain of 
adoption (or primary adopter), and lack of applicability across multiple domains. Highly 
specific innovations would have little value beyond the boundary of their primary adopter 
(Grover & Malhotra, 2003). Innovation specificity retards transferability, and exists 
distinctively from tacitness (R. M. Grant, 1996; Helfat, 1994). Lower specificity, i.e., 
higher applicability, is desirable for an innovation to be successfully propagated to a 
supply chain firm, which employs different, though related, processes and operations 
compared to the propagator.  
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Some non-specific process innovations may be expanded in scope, as opposed to 
independently transferred, to include implementers from the supply chain, making these 
innovations systemic in nature. Systemic process innovations involve more than one firm 
in their implementation (Teece, 1986). Chesbrough and Teece (2002) make a distinction 
between these innovations and “autonomous innovations” which can be pursued 
independently. Companies have created systemic innovations whose full benefits can 
only be realized through the cooperation of other members of the chain. Vendor Managed 
Inventory, Vendor Financed Inventory and Dells’ direct sale model, mandate the 
participation of more than one member of the supply chain. Therefore, a company that 
owns such a new idea would always consider propagation and would be much more 
inclined to propagate, if it chooses to implement it. On the other hand, benefits from an 
“autonomous innovations” can be reaped without interaction with other supply chain 
members.  
P4a: The lower the specificity of the process innovation, the higher the PIP 
success 
The impact of tacitness on the effectiveness of PIP in appropriating innovation 
returns is much less clear. Companies like to embed tacit knowledge in their 
organizational structure, culture, and people, making an innovation costly to imitate by 
competition. On the other hand, PIP is an inter-firm transfer process, which occurs faster 
and more effectively with explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge can only be revealed 
through application, making its transfer costly, slow and uncertain (R. M. Grant, 1996). 
We here contend that tacitness, despite impeding the transferability of an 
innovation, positively impacts the effectiveness of PIP, only if accompanied with the 
required quality and extent of supply chain interactions. Tacitness of an innovation 
provides a natural protection against competitors absorbing spilled over knowledge, 
confining returns from a propagated innovation within the propagating chain. 
To ensure successful transfer of tacit innovation from the propagating firm to its 
partner, a high level of effective interactions must be employed. Effective interactions 
through arm’s length relationship and continuous communication with the supply chain 
partner help overcome the complexity of knowledge transfer process caused by 
knowledge tacitness. Tacit innovations can only be observed through their application (R. 
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M. Grant, 1996). Accordingly, frequent supply chain interactions in which the propagator 
demonstrates the application of an innovation help the receiver understand and 
implement the change (Wang, Tai, & Wei, 2006). The receiver can only learn a highly 
tacit innovation by “doing” and “using”, i.e., personal assimilation, which is only 
possible through co-location and co-presence (E. B. Grant & Gregory, 1997; Roberts, 
2000). 
In addition, tacit knowledge resides within individuals or “human containers” (E. 
B. Grant & Gregory, 1997; R. M. Grant, 1996). The association of tacit knowledge to 
human actors emphasizes the importance of effective interactions for achieving a 
successful exchange. Individuals are distinguished from other resources by their ability to 
learn, apply their knowledge in new domains, and make new resource combinations 
(Penrose, 1959). Interactions that are characterized by strong relational ties and high 
social capital are particularly effective in allowing human actors to learn and successfully 
implement innovations (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). This joint collaboration of 
individuals allows them to develop codes of communication and coordination that evolve 
into “dynamic routines” which are hard to imitate (Helfat, 1994). 
An example is the Japanese keiretsu-style supply relations, which involve large 
cross-firm flows of tacit knowledge. Skills, habits, and values are blended, raising the 
speed and quality of the exchange (Lincoln & Ahmadjian, 2000). The embeddedness of 
the process in vertical relationships provides significant protection against (horizontal) 
imitation. 
P4b: The higher the tacitness of the process innovation, the higher its 
inimitability and PIP success. The effect of tacitness on PIP success is moderated 
by the amount and quality of interactions between the propagator and the 
receiver. 
3.4.2 Technical and Administrative Innovations 
The distinction between technical and administrative process innovations has a 
number of significant implications on PIP. Technical process innovations pertain to the 
direct production process technology, and basic work activities, while administrative 
innovations involve organizational and managerial processes such as planning, 
controlling and coordinating functions, mainly residing in the organization’s social 
system (Damanpour & Evan, 1984; Knight, 1967). Adoptions of the two types are 
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influenced by different sets of variables, which suggests considering this classification 
when constructing innovation related theories (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981). According 
to the organizational lag model (Evan, 1966), a discrepancy exists within organizations 
between the rates of adoption of technical and administrative innovations (Damanpour & 
Evan, 1984). This “lag” may be explained by the general, possibly faulty, perception that 
technical innovations are relatively more advantageous than administrative innovations, 
with the latter being more complex (Damanpour & Evan, 1984). 
Technical innovations tend to be propagated through supply chains based on 
expert power, and administrative ones based on market power. On the one hand, 
specialization of tasks coupled with deeper expertise motivates the development of 
technical innovations (Damanpour, 1987). Firms that are highly specialized possess 
technical knowledge that can be translated into relevant innovations, which will be 
propagated based on receiver’s perception of propagator’s expertise and superiority in the 
relevant area.  
On the other hand, chain integrators, which enjoy market power advantage, focus 
more on administrative innovations for coordinating the chain. These firms are “low 
professional districts, which have tighter coupling and a dominant administrative core” 
(Daft, 1978). Integrators are better off initiating administrative innovations since they 
come from the relevant (coordination and management) task domain (Zmud, 1982). 
Placing a primary focus on administrative innovations, integrators perceive more direct 
and pronounced benefit from propagating administrative innovations compared to 
technical ones (D. Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone, 2006). These innovations are difficult if 
not impossible to protect by patent, making PIP a sound appropriation mechanism 
(Teece, 1980). Examples include JIT and TQM, which have been initiated by chain 
integrators and propagated for an overall chain performance (J. Cooper, 1998). 
Companies are further motivated to propagate these innovations, as they observe a 
substantial administrative inertia suffered by smaller sized companies, signaling a 
potential for supply chain improvement. 
Furthermore, administrative innovations prosper within a formal, centralized, 
mechanistic environment, which tends to be the one for larger powerful firms, while 
technical innovations appear more in de-centralized, organic environments, which mostly 
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characterize smaller firms with lower market power (J. Cooper, 1998). Formal exercise, 
enabled by propagator’s market power advantage, provides the mechanistic governance 
structure which helps reinforce receiver’s implementation of administrative innovations 
(Damanpour, 1991). 
The orientation of a chain’s integrator towards administrative innovations may 
prevent a required balance of the two innovation types. Based on Evan’s theory (1966) 
and Daft’s (1978) refinement on technical innovations trickling down an organizational 
hierarchy and technical ones trickling up, we similarly expect administrative innovations 
to be propagated upstream (from more powerful buyers) and technical innovations to be 
propagated downstream (from knowledgeable and specialized suppliers). Given that 
administrative innovations often affect the technical core, innovators that are active in 
propagating administrative innovations may trigger technical innovations upstream a 
chain, rippling the effect both ways. More specifically, integrators with a network 
orientation focusing on the overall performance of the chain would propagate managerial 
systems enabling the development and propagation of technical innovations elsewhere 
along the chain (Figure I-2). This builds on the dual core model’s assertion that adoption 
of administrative innovations tends to trigger the adoption of subsequent technical 
innovations more readily than the reverse (Daft, 1978). Propagating administrative 
innovations upstream may motivate smaller suppliers to innovate more in technical areas 
where they specialize. This can maximize the ripple effect by having each of the two 
types of innovations originate at both ends of the chain and propagate accordingly, 
especially given the synergetic interaction and total effect on performance (Han, 
Namwoon, & Srivastava, 1998). 
P4c: Technical innovations are propagated downstream through expert power, 
and administrative innovations are propagated upstream through market power. 
P4d: Maintaining a balance between propagating technical and administrative 
innovations leads to a superior supply chain performance 
3.5 PIP and Governance Structure 
3.5.1 Governance Formality  
Supply chain governance is the mechanism through which a buyer-supplier 
interaction is coordinated. There are generally two types of governance: formal 
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(contractual) governance and informal (relational) governance. Formal contracts are used 
to specify parties’ promises, obligations, actions, or even resolution process in cases of 
dispute (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). They hold each of the parties involved legally 
responsible for carrying out the terms specified. Alternatively, governance can emerge 
naturally from the values and casually agreed-upon processes found in social 
relationships (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
An argument exists in the literature as to whether the two governance mechanisms 
are substitutes or complements (Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). Since 
this debate is beyond the scope of this paper, we will adopt a moderate view that allows 
both to co-exist in a dyadic relationship and assumes that each transaction is dominated 
by one or the other. Accordingly, governance formality is the extent to which a buyer-
supplier PIP interaction is dominated by formal contracts as opposed to informal 
arrangements (Stock, Greis, & Kasarda, 2000).  
The effectiveness of governance formality in PIP success depends on the 
radicalness of the innovation, as well as the type of power driving the process (Figure I-
3). Formal governance is effective when propagating incremental innovations. 
Incremental innovations require a structured approach and clear roadmap for explicating 
the exact process and structure to follow (Ettlie, Bridges, & O'Keefe, 1984). In this case, 
formal contracts act as a more efficient coordination mechanism that provides clearly 
specified guidelines and detailed procedures associated with incremental innovations 
(Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). Incremental innovations involve a low degree of 
uncertainty to which formal governance mechanisms have proved more effective 
(Wathne & Heide, 2004). Moreover, incremental innovations primarily depend on 
organizational knowledge and traditional structural arrangements (Ettlie et al., 1984). 
Accordingly, contracts can better explicate terms regarding this type of knowledge, 
which is associated with documentation, procedures and well-established systems. 
Formal contracts are particularly effective at handling “organizational role 
responsibilities” (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002). 
The situation is, however, reversed in the case of radical innovations. Radical 
innovations require flexibility, which is absent in formal governance structures, but 
readily allowed in relational governance (Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, & Simpson, 1992; 
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Noordewier, John, & Nevin, 1990). They entail a substantial level of environmental, 
technological, and outcome uncertainty, with which formal governance fails (Germain, 
1996; Leifer, O'Connor, & Rice, 2001; Sorescu, Chandy, & Prabhu, 2003). Dyadic 
relationships characterized by uncertain conditions require the employment of 
governance structures that allow for flexible adaptation to changing circumstances 
(Wathne & Heide, 2004). These changing circumstances necessitate responsiveness, 
which is readily enabled by relational governance as it is easily modified and adapted 
(Hoyt & Huq, 2000; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Radical innovations primarily depend on the human factor (human knowledge) 
(Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). Projects involving heavy human interactions are better 
coordinated by relational governance as it provides the flexibility, participation and 
solidarity required in human interactions (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). Radical 
innovations may require more adjustments when propagated to a different company. 
Adjustments require more human capital input, i.e., interaction, less specification in 
contracts, and therefore, more reliance on relational governance. Formal contracts will 
tend to limit the amount of knowledge that people contribute as they will tend to provide 
the minimum specified by the contract as opposed to invest more had the governance 
been informal, as reliance on contracts can “discourage either party to move beyond 
contracts” (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002). We, therefore, assert that: 
P5a: Formal governance is more effective compared to informal when 
propagating incremental process innovations 
P5b: Informal governance is more effective compared to formal when 
propagating radical process innovations 
As discussed in section 3.1, innovations are propagated based on either market or 
expert power. Innovations propagated based on expertise depend more on the human 
factor, and involve a high degree of uncertainty, technicality, and adaptation, which is 
best dealt with through flexible governance structures (i.e., relational). To successfully 
transfer human knowledge, these changes would require more joint involvement by 
members, which is more effective on relational bases, where individuals get to frequently 
interact, discuss, and coordinate efforts, adapting changes to the adopting unit. On the 
other hand, innovations propagated based on market power involve higher degree of 
coercion (e.g., threat of punishment to withhold business from non complying partners), 
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which encompasses formal exercise. When the propagator chooses to take advantage of 
market power, it resorts to contracts to fully specify terms of compliance and 
consequences of non-compliance, relying more on contractual means for getting the 
partner to conform. 
P5c: Relational governance is more effective than formal governance for PIP 
driven by expert power  
P5d: Formal governance is more effective than relational governance for PIP 
driven by market power 
3.5.2 Management Attitude 
Management innovation attitude refers to the extent to which managers favor 
change, are open to novel experiences and stimuli, and readily recognize the potential in 
new ideas (Damanpour, 1991; Pennings & Smidts, 2000). Management attitude has been 
established as a main determinant of innovation adoption and success, specifically 
process innovations (Zmud, 1982), and a function of management team’s ages, diversity, 
educational backgrounds, and risk aversion (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Gupta, Raj, & 
Wilemon, 1986). This human component of organizations determines independent 
innovation strategies and adoption decisions (Pierce & Delbecq, 1977; Rosenbloom & 
Abernathy, 1982). Employees with attitude favoring innovation adoption will implement 
innovations merely by being offered the knowledge, while those with attitudes resisting 
change require a directive from a powerful source before adopting (Leonard-Barton & 
Deschamps, 1988). These arguments have significant implications for propagations based 
on expert and market power. 
In cases of propagation based on expert power, managers with positive attitudes 
toward change will value the knowledge offered from a propagator and will tend to 
readily accept new ideas (Zhou, Gao, Yang, & Zhou, 2005). Propagation in this case is 
based on the perception of the superior knowledge abilities of the innovation owner, and 
orientation to keep up with a higher innovative performance. A strong orientation to 
change coupled with managerial support is particularly important during instances of 
knowledge exchanges involving high degree of human interaction for effective 
coordination and conflict resolution among individuals (Damanpour, 1991).  
In the case of propagation based on market power, however, managers are driven 
to acceptance based on willingness to maintain business with a highly powerful player, as 
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opposed to a self-motivated approach to preserve an innovative stance. In this case, 
regardless of the managerial attitude, managers will accept the innovation coming from a 
powerful partner. Supply chain market power corresponds to centralization of control, in 
a single organizational setting, in moderating the relation between managerial attitude 
and adoption. This centralization of power, equivalently control, “accelerates” the 
positive impact of managerial attitude on process innovation adoption (Dewar & Dutton, 
1986). 
P5e: Managerial attitude of the receiving firm affects the effectiveness of PIP 
driven by expert power more than that driven by market power 
Table I-2 illustrates elements of PIP through an example of McDonald’s 
corporation. 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper introduces the concept of Process Innovation Propagation (PIP) as a 
power-based appropriation mechanism that departs from conventional strategies of 
innovation appropriation. PIP is defined as collecting returns from process innovations 
through passing them over to supply chain partners. The transfer process is based on two 
sources of power: market and expert, and is novel in: (1) suggesting external 
appropriation through using other firms as opposed to solely depending on internal 
capabilities; (2) challenging the preclusive component of generative appropriability; and, 
(3) indirectly collecting innovation rents through operational benefits and market image. 
Acknowledging its significant potential as a profit-enhancing mechanism, PIP is 
distinguished as a new construct, and propositions regarding its elements and antecedents 
are developed based on a thorough analysis and synthesis of the literature. 
Appropriation through PIP is particularly important given the rising 
acknowledgement of supply chains as the new units of competition, failure of traditional 
formal appropriation mechanisms with process innovations, the increasing trend towards 
dis-integrated structures of supply chains, and reliance on supply chain partners in 
strategic endeavors including innovation. PIP is an appropriation mechanism that highly 
enhances profitability of firms through collecting rents on costly and valuable 
innovations and ideas. This is accomplished by capitalizing on the potential of supply 
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chain partners as units of adoption that can re-apply existing process innovations. The 
propagator incentivizes new units of adoption through its power advantage(s), and gains 
an improved operational performance of the supply chain and/ or enhanced market 
image. 
We develop propositions based on a thorough review, analysis and synthesis of 
the literature regarding elements of propagation, namely, partner selection, innovation 
selection, and governance structure that maximize appropriation through PIP. We assert 
that the highest potential arises from partners that employ a strategic fit with the 
propagating company (innovation owner). This departs from conventional literature on 
supplier selection based on its innovation properties, to selection based on potential from 
joint work and sharing of innovations. Partners must be selected based on similarities of 
their strategic priorities with the focal firm, total interdependence and incentive 
alignment.  
Properties of an innovation also have direct implications on selecting the right 
process change to propagate. Innovations characterized by high degree of transferability 
might not necessarily be effective in appropriating returns through PIP. Companies 
should pay more attention to specific elements of transferability, namely specificity and 
tacitness, realizing that although both contribute similarly to transferability, we argue that 
tacitness helps PIP appropriation while specificity hurts it. Moreover, the theory 
presented herein explains the observed bias toward propagating administrative 
innovations over technical ones, in attempt to promote a balance of both types for a 
superior supply chain performance. Integrators must therefore pay more attention to the 
diffusion of technical innovations from smaller, more knowledgeable suppliers, possibly 
by propagating the right administrative (managerial) innovations that can put a technical 
innovation process in place. 
Finally, we also address the proper governance elements for effective PIP 
depending on the radicalness of innovation as well as the driving power source. More 
specifically, we argue that the higher the radicalness of the innovation, the higher the 
effectiveness of relational governance over formal one. This also implies that more 
radical innovations employing a high degree of knowledge, i.e., expert driven, are better 
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governed informally, while incremental innovations with less uncertainty can be formally 
governed. 
This research can be extended along several dimensions. Firstly, a theory could be 
constructed for propagating product innovations. Product innovations require a different 
treatment in a supply chain context where the innovator will demand newly innovated 
component parts or downstream manufactured goods for its product innovation. The 
theory could also be explored from the perspective of the receiving company, i.e. 
investigating the factors that affect acceptance of a propagation request from one’s supply 
chain member. Moreover, several external and contextual factors can be studied, given 
that knowledge transfer is greatly affected by such factors as the business environment, 
product market conditions, cultural issues and organizational distance. The (quite 
common) case of symmetric power in propagation can also be examined. Studies can 
examine how propagation can occur in balanced power relationships. Finally, both theory 
expansion to a network level of analysis (considering a triad or more of exchanges) and 
contraction to a fully integrated supply chain (intra-organizational flows) are fruitful for 
further research.  
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5. TABLES 
Table I-1 
Distinguishing PIP from Other constructs 
Criterion PIP Supplier Development Innovation Diffusion Joint R&D
3
 
Definition Appropriating returns from process 
innovations through passing them over 
to supply chain partners. 
Any activity initiated by a buying 
organization to improve the 
performance of its suppliers 
Adoption of an innovation that is 
out there by individuals in the 
relevant population 
Collaboration between two or more 
firms, horizontal or vertical, to develop 
an innovation that has not existed before 
Directionality Giver (owner) and taker (receiver) 
Giver is defined as the first firm to 
adopt an innovation in the chain, may 
or may not have developed it 
Giver and taker 
Giver is defined as the resource 
owner 
Only receiver to an existing 
innovation 
Non-directional: no source or destination, 
but a collaborative, joint work 
Main driver Giver’s power: persuades successful 
transfer and adoption 
Taker’s power (giver’s dependence 
on taker): persuades giver’s 
investments; otherwise supplier may 
be replaced 
Environmental change including 
pace of technological change and 
strength of competition 
Complementarity of knowledge, mutual 
dependence, high development costs and 
risks 
Motivation Desire to improve supply chain 
performance 
Desire to improve supplier’s 
performance 
Desire to improve own 
performance 
Desire to spread costs and risks of the 
innovation development 
Initiation/ initial 
development of 
innovation 
At the supply chain giver (innovation 
owner) 
At the supply chain receiver; change 
specific to supplier, more than likely 
developed there 
Could be anywhere outside the 
chain, market, or industry 
Joint initiation by two firms (in a chain in 
the case of vertical R&D) 
Management 
Attitude 
Not necessarily needed as the process 
may be driven by market power 
Not relevant as innovation may be in 
solution to problem 
Required: management must 
place emphasis on innovation 
Required: management must place 
emphasis on innovation 
Approach Proactive by giver Mostly reactive, in response to 
supplier problems 
Proactive by Receiver Proactive by both firms 
Activity Expanding the scope of an innovation 
across the supply chain 
Includes initiatives such as 
evaluation/ auditing/ problem solving 
Customizing an innovation that 
may be out of the whole industry 
Creating a new innovation, usually new 
to the world 
Intellectual 
Property 
Not important as the process is based 
on sharing 
Not relevant as IP may not be 
involved 
IP preserved to innovation’s first 
developer 
IP is shared among developers 
Aim Appropriating value from an innovation Improving performance of a (usually 
mis-performing) supplier 
Keep up to environmental 
changes 
Creating an innovation 
                                                        
 
3 Note that joint R&D includes supplier integration/ involvement in new product development (NPD) as the former encompasses any active participation in innovation 
development, while not necessarily implying that both partners derive immediate commercial benefits from the venture (Tether, 2002). This process is also referred to as co-
development, co-creation, and innovation cooperation (Fliess & Becker, 2006) 
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
 38 
Table I-2  
An Illustration of PIP Elements: The Case of McDonald's
4
 
PIP Element PIP Element Illustration Biodiesel Process Innovation 
Drive Expert-Power 
Driven 
Suppliers provide ideas on technical issues such as the baking 
process for sandwich buns based on their expertise 
McDonald’s receives the Biodiesel innovation persuaded by the expert 
power of Neutral Group in the oil conversion process. It them propagated 
the innovation to its supplier (upstream), e.g. Del Monte Foods, helped 
by its size and market power. 
Market-Power 
Driven 
McDonald’s propagates new process ideas based on its size 
and market power to make sure there is a consistency of taste, 
quality and process nationally and internationally. Different 
suppliers accept in attempt to keep business with 
McDonald’s. 
Appropriation Operational 
Benefits 
McDonald’s perceives a win-win situation from propagation. 
Suppliers enjoy operational benefits from innovations such as 
green building design that reduces power consumption. 
Savings that flow to suppliers’ bottom line allow McDonald’s 
to negotiate price reductions. 
Used cooking oil has now an extra value as an input to the conversion 
process. The more conversion, the more value for McDonald’s scrap oil. 
Enhanced 
Reputation 
McDonald’s has been very successful in promoting and 
establishing a green image for both operating on green 
standards and dealing with green suppliers.  
Biodiesel translates into less oil scrapped, as well as 80% reduction in 
carbon dioxide emission ("McDonald’s UAE Gives Cooking Oil 2nd Life 
as Biodiesel," 2013), giving McDonald’s a responsible and sustainable 
image that increases with every supplier using the process. 
Partner 
strategic fit 
Strategic 
Similarity 
McDonald’s propagates to suppliers with years of 
partnerships, some exceeding 50 years. The company shares 
with these suppliers the same values, plans, objectives, and 
visions. Companies even share planning meeting and perform 
together their quarter reviews. 
Del Monte Foods is a McDonald’s “long-time partner and supplier” for 
years ("McDonald’s UAE Gives Cooking Oil 2nd Life as Biodiesel," 
2013). In addition to a vast amount of business between the two 
companies, they also share similar sustainable strategies, with 
McDonald’s well-established "Global Best Practices" in Sustainable 
Supply and Green Initiatives ("Best Practices: About McDonalds.com," 
2014), and Del Monte’s formalized sustainable goals ("Del Monte Foods 
formalizes environmental sustainability goals," 2010). 
Interdependence Innovation partners share a high degree of interdependence 
with McDonald’s which spends more than $30 billion dollars 
on its supply chain, 80 % of which are with 16 multinational 
partners, making interdependence very strong. 
Incentive 
Alignment 
Although McDonald’s suppliers deal with competition, the 
company works on being the preferred partner to those with 
whom ideas are shared, to ensure that incentives are aligned. 
 
 
                                                        
 
4 The information in this table was compiled based on interviews with Rob Dick, Senior Director, National Supply Chain at McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Limited; and Ala 
Mohammad, Senior Director Supply Chain & Quality Systems Management at McDonald's Asia Pacific Middle East & Africa. 
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Table I-2 (continued)  
An Illustration of PIP Elements: The Case of McDonald’s 
Innovation 
Properties 
Vertical 
transferability 
McDonald’s depends on vertical transferability to roll out 
ideas to different suppliers and standardize processes. 
These include green building design, green trucks, 
loading/ unloading dock design, which are all readily 
implementable across different businesses. 
Being a transportation innovation, the Biodiesel employs a great deal 
of transferability, facilitating its propagation. 
Technicality of 
Innovation 
McDonald’s propagates management innovations such as 
teaching suppliers succession plans, how to build lead 
managers, innovation management process (e.g. how to 
conduct ideation sessions) 
Technical ideas originate from suppliers who have the 
expertise on issues such as: baking process, packaging, 
food storage, … etc. 
Biodiesel relates to a support activity of transportation, as opposed to 
being part of the core production process. It was therefore, propagated 
successfully upstream to McDonald’s suppliers. 
Governance 
structure 
Formality Most changes require a substantial degree of adaptation, 
and therefore little documentation is used, making 
innovation interaction more informal. Suppliers do expect 
to keep secrets and confidentiality based on McDonald’s 
market power, and willingness for repeated business. 
Seeing Biodiesel as a “groundbreaking initiative” ("McDonald’s UAE 
Gives Cooking Oil 2nd Life as Biodiesel," 2013), McDonald’s has 
collaborated with Del Monte Foods in a very friendly, relational 
manner, taking the process transformation gradually and relying on 
encouragement and convincing in contrast to detailed contracts. 
Managerial 
attitude 
McDonald’s maintains innovation transactions with 
suppliers of innovative attitude 
McDonald’s propagated the Biodiesel innovation to Del Monte, which 
is a food industry leader in innovative processing, distribution, and 
marketing practices ("Del Monte Foods Turns to Dog Owners to 
Unleash Innovation," 2008). 
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6. FIGURES 
Figure I-1 
The Effect of Partner Selection on PIP Success 
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Figure I-2 
The Effect of Innovation Selection on PIP Success 
 
  
PROCESS INNOVATION PROPAGATION  EMAN NASR 
 42 
Figure I-3 
The effect of Governance Structure on PIP Success 
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CHAPTER II.  Characterizing Intellectual Capital Properties 
that Drive Innovativeness of Supply Chains With Power 
Differences 
ABSTRACT 
How can supply chain firms’ knowledge be combined to maximize their abilities 
to produce radical and incremental innovations? This paper attempts to answer this 
question by formulating properties of knowledge that are most relevant to radical and 
incremental innovative capabilities. We use an intellectual capital lens, classifying 
knowledge into human, organizational, and social, to create hierarchical component 
models that portray characteristics of each knowledge type on the level of a supply chain 
dyad. Hypotheses are developed and tested using a survey, which is administered to a 
population of supply chain managers in Canada. The paper provides several significant 
insights, advising managers regarding partner selection, team composition, and 
governance mechanisms. It also contributes by presenting novel ways for data collection, 
and a two-stage analysis technique using PLS.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After establishing the knowledge-innovation link within firms (Cassiman & 
Veugelers, 2006; Peri, 2005), researchers have gone a step further to explore types of 
knowledge that have particular relevance to each type of innovative capabilities. 
Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) establish the associations between human capital and 
radical innovative capability; and between organizational capital and incremental 
innovative capability. Nevertheless, with a vastly growing recognition of buyer-supplier 
interaction as a necessity for innovation generation (Roy, Sivakumar, & Wilkinson, 
2004), the extension of firm-level knowledge-innovation theories to the supply chain 
level of analysis still lags behind (Hult, Ketchen, Cavusgil, & Calantone, 2006). 
Accordingly, we present and empirically test a knowledge-innovation theory for the 
supply chain, taking into consideration the most pronounced governor of the exchange 
relationship, that is, buyer-supplier power differences.  
Little is known about the intangible success factors of supply chain innovation, 
such as knowledge resources (Craighead, Hult, & Ketchen, 2009; Hult et al., 2006). 
Witnessing below-expected outcomes from joint innovation projects, companies strive 
for a sustainable solution to the problem by taking a capability-building perspective and 
cultivating joint innovative capabilities with supply chain partners. It, therefore, becomes 
imperative to determine firms’ knowledge properties that lead to more effective supply 
chain innovative capabilities, both radical and incremental. By presenting and testing 
hypotheses regarding chains’ knowledge properties and innovative capabilities, we 
attempt to fill the scarcity in the literature on this important subject, as well as answer 
calls about using the supply chain as the new unit of analysis (Capaldo, 2007; 
Christopher & Ryals, 1999; Harvey, 2000; Sharifi, Ismail, & Reid, 2006; Straub, Rai, & 
Klein, 2004), and the actual level where resources and capabilities reside (Barney & 
Mackey, 2005; Gulati, 1999; Ketchen & Hult, 2007). 
Intellectual capital encompasses knowledge that is valuable and useful for a firm
5
 
(Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996). In a supply chain context, it has been defined as “credible 
information and/or experience, held by individuals and/or residing in the infrastructure of 
                                                        
 
5 Based on this definition, and as is custom in the literature, knowledge and intellectual capital terms will be used 
interchangeably (Bontis, 1998, 1999; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Stewart & Ruckdeschel, 1998). 
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the firm, which can be converted into supply chain value” (Craighead et al., 2009). In 
pursuing our objectives, we follow Subramaniam and Youndt’s (2005) intellectual capital 
lens, building on the prominent taxonomy that classifies intellectual capital into human, 
organizational, and social to devise our hypotheses.  
This study aims to characterize properties of each intellectual capital element 
required by supply chain firms to achieve high radical and incremental innovative 
capabilities. We introduce three characterizations for intellectual capital elements, 
namely: dominant organizational capital, human capital related diversity and social 
capital valuation, as properties that affect supply chain innovative capabilities. The 
former two are argued to direct incremental and radical innovative capabilities in supply 
chains, respectively. Building on the reciprocity rule borrowed from the social exchange 
theory (Blau, 1964), we further argue that social capital valuation drives both capabilities 
in supply chains.  
Being a focal element of interdependent supply chain relationships (Dapiran & 
Hogarath-Scott, 2003), inter-firm power complicates the effect of human and 
organizational capital elements on innovative capabilities. The pronounced effect of 
power exercise has ranged from driving suppliers to invest billions of dollars in 
innovations (Schrage, 2002) to drive supplier bankruptcy from failure to comply with 
innovation directives (Brown, Gabrielsen, & Pope, 2003; Turnbull, Oliver, & Wilkinson, 
1992). This highlights a huge disparity in the innovation outcomes from exercising power 
with partners.  
Driven by its Extended Enterprise, Chrysler has achieved considerable success 
through its Supplier Cost Reduction Effort (SCORE) program to drive mutually 
beneficial cost reduction and product improvements (Maloni & Benton, 2000). On the 
other hand, Wal-Mart threatens its suppliers to pull its orders from them if they do not 
meet its standards (Aston, 2009). It remains unclear why the two opposing strategies have 
worked successfully in these two cases. Nevertheless, GM exploits its power against its 
suppliers similar to Wal-Mart, dictating nonnegotiable cost reductions to suppliers 
(Maloni & Benton, 2000). Yet, many argue that the benefits were overshadowed by 
supplier resentment and a lack of synergistic improvement (Maloni & Benton, 2000), 
questioning success of the movement. 
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Accordingly, two seemingly contradictory hypotheses are examined: (1) power 
exercise helps because it drives propagation of existing technologies through the supply 
chain and, (2) power exercise hurts because it suppresses the creative abilities of less 
powerful chain members. We administer a survey to a population of purchasing managers 
in Canada using multiple novel data collection techniques, and test our model using PLS, 
which is the recommended approach for formative hierarchical component models.  
This chapter is arranged as follows. The next section will review the relevant 
literature highlighting gaps, which this chapter attempts to fill. In section 3 hypotheses 
are developed and the proposed model is presented. Section 4 will explain the survey 
methodology used including population, sample and instruments used. Sections 5 and 6 
offer the results and their discussion, respectively, followed by conclusions in section 7. 
Finally limitations and future research directions are given in sections 8 and 9, 
respectively. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Intellectual Capital and Innovative Capabilities 
2.1.1 Intra-firm Intellectual Capital 
After Sveiby’s work on “Knowledge-based” assets ("The Know-how company", 
1986, "The New Annual Report", 1988, and "The Invisible Balance Sheet", 1989), Tom 
Stewart initiated the term Intellectual Capital as the real “New Wealth of Organizations” 
(Stewart, 1991; Sveiby, 1997). Intellectual Capital (IC) is a highly strategic, intangible 
asset that companies increasingly create and nurture. It has been defined in several ways 
throughout the literature, notably as “knowledge that can be converted into value” 
(Edvinsson & Sullivan, 1996), “the sum of all knowledge firms utilize for competitive 
advantage” (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), and, “the sum total of the useful knowledge 
of an organization's employees and customers” (The human resources glossary : the 
complete desk reference for HR executives, managers and practitioners, 1998). 
Financially, it is sometimes regarded as the difference between book value and market 
value ("A Viking with a Compass," 1998).  
IC is, in fact, a major source of competitive advantage and a distinguishing 
feature among firms (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Ulrich (1998) gives six reasons for the 
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criticality of firms’ IC; most importantly, being a firm’s only appreciable asset that is 
receiving a mis-focused treatment from managers and is sometimes even ignored. IC is 
rapidly becoming a very important measure of the company's future performance (Roos 
& Roos, 1997). It is more strategic in firms and industries for which innovation is 
particularly important. 
One common view classifies IC into: Human Capital (HC), Organizational 
Capital (OC), also referred to as structural capital, and Social Capital (SC), also referred 
to as relational capital. HC constitutes individuals’ abilities, skills and other knowledge, 
which they can utilize in attaining the firm’s objectives (Schultz, 1961). OC is defined as 
knowledge owned by organizations residing within its documents, structures and systems, 
independent from individuals (Albino, Garavelli, & Schiuma, 1998; Youndt, 
Subramaniam, & Snell, 2004). Lastly, SC is the goodwill that is engendered in the 
structure and content of relations among individuals, including trust, cooperative norms, 
and associations within groups (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Knack & Keefer, 1997).  
This classification is particularly significant within the context of innovation as 
each of the three types differently affects radical and incremental innovative capabilities 
in organizations. The former capability is defined as the firm’s ability to develop changes 
that can be considered as fundamental and revolutionary (Dewar & Dutton, 1986), while 
the latter represents a firm’s ability to produce simple improvements and adjustments to 
current products or processes (Dewar & Dutton, 1986).  
A link has been established in the literature on the particular (positive) association 
between HC and radical innovative capabilities, and between OC and incremental 
innovative capabilities in firms (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). Firms institutionalize 
their knowledge in the form of OC to be extended, deepened and strengthened, for 
example by making improvements and developing related patents (Martin & Mitchell, 
1998; Stuart & Podolny, 1996; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). On the other hand, 
creativity, brightness and the ability to question prevailing norms come from employees’ 
constituting a company’s HC (Snell & Dean Jr, 1992; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Relational capital, however, has been found to facilitate the 
two aforementioned links by providing relationships and networks that improve the 
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leverage of codified knowledge, encourage more sharing of knowledge, and enable more 
acceptance for radical changes (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005).  
2.1.2 Inter-firm Intellectual Capital 
Contending that supply chains are the new units of competition (Capaldo, 2007; 
Christopher & Ryals, 1999; Harvey, 2000; Ketchen & Hult, 2007; Sharifi et al., 2006; 
Straub et al., 2004), it becomes imperative to consider the effective combination of IC 
elements of supply chain teams. Buyers and suppliers that individually possess human, 
organizational and social capital may not witness the expected success when 
collaborating on joint innovation projects (Devaraj, Krajewski, & Wei, 2007). This 
implies that it is not the mere existence of knowledge that can make inter-firm teams 
more effective, but it is the properties of the teams’ knowledge that drive innovation 
outcomes. Outcomes falling below expectations may be attributed to knowledge 
properties, such as overlap and redundancy, conflicting cultures and norms or from an 
undesirable level of differences in knowledge stocks. Accordingly, we need to investigate 
properties of knowledge that allow buyers and suppliers to innovate effectively. 
On the one hand, access to valuable complementary knowledge is one of the most 
cited incentives for companies to work jointly. The fact that synergies arise from 
complementarity in resources is well grounded in the Economic Theory of 
Complementarities (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). Knowledge complementarity is “that 
which occurs when two firms have non-overlapping or different knowledge bases that 
might be combined and integrated to create value that did not exist in either firm before” 
(Fang, 2011). Similarly, complementary IC is “related but not the same” and is highly 
synergetic (Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005). The importance of complementarity of 
resources (including IC) for synergy creation is highly recognized in literature streams on 
acquisitions and alliances (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001). An underlying 
notion is that of super-modularity in which the “whole is more than the sum of its parts” 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). This literature stream argues that lack of complementarity 
implies knowledge overlap and redundancy (Fang, 2011). 
An opposing argument, however, calls for knowledge overlap as a requirement 
for effective communication and exchange of knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Firms with similar knowledge bases find it cognitively easier to absorb and utilize each 
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other’s knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Complementarity makes it even more 
challenging to combine and integrate knowledge sets (Harrison et al., 2001). In some 
cases, complementarity could even motivate partners to create barriers preventing their 
knowledge from being transferred and hindering innovation (Larsson, Bengtsson, 
Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998). Empirically, technological overlap is found to be a 
significant criterion in alliance partner selection decision (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 
1998). Knowledge relatedness among firms is argued to be positively associated with 
knowledge acquisition and transfer (Inkpen, 2000; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Von-Hippel, 
1994). 
In this paper, we argue that distinguishing between organizational and human 
knowledge helps resolve the opposing streams on similarity/ complementarity of 
knowledge. More specifically, similarity of OC is key to provide a homogenous, 
dominant pool of knowledge to build on for incremental innovations. However, in the 
case of HC, breadth and diversity of knowledge is required to reach out for radical 
innovations, in which case complementarity is needed. 
2.1.3 Reciprocity and Social Capital Valuation 
Within a firm, social capital facilitates the translation of each of organizational 
and human capital into innovative capabilities (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). This, 
however, may not be attainable across firms’ boundaries, namely in buyer supplier 
innovation endeavors. Firms may resist being carried away by the relational ties, fearing 
opportunistic partners who may exploit “good partners” through skill acquisition (Hamel, 
1991), excessive spillovers to competition (J. Dyer, Cho, & Chu, 1998), and even by 
becoming direct competitors (Arruñada & Vázquez, 2006). These actions present a major 
threat of losing competitive advantage as soon as knowledge crosses a firm’s own 
boundaries. This risk is known as the “relational risk”, defined as the probability that the 
partner does not comply with the spirit of cooperation and acts opportunistically in 
misusing the acquired knowledge (Das & Teng, 1998). 
The social resolution to this “boundary paradox” (Quintas, Lefrere, & Jones, 
1997) is addressed by the Social Exchange Theory’s most common exchange rule, 
reciprocity. Firms may readily provide knowledge and act in kind for the immediate 
benefit of a partner, only in expectation to be reciprocated fairly (Molm, 1994). 
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Reciprocation is a direct consequence of high valuation of social capital, as companies 
place more emphasis on the mutual valuation of the relationship than risks of losing 
competitive knowledge. 
Reciprocity, also known as Norms of Reciprocity, depends on two interrelated 
minimal rules: (1) individuals should assist those who have assisted them; and (2) 
individuals should not injure/deprive those who have assisted them (Gouldner, 1960). In 
our context, this means that a good act of being open in sharing competitive knowledge is 
met by (1) partner’s openness in knowledge sharing; and, (2) partner refraining from 
knowledge abuse by intended spillover to competition. “Reciprocal exchange” is a 
process of "gift-giving" (Molm, 2003). Reciprocation is the only way for ready 
knowledge sharing and is only allowed because of social capital valuation. Accordingly, 
even though the interdependence reduces risk and encourages cooperation (Molm, 1994), 
great uncertainties that surround outcomes of knowledge exchanges are only addressed 
by social capital valuation based on norms of reciprocity (Cook & Rice, 2006).  
To sum up, reciprocity norms suggest that companies do not act solely on the 
basis of traditional economic factors, but they may in fact place economic valuation on 
social factors including repeated exchanges, future obligations and the belief that each 
party will fulfill its obligations (Zhao, Huo, Flynn, & Yeung, 2008). In this paper, we 
develop this claim to investigate the effect of social capital valuation on a supply chain’s 
innovative capabilities.  
2.2. Inter-firm Power 
2.2.1 Background on Inter-firm Power 
Power existence is defined as a potential influence, or the capacity to affect 
actions of another unit (Emerson, 1962; Fidler & Johnson, 1984). Supply Chain power is, 
therefore, the ability of a partner to induce another to do what it would otherwise not do 
(Dapiran & Hogarath-Scott, 2003; Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981). Being a potential 
influence, power does exist even if not observed (Emerson, 1962). Kim (2000), for 
instance, distinguishes between inter-firm power structure and the actual use of influence 
strategies. Supply chain exchanges, including joint innovation projects, are based on 
interdependence among partners, which may entail asymmetric power that interferes with 
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the effectiveness of outcomes. Power is an element of any relationship (Dapiran & 
Hogarath-Scott, 2003) and is, therefore, worth studying in a supply chain context.  
Even though power can take different forms and can have several bases (French 
& Raven, 1968), the exercised/ unexercised classification (referred to as mediated/ non-
mediated) is the most common in the literature that has gained consistent empirical 
support (Ke, Liu, Wei, Gu, & Chen, 2009). Exercised power, namely reward, coercive, 
and legal, involves the actual influence that a source applies on a target. The three 
different manifestations of power observed among firms are: (1) reward power involving 
provision or promise of rewards, (2) coercive power involving provision or threat of 
punishments, and, (3) legal power involving resorting to contractual agreements (Benton 
& Maloni, 2005; Fidler & Johnson, 1984; Ke et al., 2009; Maloni & Benton, 2000). This 
exercised/ unexercised classification is regarded as the most appropriate dichotomization 
specifically for a supply chain environment (Benton & Maloni, 2005).  
The primary source that gives a firm power advantage over its partner is 
interdependence asymmetry. Channel members are inherently dependent on each other. 
Asymmetry occurs, however, when there is a discrepancy between each firm’s 
dependence on its partner.  Dependence is the extent to which it is necessary for a firm to 
maintain a particular channel relationship to achieve desired targets and is usually 
measured in terms of replaceability of a partner (S. K. Kim & Ping-Hung, 2003). 
Interdependence asymmetry takes into account two facts (1) dependence is mutual and 
has to be addressed from two sides of a dyad/ linkage; (2) what primarily matters in a 
dependence relation is the relative or net dependence or the discrepancy between each 
side’s dependence on the other. Power is indicated as the primary consequence of 
interdependence asymmetry (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). A firm can find it necessary 
to keep relationships with a particular partner for a variety of reasons including process 
dependence, knowledge dependence, or unavailability of substitutes. 
2.2.2 Consequences of Power in Supply Chains  
Power plays a prominent role in motivating decisions in supply chains (Brewer & 
Speh, 2000). It allows firms to gain favorable terms in supply chain exchanges (Crook & 
Combs, 2007). Firms use their relative bargaining power against supply chain partners in 
two ways: appropriation and propagation. The former effect is generally perceived as 
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negative, being biased toward the more powerful partner, while the second is perceived 
as positive, taking a leadership position for promoting innovations. 
Appropriation involves obtaining larger proportion of supply chain profits. A 
partner with a favorable “product category commitment ratio”, used to measure the 
balance of power among supply chain partners, can extract additional financial returns at 
the expense of the other partners (Brewer & Speh, 2000). Revenue sharing contract 
parameters, for instance, depend on the relative contractual power of the supply chain 
actors (Giannoccaro & Pontrandolfo, 2004). Benefit extraction can also take the form of 
shifting activities or costs to partners. In VMI (Vendor-Managed Inventories) tasks 
related to monitoring and controlling inventories are shifted to suppliers; and in quick 
response programs suppliers are burdened with more frequent deliveries and higher 
inventory holding costs (Subramani, 2004). 
From a different perspective, power allows firms to act as innovation leaders 
inducing partners to adopt/ develop technologies. The ripple effect of innovations on the 
whole supply chain drives partners to influence each other to innovate (see chapter 2). 
Research supports the effect of inter-firm influence strategies and technological adoption 
(Hausman & Stock, 2003). For instance, bargaining power explains the ability of high-
volume buying firms to mandate the use of Electronic Commerce on suppliers (Min & 
Galle, 1999; Riggins & Mukhopadhyay, 1994).  
The giant retailer, Wal-Mart, threatens to pull its orders from suppliers if they do 
not innovate to meet with its new “green” standards (Aston, 2009). The company’s 
investments in technological systems resulted in an “order of magnitude impact” on its 
suppliers’ innovations (Schrage, 2002). On another frontier, automotive manufacturers 
oblige suppliers to continuously innovate for annual price reductions (B. Kim, 2000; 
Liker & Choi, 2004; Maloni & Benton, 2000). Exploiting its power, GM dictates 
nonnegotiable cost reductions on its suppliers driving several process innovations (B. 
Kim, 2000). Some scholars, however, still argue that benefits from influence-based 
innovations are always biased in favor of the more powerful network leaders (Cachon & 
Lariviere, 2005; Dwyer & Walker Jr, 1981; Mitra & Singhal, 2008). 
From the above, we notice that arguments are scattered in the literature about both 
the positive and negative effects of power on innovations. It is still unclear whether 
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power exercise would help provide leadership and direction for promoting innovations, or 
would kill creativity and flexibility required for more effective innovations. We here 
attempt to reconcile these disagreements by distinguishing types of innovations, namely 
radical versus incremental, for which power exercise would pay off. Theoretical 
development of hypotheses is shown next. 
3. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Dominant Organizational Capital and Incremental Innovation 
Organizational Capital is knowledge that is owned by organizations, independent 
from individuals (Albino et al., 1998). Organizations can both own knowledge and be 
knowledge actors, which are entities that possess, acquire, and exchange knowledge 
(Albino et al., 1998). Organizational capital is the institutionalized knowledge and 
codified experience residing within databases, patents, manuals, structures, systems, and 
processes, away from individuals working therein (Youndt et al., 2004). Firms preserve 
knowledge over time while “individuals come and go” (Daft & Weick, 1984). 
Within one firm, the stock of institutionalized knowledge is generally 
homogenous, providing direction for structured recurrent activities that deepen existing 
knowledge, and enabling the firm to reinforce it in further incremental innovations 
(Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). In a dyad, however, two such 
stocks exist simultaneously and may not necessarily be homogenous to one another. The 
two knowledge profiles (OC) may indeed conflict. For instance, firms may be patenting 
in different fields, using different technologies and systems, following different 
organizational structures, or adopting different innovation processes. In this case, each 
firm attempts to direct incremental innovation activities to its own structure, extend its 
own stock of knowledge, and perform what has proved to be successful for its own cause 
(Katila, 2002; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). In doing so a firm aims to enhance its 
existing competence and capabilities (as opposed to destroying it) (Henderson & Clark, 
1990). When this is done simultaneously by several firms in a collaboration, it may 
jeopardize the existence of a clear and unified direction required for incremental 
innovations. Accordingly, the joint ability of the firms to produce incremental 
innovations may be adversely affected. 
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Why then would firms in a dyad not learn from each other? By decoupling 
organizational knowledge from human knowledge, the concept of organizational learning 
becomes moot
6. Organizations do learn, but “only through individuals who learn” (Senge, 
1990: 139). Organizational learning is usually thought of as a metaphor originating from 
individual learning, as organizations cannot learn independent of all individuals (Kim, 
1993). Although organizations do possess memories that may exist independent from 
people, learning itself is not an independent trait of organizations (Hedberg, 1981). 
Accordingly, it is safe to argue that organizational knowledge, when decoupled from 
individuals, is idiosyncratic in nature and resists changes. For instance, when Standard 
Operating Procedures are institutionalized, they become more difficult to change, 
delaying the search for new procedures (Kim, 1993). Routines cause resistance to change, 
giving stability and rigidity to processes, and it is individuals (managers) that attempt to 
alter these routines. Institutionalized knowledge, i.e., OC, facilitates and smoothens 
regular changes and improvements, while resisting changes based on opposing stocks of 
knowledge coming from other firms (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Routines tend to be 
persistent and inflexible to adaptation to other firms’ knowledge (Teece et al., 1997), as 
OC intensifies organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
Similarly, in a buyer-supplier innovation interaction, each firm’s OC resists the 
other’s opposing stock of knowledge. The level of resistance will correspond to the 
difference in types of firms’ OC stocks (e.g., difference in organizational cultures), and 
strengths of each organization’s OC (e.g., strength of each organizational culture). Strong 
organizational cultures are more difficult to change. The conflict between comparably 
strong OC stocks, such as cultures, impedes the effective transfer and sharing of 
knowledge (Lyles & Salk, 1996). Such conflicts are particularly escalated among 
businesses with comparable sizes. Examples include Daimler-Chrysler’s “merger of 
equals” which failed due to conflicting organizational cultures, where Germans failed to 
smoothly dominate because of the comparable strength of the two cultures (Weber & 
Camerer, 2003). These cross-cultural conflicts, known as “acculturative stress”, hinder 
                                                        
 
6 Note that there is a distinction between organizational learning and organizational adaptation, as change does not 
necessarily imply learning (Hedberg, 1981; Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Learning may include simple adaptation, while 
encompassing much more, such as understanding of causal relationships. 
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effective knowledge transfer (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). The higher the level of OC 
in a firm, the more difficult it is to disrupt it, while the smaller the stock, the easier the 
adaptation (Gatignon, Tushman, Smith, & Anderson, 2002). 
Firms with comparable stock levels face conflicts of conventions, with no clear 
character of a dominant style that can guide incremental innovations. The existence of a 
dominant style of OC allows smooth inter-firm communication and effective 
development of incremental innovations. We call this Dominant OC, which is defined as 
the prevalence of a particular profile of institutionalized knowledge, i.e. type of 
processes, patent fields, documentation style, … etc. in a multi-firm pool of OC. In a 
supply chain linkage with a buyer and supplier working jointly, a single OC profile must 
dominate to provide a consistent direction for further incremental innovations. This can 
result from: (1) dominant OC content: similarity in the type of OC stocks in the two 
firms, and/ or, (2) dominant OC magnitude: gap in the quantity of OC stocks (i.e., one 
OC stock is much larger than the other).  
Dominant OC content results from similarity in firms’ OC stocks. OC similarity 
between two organizations, also known as knowledge symmetry/ relatedness/ overlap, 
facilitates inter-firm communication and two-way learning, and allows each of the firms 
to absorb new external knowledge from the other (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1998). OC similarity entails cultural proximity, related patent fields, and 
common innovation processes between companies. Cultural proximity achieves 
organizational fit, reduces equivocality, and allows easier and more effective 
collaboration (Albino et al., 1998; Knoben & Oerlemans, 2006; Lui & Ngo, 2005). The 
presence of similar patent fields unifies the direction for extending and growing existing 
innovations. Lastly, organizations with common innovation processes find fewer 
conflicts in procedures, routines, and practices that may stand in the way of simple 
changes. Firms coming from detached knowledge realms employ diverging innovation 
“recipes” or “routines” impeding collaboration (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). Knowledge 
overlap with a buyer/ supplier firm, therefore, enables a firm to reinforce its in-house 
skills by absorbing this similar further external knowledge (Mowery et al., 1998).  
A gap in OC magnitudes, i.e., difference in OC strengths, may also lead to a 
dominant organizational knowledge stock. Ahuja and Katila (2001) contend that smaller 
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relative size of knowledge bases (i.e. higher gaps) is required in joint innovations to 
minimize: (1) the relative amount of resources devoted for integrating the two knowledge 
bases; and, (2) modifications to existing routines and changes to organizational functions. 
A higher gap in organizational stocks allows a larger stock firm to take the lead and 
provide direction for further incremental innovations, while making minor modifications 
to the smaller stock firm. Well-established firms with deeper history have more complex 
organizational knowledge which is difficult to change, while smaller firms with simple 
knowledge structures can easily acquire new knowledge from other firms in joint 
ventures (Lyles & Salk, 1996). When the knowledge bases (to be combined) are 
relatively equal in size, however, it becomes more difficult to determine which of the two 
bases to build on or extend. Both stocks, in this case, have equal strength and would 
struggle, trying to reinforce themselves. 
Overall, the key driver that enhances incremental innovation capability is the 
presence of dominant organizational capital (Figure II-1), which may come from two 
sources. In the first case, OC similarity minimizes conflict as to what knowledge will be 
extended or deepened through upcoming innovations. And in the second case, 
domination of quantity allows the higher stock of OC to lead the innovation process.  
H1: The greater the Dominant Organizational Capital (DOC) in a supply chain, 
the higher the supply chain’s incremental innovative capability7 
3.2 Human Capital Related Diversity and Radical Innovation 
HC constituting knowledge residing within and utilized by individuals, comprises 
the basis for radical innovativeness within firms (Schultz, 1961; Subramaniam & Youndt, 
2005). This stems from the fact that radical innovations are triggered by tacit knowledge, 
which resides within individuals (Grant, 1996; Cowan et al., 2004, Hall and Andriani, 
2003 and Mascitelli, 2000; Castiaux, 2007). What individuals accumulate below their 
level of consciousness allows them to go beyond details and specifics, recognizing 
interrelationships and discovering missing links forming the bases of breakthrough 
innovations (Mascitelli, 2000). OC is by definition mostly codified and explicit 
                                                        
 
7 We will adopt Benton and Maloni’s (2005) definition of a supply chain as a link between a firm and one of its first 
tier suppliers. This represents a building block, which is easily extendible throughout a supply chain (Benton & Maloni, 
2005). 
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(documentation style, patents ... etc.) with sparse tacit content required for the undefined 
and uncertain context of creative processes (Polanyi, 1958; Castiaux, 2007).  
In an inter-firm collaboration, transfer of tacit knowledge is mainly due to contact 
between individuals (Castiaux, 2007). Individuals are distinguished from other resources 
by their ability to learn, apply their knowledge in new domains, and make new resource 
combinations; which all lead to radical innovations
8
 (Penrose, 1959). From an 
exploration/ exploitation perspective, Popadiuk and Choo (2006) argue that: 
“Tacit knowledge (residing in individuals) … is closely related to knowledge exploration 
(for radical innovation) while explicit knowledge (residing in organizations) is more 
concerned with knowledge exploitation (for incremental innovations)”. 
Involving explorative activities, radical innovations require a diversity of skills to 
provide breadth for the exploration process. It is this breadth of knowledge that allows 
novel ideas and concepts to be cultivated, by departing from existing skills and making 
new associations and linkages (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
March, 1991). Radical innovations also involve an uncertain setting, which requires 
diverse knowledge for a more robust learning basis (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Employees who spawn a diversity of knowledge and carry a wide variety of experience 
present an invaluable resource that can stimulate innovative idea generation (Chen & 
Huang, 2009; McDermott, 1999). 
Excessive diversity, however, comes at a disadvantage. Human knowledge that is 
too diverse may result in “unwieldy and impractical” outcomes (Taylor & Greve, 2006). 
On one hand, high levels of diversity in teams carry a great potential for team conflict 
(Taylor & Greve, 2006). Employees that are too diverse may face internal 
communication problems, impeding effective teamwork (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This 
raises questions regarding how diverse HC should be for effective radical innovation 
outcomes. We here assert that HC related diversity, acts as the key determinant of radical 
innovativeness for supply chains (Figure II-1). 
Skill relatedness has been defined in the literature as a property of industries that 
describes skill linkages among different industries (Farjoun, 1998; Neffke & Henning, 
2013). Two industries are said to be skill-related to the extent to which they share skill 
                                                        
 
8 See more on the resistance of institutionalized knowledge to learning and radical changes in section 3.1. 
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profiles (Farjoun, 1998). Similarly, we here define skill relatedness as a property of a skill 
set. Two or more skills are related to the extent to which they are simultaneously used in 
a variety of products and services: the higher the co-existence of certain skill 
combinations in the production of various products and services, the higher the level of 
these skills’ relatedness. Related skills, as defined above, may be highly different. Think 
for instance about accounting and marketing professions present in multiple types of 
businesses. Differences in skills can be characterized through indices like the Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) code, which classifies workers into occupational 
categories. 
Relatedness in human capital helps minimize the disadvantages of excessive 
(unrelated) diversity, which include: team conflicts (Taylor & Greve, 2006), 
communication problems (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and reaching “unwieldy and 
impractical” outcomes (Taylor & Greve, 2006). Skills that are relatedly diverse have a 
higher probability of success in joint research (Sinha & Cusumano, 1991). This is 
particularly true for the case when the expected benefits and risks are high, i.e. radical 
innovations (Sinha & Cusumano, 1991). The value of a resource is enhanced by the co-
presence of related resources. While radical innovations require transferring/applying 
skills in new domains and contexts, the value of the skill transferred may be lost due to 
absence of other skills that enhance its value (Farjoun, 1994). Related resources are 
mutually supportive, creating super-additive value synergies from their usage across 
different domains and contexts (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 
2005). The combination of unrelated resources may potentially produce radical 
innovations, but the speed and ease of their creation are much lower than with the case of 
related resources due to the lack of necessary absorptive capacity (Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 
2010). 
HC related diversity is obtained: (1) quantitatively, through a bigger pool of HC, 
and/or, (2) qualitatively, through complementarity in the HC pool. HC complementarity 
is defined in the literature as knowledge that is related but different (Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman, 2005). Complementarity in supply chain firms’ HC bases implies a non-
overlapping character of knowledge that allows integration to create value that had not 
existed in either firm before (Fang, 2011; Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). Alternatively, lack 
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of complementarity can imply redundancy, which causes inefficiencies and conflicts 
(Fang, 2011).  
Larger teams are by definition more diverse making team size another source of 
HC related diversity (Carpenter, 2002). Getting together more people to work on 
innovation projects presents an invaluable resource (McDermott, 1999). A team’s size is 
proportional to the amount of resources contributing to an innovative output (Hambrick 
& D'Aveni, 1992). A higher input of human capital implies a wider spectrum of 
knowledge and a greater opportunity for radical innovations (van-den-Bergh, 2008). 
More “creators” provides knowledge diversity required for radical innovations (West & 
Anderson, 1996). This would lead to a more effective exploration process and, 
accordingly, a higher output of radical innovations. A higher level of HC implies skilled 
and creative employees, who would likely question prevailing systems and attempt to 
change them significantly (Snell & Dean Jr, 1992; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). In the 
highly creative environment of radically innovative teams, unique individual stocks of 
knowledge, obtained from a greater HC pool, carries particular importance (Taylor & 
Greve, 2006).  
Note that in the case of management teams, bigger size may entail conflicts 
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997). Nevertheless, this view does not find consensus as some 
scholars have empirically found that larger top management teams perform better 
(Haleblian & Finikelstein, 1993; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992). It is imperative to note, 
however, that decision-making teams are beyond the scope of this discussion, since we 
only focus on innovation teams. Empirical studies have found innovation teams to be 
more effective when larger, especially that innovation is arguably a process characterized 
by conflict in attempting to adapt changes to organizations (Curral, Forrester, Dawson, & 
West, 2001; Dailey, 1978; West et al., 2003).  
H2: The greater the HC Related Diversity (HRD) in a supply chain, the higher 
the chain’s radical innovative capability. 
3.3 The Moderating Role of Power Exercise 
Little is known about whether influence strategies positively or negatively affect 
innovativeness of businesses (Hausman & Stock, 2003). Supply chain firms may resort to 
influence strategies, coercive, reward or legal, attempting to affect partners’ innovation 
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performance. Wal-Mart, for instance, pushes its suppliers to invest in new technologies 
like RFID and green initiatives by threatening to withhold business from non-conformers 
(Aston, 2009). This study argues that power exercise will be effective when the direction 
and source of lead for the innovation process is clearly defined, i.e. in the case of 
incremental innovation, while it would be ineffective in the case of the more uncertain 
radical innovation, when higher flexibility and creativity is needed. 
Power exercise stimulates actions directly by decoupling emotional attachments 
(Ireland, Hitt, & Webb, 2005; Ireland & Webb, 2007). It provides the high level of 
reinforcement needed for organizational capital to translate into incremental innovative 
capability. When exercised, power can overcome both active and passive resistance of 
firms to implement innovations (Fidler & Johnson, 1984). It is therefore effective when it 
comes to adopting existing technologies or expanding their scope (Maute & Locander, 
1994). Firms exercise power to induce partners to follow their lead in innovation projects. 
In the case of incremental innovations, compliance is required to unite firms along a 
single direction for extending a specific dominant knowledge profile. Influence strategies 
ensure that the less powerful firm abides by the dominant firm’s directives (Ke et al., 
2009). Power exercise is, therefore, expected to have both a direct and moderating 
positive effect on incremental innovative ability: 
H3a: Power exercise positively affects a supply chain’s incremental innovative 
capability 
H3b: Power exercise positively moderates the relationship between DOC and 
incremental innovative capability of a supply chain 
On the other hand, power may inhibit the ability of individuals to produce radical 
innovations. Depriving individuals from taking part in the decision making by exercising 
power impairs their creativity and their willingness to make fruitful suggestions (Fidler & 
Johnson, 1984). This can result in negative attitudinal orientations further dampening 
radical innovative capability. In developing radical innovations, it is difficult to evaluate 
or monitor innovation efforts. It is, therefore, imperative for participating individuals to 
have the willingness to be effectively involved. Power exercise typically results in low 
involvement levels as (less powerful) firms perform in a minimally acceptable manner for 
which punishment is avoided or reward is present (Fidler & Johnson, 1984). 
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The control induced by exercising power adversely affects creativity and 
flexibility needed for radical innovative capability. New ideas and knowledge requires 
not only creative and highly skilled employees but also flexibility in adapting and 
implementing (March, 1991). Flexibility has been cited as a necessary requirement for 
radical innovations. Companies pursuing high level of innovations are in fact decreasing 
their hierarchical control (Kanter, 1989). The substantial level of control and direction 
employed by use of influential strategies between linkage firms will largely diminish 
people’s flexibility, deterring the overall human capital from being translated into radical 
innovations.  Radical innovation is facilitated by the flexibility following from a lack of 
enduring relations between firms (Bart, 1999). Strategic commitments caused by a 
powerful firm’s influence will make the weaker firm more rigid and less flexible, 
standing in the way of breakthrough innovativeness. 
Moreover, negative feelings are generated and autonomy is lost from forced 
compliance, again, adversely affecting radical innovations (Ke et al., 2009). As one firm 
complies with directives from another under power influence, it foregoes the opportunity 
to demonstrate its competence (Ke et al., 2009). This means that power exercise inhibits 
radical innovative capability and dampens the effect of competence HRD may have on 
the capability (Figure II-1).  
H4a: Power exercise negatively affects a supply chain’s radical innovative 
capability 
H4b: Power exercise negatively moderates the relationship between HRD and a 
supply chain’s radical innovative capability  
Although Wal-Mart, which had changed supply chain process almost radically, 
may seem like a counter example to our argument, a closer look will actually show the 
opposite. On one hand, Farrell (2003) argues that the retailer’s real gains were obtained 
only by redefining and enhancing relationships with suppliers as opposed to exercising 
power. Suppliers that witnessed excessive usage of power such as Vlastic have declared 
bankruptcy, indicating failure of the forceful strategy in radical changes (Crook & 
Combs, 2007). This situation of suppliers having little choice but to comply with 
retailer’s innovations, is completely different from joint work on the actual creation and 
development of innovations. No studies, to our knowledge, have investigated the actual 
effect on joint innovation capability, as an outcome, of a Wal-Mart-supplier dyad. Studies 
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do argue, however, that the outcomes of Wal-Mart’s power has been unequal returns on 
ideas and resources, biased against suppliers; and that win-win collaborations exist 
between Wal-Mart and firms with comparable-power such as Procter and Gamble, where 
no excessive power can be exercised on either side (Corsten & Kumar, 2005). Success of 
the partnership has been specifically attributed to the lack of relative power between the 
two players (Tang, 1999). Another study found that the less the market-share of Wal-
Mart’s suppliers (i.e., more chance of power exercise), the higher the failure rate of these 
suppliers (Bloom & Perry, 2001). Finally, scholars have further argued that Wal-Mart’s 
innovations are all about cost reduction, which may have in fact impeded product and 
quality related innovations manufacturers wished for (Bianco et al., 2003). Evidence has 
thus indicated that Wal-Mart’s forceful strategies fail in joint radical innovation 
endeavors. 
3.4 Social Capital Valuation 
A discussion on intellectual capital is not complete without considering its third 
element, social capital. The effect of supply chain social capital on innovation outcomes 
can be attributed to the value firms place on their relational ties. Companies that highly 
value inter-firm social capital and the importance of relational ties are better able to 
collaborate for both the effective creation and implementation of innovations. Studies 
confirm significant financial value from perceived buyer-supplier trust, not only through 
transaction cost reduction, but also from enhanced sharing and collaboration, which 
directly translates into higher innovative abilities (J. H. Dyer & Chu, 2003).  
Social elements are “externalities” described as goods and commodities with real, 
practical economic value (Arrow, 1974). This “calculus-based” view of trust ensures 
tangible, economic outcomes from creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the 
costs of severing it (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Accordingly, companies that adopt this 
view comply with implicit knowledge sharing rules, including ready provision and 
secrecy, ensured by the expected rewards of being trusting and trustworthy (and possibly 
avoiding “threats” of violating trust) (Ba, Whinston, & Zhang, 2003).   
The effect of social capital valuation on innovation can be attributed to the “best 
known” exchange rule borrowed from the social exchange theory: reciprocity or payment 
in kind (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). According to that rule, “voluntary actions of 
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individuals … are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in 
fact bring from others” (Blau, 1964). In a buyer-supplier knowledge exchange, social 
capital valuation by one party drives more sharing of knowledge, i.e. providing benefit to 
the other, in attempt to invoke reciprocation from the other and provision of knowledge 
in return (Blau, 1964; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998).  Accordingly, high 
valuation by both parties builds up a larger shared “knowledge repository” retrievable by 
all members to jointly produce radical and incremental innovations (Cress & Martin, 
2006). As participating firms allocate and share adequate resources, the endeavor will 
more likely succeed (Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006).  
Social capital economically incentivizes companies that value it to allocate more 
knowledge to the dyadic pool and to behave honestly by refraining from opportunism (Ba 
et al., 2003). The mere valuation of social capital elements such as mutual trust and 
respect reflects on the effective sharing of ideas and exchanges of knowledge, boosting 
both radical and incremental innovation capabilities (Figure II-1): 
H5a: Social capital valuation positively affects a supply chain’s incremental 
innovative capability 
H5b: Social capital valuation positively affects a supply chain’s radical 
innovative capability 
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Method Overview 
To test the hypotheses above we used a self-administered web-based survey for 
being a more efficient and cost effective method (Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009). The 
survey targeted a population of purchasing managers in Canada. The purchasing manager 
role necessitates extensive dealing with suppliers and hence fair knowledge about 
supplier innovation relations, making the position a conventional choice for target 
respondents in similar studies (Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009; Choi & Hartley, 1996; 
Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart, & Kerwood, 2004). Respondents were all contacted by 
email, with a brief introduction and link to the formal invitation/consent letter that 
proceeds to the survey (invitation letter is given in Appendix II-A). 
We used two sources of motivation for managers to increase participation. First, 
we informed them that the study is funded and supported by Social Sciences and 
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Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). Secondly, they were promised a copy of the 
results upon study completion (see invitation/ information letter in Appendix II-A). 
Mentioning the funding by a federal research agency, along with associating the research 
to a credible academic institution provided legitimacy to the research and diverted fears 
of potential harm from the survey website, in the way of computer viruses (Braunscheidel 
& Suresh, 2009). 
4.2 Survey Design and Measurements 
The survey was designed to start with simple and straightforward questions that 
introduce the topic (R&D, competition, industry … etc.). Questions perceived as more 
difficult followed in a logical order (independent variables, dependent variables, 
moderator), in line with survey design recommendations (N. K. Malhotra, 2006). Less 
important, more descriptive questions including ones about company age, respondent 
tenure, and company size were placed at the end (Leung, 2001; Taylor-Powell & 
Marshall, 1996). A short introduction was provided asking respondents to identify one 
supplier of their choice as follows: 
“To complete this survey, please identify a supplier that you are knowledgeable about 
and with whom there has been some recent joint work (or attempt for joint work) on 
product or process improvements. This can include, but is not limited to, product 
enhancements, new product development, cost reduction techniques such as setup time 
reduction, waste minimization or other process improvements.” 
All reflective (first order) measurements for this study are borrowed from the 
literature (see Table II-1) and have been adapted to the current study’s buyer-supplier 
context and dyadic level of analysis. Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) offer measurement 
scales for innovative capabilities, organizational capital and human capital. Scales for 
innovative capabilities were reworded to ask about the entire dyad. The stems for items 
of organizational capital and human capital were adapted to ask about similarity in the 
former and complementarity for the latter. 
Power exercise items are well anchored in the literature (Handley & Benton Jr, 
2012a, 2012b). The legal power options were adjusted to reflect the directionality of legal 
power exercise. Relative coercive power, and relative reward power were calculated from 
difference scores among parallel items as in Kumar et al. (1995). Similarly, total scores 
(such as total social capital valuation, and total R&D) were calculated for parallel items 
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to reflect their total value for the buyer-supplier level (i.e., dyadic level), similar to total 
interdependence calculation by Kumar and colleagues in the mentioned paper. 
Buyer-supplier size difference was used as a proxy for organizational capital gap. 
This is based on the fact that larger firms have higher organizational capital compared to 
smaller ones. Larger firms enjoy more patent count due to their financial resources and 
higher R&D expenditures; while smaller firms patent with a much lower propensity 
(Arundel & Kabla, 1998; Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Scherer, 
1983). Moreover, larger firms employ more rigid structures and codified rules 
(administrative complexities) compared to smaller counterparts (Greiner, 1972; Miller, 
1987a, 1987b; Sharma, 1999). Their organizational cultures are also stronger and better 
established (Barney, 1986). 
Finally, control variables were added to the survey questionnaire as appropriate 
(Table II-2). All measurement items for multi-item constructs are given in Appendix II-B. 
4.3 Pre-Test and Pilot Study 
The survey instrument was run by senior professors of Operations Management 
and Marketing to make any suggestions for changes that may enhance clarity, 
comprehensibility, and/ or comprehensiveness of answers. A draft questionnaire was pre-
tested with three subject matter experts in purchasing, coming from three distinct 
industries (plastic packaging manufacturing, automotive, and display technology) to 
maximize the breadth of improvements. These managers were interviewed, asked to take 
the survey, and encouraged to suggest any improvements or changes they deem 
appropriate.  
A number of changes were made to improve the quality of the questionnaire. 
These included clarifying the level of inquiry, i.e., whether respondents answer questions 
based on a particular project or general relationship; and answer based on the level of the 
plant, subsidiary or whole company. Wording was further simplified to avoid unintended 
meanings. Finally, one question was rewritten for being perceived as double-barreled. 
4.4 Sampling 
To maximize sample size, a combined approach was used to collect three sub-
samples from a population of purchasing managers in Canada. The first one was to 
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contact supply chain consulting companies, motivating their interest about the research, 
asking them to share their client list, and promising a copy of study findings upon 
completion. A search was done on supply chain consulting companies in Canada, which 
were contacted by email accordingly. One company responded with interest, and shared 
its list of contacts.  
In the second approach, we used LinkedIn’s InMail service to contact subject 
matter experts. LinkedIn is evolving as a venue to reach appropriate professional in 
supply chain management research (Moori, Pescarmona, & Kimura, 2013; Weinstein, 
Jin, & Barrett, 2013). We performed an advanced search for (current) titles of 
“Purchasing Managers” located in Canada. Other relevant titles that appeared in the 
search results, such as “Senior Buyer” and “Supplier Quality Manager”, were also 
contacted. To help eliminate non-response bias, we restricted search results to 
respondents not connected to the sender (i.e., not in the sender’s network. In LinkedIn, 
this is described as “3rd and everyone else”. What LinkedIn considers to be 1st and 2nd 
connections were excluded for being connected directly or indirectly to the sender).  
Finally, a snowballing approach was used, contacting our three pilot study 
companies, asking them to recommend five contacts deemed appropriate for taking the 
survey, and the process was repeated with each of their contacts that showed interest and 
took the survey. Both techniques of resorting to personal contacts and combining 
multiple approaches for maximizing sample size have been used in high quality survey 
research and studies on supply chain management (Cousins & Menguc, 2006; Lovelace, 
Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001; Tatikonda & Montoya-Weiss, 2001). We obtained a total of 
145 responses. Descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix II-C. 
4.5 Usable Sample  
List-wise deletion was used to eliminate cases with excessive and non-replaceable 
missing data, with the former being defined as: more than two missing items in multi-
item questions; and the latter as one or more missing stand-alone question (such as team 
size). From the total sample, 22 responses were eliminated for excessive missing data 
(more than two blank questions/ items). Responses with a missing stand-alone question 
(i.e., one that does not belong to a multi-item construct) were also eliminated for not 
being eligible for estimation. This resulted in 105 usable responses, 19 of which have one 
CHARACTERIZING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL PROPERTIES EMAN NASR 
 76 
or two missing items of multi-item constructs. Given a maximum of 8 arrows directed 
into our endogenous variables (see Figure II-4), our usable sample size exceeds the 
“conservative” rule of 10:1 ratio (10 samples for each arrow directed to a dependent 
variable), with much more liberal statisticians satisfied with 2:1 ratio, and a mid-position 
of 5:1 ratio (Falk & Miller, 1992). PLS has been consistently used for comparable and 
much lower sample sizes, as small as 50 (Klein, 2007; Morgan, Kaleka, & Gooner, 2007; 
Rosenzweig, 2009; Sawhney, 2013). 
 To estimate missing items, we performed case mean substitution (across items 
and within the individual), as opposed to total mean substitution for being generally more 
recommended (Roth, Switzer, & Switzer, 1999). Moreover, to our knowledge, there is no 
evidence/ argument that has been made of the former decreasing variability (Tsikriktsis, 
2005). It does, however, assume equal means and standard deviations between predictors 
and missing variables (Tsikriktsis, 2005). A total of 26 items were estimated using the 
mean substitution imputation approach. The missing item count falls well short of the 
rule of thumb cutoff of 10%, deeming the estimation appropriate ((26*100/46*105) = 
0.54%)
9
 (Ettlie, Perotti, Joseph, & Cotteleer, 2005; Power & Terziovski; Rosenzweig, 
2009).  
4.6 Analysis  
Three of our constructs, namely power exercise, HC related diversity and 
dominant OC are formative combinations of first order reflective constructs, i.e., second 
order constructs of type II (reflective first order-formative second order) (Hair, Hult, 
Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Hierarchical component models provide higher levels of 
abstraction that help achieve more theoretical parsimony and less model complexity 
(Akter, D'Ambra, & Ray, 2011; Edwards, 2001; Vinzi, Chin, Henseler, & Wang, 2010; 
Wetzels, Odekerken-Schröder, & van Oppen, 2009). According to our cases of formative 
(second order) constructs, PLS-SEM is the recommended analysis method, given that it 
completely avoids the identification problem with formative models (Akter et al., 2011; 
Chin, 1998a; Gefen, Rigdon, & Straub, 2011; Wetzels et al., 2009). We, therefore, 
perform PLS analysis, using SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). 
                                                        
 
9
 Note that the maximum percentage of missing responses per item is 3.4 %. 
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To test the model, a PLS two-stage approach was adopted. There are three ways 
to deal with second order constructs. The first one is the repeated indicator approach 
(Ringle, Sarstedt, & Straub, 2012; Wetzels et al., 2009). This is not recommended in our 
model because the number of indicators should be similar across all first order constructs 
making up the second order one (Hair et al., 2014). In each of ‘HC Related Diversity’ and 
‘Dominant OC’ their component first order constructs have different numbers of 
indicators (one versus four), which can lead to significant biases (Becker, Klein, & 
Wetzels, 2012). The second method is known as the hybrid approach (Wilson & 
Henseler, 2007). In this method, indicators of each first order construct are split between 
itself and the second order construct. Such an operation is not applicable to our model as 
some of our first order constructs have a single indicator (namely team size and 
organizational size gap), defying the possibility of splitting. 
Lastly, the third method and the one that is used in this study is the two-stage 
approach. In stage one the structural model is analyzed and latent variable scores 
estimated without the presence of second order constructs. Latent variable scores are 
obtained from this analysis and subsequently used as indicators in a second higher-order 
structural model analysis (stage two) as shown in Figure II-2 (Becker et al., 2012; 
Ciavolino & Nitti, 2009). The first stage PLS path analysis provides latent variables 
scores for lower-order latent variables, which can be used in a second stage as manifest 
variables for the higher-order latent variables (Wetzels et al., 2009). In other words, a 
second-order factor is measured using the scores of its first-order factors (Luo, Li, Zhang, 
& Shim, 2010). One limitation of this method is the fact that it does not account for the 
whole model when estimating latent variable scores in the first stage. 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Stage One 
Stage one model constitutes a decomposed version of the main effects 
hypothesized in section 3 (i.e. without the presence of second order constructs) as shown 
in Figure II-3. The decomposed model is used for factor analysis of first order (reflective) 
constructs, and for obtaining latent variable scores that will be used as indicators for 
second order constructs in stage two. Items that did not load well on the intended scales 
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(less than 0.65 loading) were dropped prior to further analysis, leading to our final outer 
model as shown in Table II-3. Researchers have commonly used lower cutoffs for item 
loadings (Brah, Wong, & Rao, 2000; Falk & Miller, 1992; Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010; Li, 
Liu, Li, & Wu, 2008; Oke, Burke, & Myers, 2007; Park, Hartley, & Wilson, 2001; 
Samson & Terziovski, 1999).  
Our lowest factor loading was HCC2, with a lower loading of 0.43, which we 
kept to avoid having a single item latent variable (Human Capital Complementarity); a 
practice that has consistently been recommended against (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; 
Peter, 1981; Shore & Tetrick, 1991; Zaichkowsky, 1985). This can be justified by the 
high composite reliability score of the underlying latent variable (0.714), and by the fact 
that knowledge complementarity measures are less established in the literature, leading to 
lower acceptable loading cutoffs (as low as 0.4), and Cronbach alpha (as low as 0.5) 
(Nunnally, 1967). Cronbach alpha for the rest of the constructs met the “practical lower 
bound” of 0.6, as indicated in several research papers (Flynn, Schroeder, & Sakakibara, 
1994; M. K. Malhotra & Grover, 1998; Narasimhan & Jayaram, 1998; Prater & Ghosh, 
2006), including ones using existing measures (Vaidyanathan & Devaraj, 2008). 
To consider the reliability and validity of our measurements we used several 
approaches that test for indicator reliability, composite reliability, convergent and 
discriminant validity. All results well exceeded recommended cutoffs, confirming the 
reliability and validity of all our measures (see Table II-8 for a summary). 
5.2 Stage Two: Structural Model 
The structural model was assessed by a PLS analysis and a subsequent 
bootstrapping technique. The former provides path coefficients (Figure II-4 and Table II-
10), R square values, and communalities from which a global criterion of goodness of fit 
(GoF) can be estimated
10
 (Table II-9). In the latter technique, multiple subsamples from 
within the same sample are used to build a distribution for each parameter and derive a 
standard estimate, avoiding any distributional assumptions for the data (Sumukadas & 
Sawhney, 2004). To ensure the stability of our results, we ran bootstraps using several 
                                                        
 
10
 Although a global Goodness of Fit index has been suggested for PLS, (Tenenhaus et al., 2004), valued at 48.16% in 
our model, this has been found to be mainly a diagnostic tool, not a formal testing technique and not very suitable for 
model validation (Henseler and Sarstedt, 2013; Wetzels et al., 2009). 
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sub-sample sizes (500, 700, 1000), finding estimates to be very stable. We, therefore, 
only report results of the 1000 sub-samples. As shown in Figure II-4 and Table II-9, the 
model accounts for 36.4% and 35% of the variance in radical and incremental innovation 
capabilities, respectively. R square values exceed the recommended cutoff of 0.25
11
 (Hair 
et al., 2014). Lying above 33%, both R square values are considered moderate effect sizes 
(Chin, 1998b). The software converged after 10 iterations only (out of the maximum of 
300 allowed), signaling a good estimation (Wong, 2013). 
Support for our developed hypotheses is assessed by examining path coefficients 
from the PLS run and their significance levels obtained from t-values resulting from the 
bootstrap as in Figure II-5 (Sawhney, 2013). Because of the novelty of the concepts 
developed in this research, we examine two-tailed results of the t-test to consider both 
directions of each effect, and we follow the liberal rule describing p values < 0.01 to be 
very strongly significant, < 0.05 as strongly significant and < 0.1 as significant (Ahmad 
& Schroeder, 2003; Jayaram, Ahire, & Dreyfus, 2010; Lo, Wiengarten, Humphreys, 
Yeung, & Cheng, 2013; Srinivasan, 1985).  
Results indicate that the relationship between HRD and supply chain radical 
innovative capability (H2) is negative and significant at the p<0.05 level. The path 
coefficient indicates that a standard deviation increase in HC related diversity is 
associated with a 0.188 standard deviation decrease in radical innovation capability, 
statistically controlling for the effect of other explanatory variables. Similarly, the 
relationship between power exercise and radical innovative capability is confirmed at the 
p<0.05 level, showing support for hypothesis H4a. The corresponding path coefficient 
indicates that a standard deviation increase in power exercise is associated with a 0.184 
standard deviation decrease in radical innovation capability, statistically controlling for 
the effect of other explanatory variables. The result for the interaction between power 
exercise and HRD demonstrates weaker support for hypothesis H4b at p<0.1. 
Hypotheses H5a and H5b are both strongly supported at the p<0.01 and p<0.05 
levels, respectively. A standard deviation increase in social capital valuation is associated 
with a 0.194 standard deviation increase in radical innovation capability, and a 0.287 
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 Much more lenient researchers recommend cutoff of 0.1 (Falk and Miller, 1992). 
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standard deviation increase in incremental innovation capability, statistically controlling 
for the effect of other explanatory variables.  
Nevertheless results for incremental innovative capability are less conclusive. 
With the exception of social capital valuation, our hypothesized antecedents of 
incremental innovative capability (dominant organizational capital, power exercise and 
their interaction) are insignificant, failing to support hypotheses H1, H3a, and H3b. It is 
also worth noting that from the path coefficients shown, the effects of HC related 
diversity and dominant OC on radical and incremental innovative capability, respectively, 
are both negative. This comes counter to our hypotheses as developed in section 3. 
Results for hypothesis testing are shown in Table II-10. 
6. DISCUSSION 
Results regarding social capital valuation confirm our reciprocity theory. When 
companies perceive higher profitability from social capital, they not only work on 
building and nurturing trust, but also act in the direct and immediate benefit of the 
partner. Companies do so by giving away more knowledge, and protecting the partner’s 
proprietary knowledge. These actions directly cultivate and preserve social capital in a 
supply chain relationship. To the extent to which such in kind actions are duplicated by 
both firms in a dyad, both radical and incremental buyer-supplier innovative capabilities 
are enhanced. 
Similarly, the effect of power exercise on radical innovative capability comes in 
line with our expectations. Active influence upon supply chain partners seems to have a 
daunting effect on radical idea generation in buyer-supplier teams. Radical innovations 
rely on freedom of ideas and flexibility of governance as opposed to rigid structures and 
stone-set directions. This implies that supply chain teams working on the development of 
radically new products must refrain from resorting to threats (e.g. of withdrawing 
business), rewards, and legal right usage. This result can be viewed in line with 
“brainstorming” sessions consistently used for radical idea generation, in which ideas are 
not evaluated (no threats, rewards or punishments) to encourage the production of as 
many new ideas as possible (Leonard & Sensiper, 1998). Royal Dutch/Shell, for example, 
developed "innovation labs" with more flexible processes that circumvent the usual rigid 
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processes of the company to encourage unconventional idea generation (Hamel & Getz, 
2004). 
Although we expected the relatedness inherent in supply chain teams to overcome 
problems of increasing team diversity (i.e., a positive overall effect of HRD), results fail 
to support this claim. We conducted further analysis to test a decomposed model 
separating first order constructs of human capital complementarity and team size to 
investigate the separate effects (Figure II-6). Results of the two-tailed t-test (Table II-11) 
show weak significance of human capital size and lack of significance of human capital 
complementarity, with both having negative effect sizes. This comes in line with an 
existing view that argues that too diverse teams can be dysfunctional and come up with 
less practical output (Taylor & Greve, 2006). According to our results, the negative effect 
of diversity on inter-team conflict and lack of coordination, (De-Dreu & Weingart, 2003; 
Williams & O'Reilly, 1998), seems to outweigh the exploration potential of members’ 
knowledge breadth. Moreover, the weak/ lack of significance of first order variables’ 
main effects imply the significance of HC related diversity as a higher-level abstraction 
that has a strongly significant effect on radical innovative capability. 
Results of HC related diversity may also be attributed to the quality of data (see 
descriptive statistics in Appendix II-C). For example, the discrepancy between means and 
medians of both human capital complementarity and total HC suggest the presence of 
outliers, which may have affected our results. Data is positively skewed for both 
variables with high positive kurtosis, implying that, for example, the range of team sizes 
may have been too small to allow for the diversity required. This presents a limitation to 
this analysis as PLS may not be as robust for highly skewed distributions (Wetzels et al., 
2009). 
The combined effect of power exercise and HC related diversity is shown to be 
positive. Larger supply chain teams may be effective, if extra control is put in place. 
Increasing size and diversity with little control may lead to chaos and ineffective results. 
Accordingly, power exercise may reverse the negative effect of diversity on radical 
innovative capability, providing discipline and control for larger sized teams with 
members of various backgrounds. Active power exercise can be particularly important to 
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help diverse teams that may find higher inertia from their big size and/or from their 
differences, achieve radical changes to current products/ processes. 
This result comes in line with the Microsoft practice of “directing” the creativity 
of people in large teams (Cusumano, 1997). In larger teams, Microsoft would exert some 
degree of influence, similar to what can be done among supply chain companies, by 
directing specific features for product innovation, putting pressure on projects, and 
stabilizing evolving product properties incrementally (Cusumano, 1997). This can be 
similarly implemented in large supply chain teams, where for instance buyers have 
deeper market/user knowledge, and are therefore better able to dictate to the buyer-
supplier team what features to focus on developing. This approach becomes more 
important in larger teams where ideas may completely diverge and processes go out of 
control. 
On the other hand, results fail to support the importance of power exercise for 
driving incremental innovations. Our prior theorizing for power to provide direction, 
lead, and control has proved to be required in extreme cases, such as ones with 
excessively diverse or largely sized teams as discussed above. In less troubled 
interactions, however, as in the case of incremental innovations, projects may run 
smoothly, with no need to interfere with influential strategies. 
This can also be attributed to the fact that incremental changes face less inertia for 
their less pronounced effects, and possibly for the increasing acknowledgement of the 
necessity of improvements. Managers generally resist radical changes that they perceive 
as disruptive, time consuming and expensive (Orlikowski, 1993), while they tend to 
accept improvements, which require less upsetting for current processes/ products, 
without any need to impose forces of power exercise. Organizations may be readily open 
for “convergent” changes with no need for imposing influence (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996). 
Similar to the lack of effectiveness of power exercise on incremental innovation, 
the concept of domination fails too with organizational knowledge. Dominant knowledge 
seems to be detrimental to the effectiveness of joint innovation work. With a closer 
investigation for the decomposed dominant OC construct (see Figure II-6), the effect of 
size gap is negative and strongly significant. This can be attributed to the fact that small 
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changes and incremental improvements may not be applicable to firms of differing sizes. 
Counter to our expectation that domination by size may provide a more defined direction 
for change, size discrepancy leads to diverging structures, objectives and priorities for 
changes making successful incremental innovations unattainable. Therefore, the concept 
of domination, by exercising power or even by knowledge tends to be detrimental to 
incremental innovation.  
7. CONCLUSION 
This research takes a novel approach to characterize knowledge properties in a 
supply chain dyad, by adopting an intellectual capital classification system. We develop a 
hierarchical component model that captures properties of human and organizational 
knowledge, believed to drive a supply chain’s radical and incremental innovative 
capabilities. We also build on the social exchange theory, to define social capital 
valuation as determinant of both innovative capabilities through actions of reciprocity. 
Finally, our study acknowledges power as a key element of supply chain relationships, 
being a relationship primarily based on market transactions (market power), joining 
expertise (expert power), and contract settlement (legal power). Upon empirically testing 
our hypotheses using a PLS two-stage approach, our results offer several significant 
insights that advance our knowledge about the supply chain innovation and help 
managers with more effective innovation management strategies. 
On one frontier, we conclude that supply chain teams are more effective in 
producing radical innovations when less diverse. Both positive and negative effects of 
diversity can be spotted in literature, with the former including higher spectrum of ideas, 
more breadth of knowledge, and the latter including higher chance for intra-team conflict 
and less coordination effectiveness. Our results advocate the latter argument, indicating 
that, even in a related supply chain context, bigger and more diverse teams are not able to 
produce radically innovative ideas. Further analysis reveals that the effect can be more 
attributed to team size rather than complementarity. In other words, reducing team size in 
a supply chain joint innovation project minimizes clashes, conflicts and coordination 
problems leading to more effective radical innovation outcomes. What supports this 
claim even further, is the moderating effect of power exercise, which when present 
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enables the operation of more diverse teams by facilitating coordination and providing 
rigid discipline. 
Counter to our expectations, incremental innovations are not driven by 
domination of knowledge or power. The idea of domination, either as a property of 
knowledge or through power exercise, seems not to work with innovation teams, 
including ones aimed at incremental changes. Even with incremental innovations, 
flexibility is still required to make the necessary adaptations, which may still be 
surrounded by uncertainties (Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1988; Tyre & 
Orlikowski, 1994). This is one reason why some scholars qualify changes as innovations 
as soon as they are new to an adopting unit. Supply chain partners’ discrepancy in size 
acts as a significant barrier to the development of incremental changes. Firms with 
different sizes likely employ maximally different governance structures, documentation 
systems, patent strategies and administrative processes, which may stand in the way of a 
smooth joint process for building extensions and incremental changes. 
  Our study further confirms the importance of acknowledging the economic value 
of social capital. Companies that highly value social capital are significantly better able to 
produce both radical and incremental innovations. We attribute these results to the 
reciprocity rule, borrowed from the social exchange theory, which necessitates working 
for the immediate benefit of the other, reciprocating good acts, and expecting 
reciprocation. Companies that perceive tangible benefits from building and preserving 
social capital reciprocate by openly sharing knowledge, protecting the other’s knowledge 
and refraining from opportunism, in an effort to build good reputation with the partner 
and preserve relational ties. 
Finally, the empirical study presented in this chapter suggests a resolution to the 
opposing arguments on the effectiveness of power exercise on innovative capabilities of 
supply chain firms. Power exercise fails to help innovation in supply chain teams. 
Although anecdotal examples of firms, such as Wal-Mart, advocate the positive results of 
exercising power in driving partners to invest in innovations, we here argue that 
performance would be significantly improved with more flexibility and less influence. 
8. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
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This study suffers from several limitations worth noting. Although our proxies are 
highly justified, team size and firms’ size gap may not be perfect representations of the 
underlying constructs. Total human capital, for instance, includes people’s skills, 
qualifications and experience along with their number. Size gap is not an exact 
representation of discrepancies in organizational capital, which can be captured more 
effectively by differences in patent counts, difference in firm ages (history), and 
difference in CMMI level (or other similar certification). Finally, higher factor loadings 
(especially for human capital complementarity) would have led to better results. 
Archival data can be used in future studies to characterize and operationalize skill 
relatedness in supply chain teams, e.g., using secondary data about occupational 
classifications and co-existence of skills across industries. The effect of such on supply 
chain innovation is worth studying. Furthermore, partners’ decisions on exercising power 
and sharing knowledge are also ripe for future research. This includes characterizing a 
causal relationship between mediated (exercised) power and non-mediated (unexercised) 
power, and possible moderators for the relationships. It also includes characterizing 
strategic traits of knowledge that may affect the decision to share. Finally, a study on how 
economic benefit of social capital can be calculated would be very useful.  
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9. TABLES 
Table II-1 
Main Constructs and Their Scales’ Sources 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Construct Sub-constructs Measure 
Dominant OC OC Similarity (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005) 
OC Gap Firms’ size gap used as proxy 
HC Related Diversity HC 
Complementarity 
(Fang, 2011; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005) 
Total HC Joint team Size used as proxy 
Power Exercise Reward power (Handley & Benton Jr, 2012a, 2012b) 
Coercive Power (Handley & Benton Jr, 2012a, 2012b) 
Legal Power (Handley & Benton Jr, 2012a, 2012b) 
Social Capital Valuation ____ (Cousins, Handfield, Lawson, & Petersen, 2006; Lawson, Tyler, & Cousins, 
2008) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Incremental Innovative 
Capability 
____ 
(Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005) 
Radical Innovative Capability ____ (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHARACTERIZING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL PROPERTIES EMAN NASR 
 87 
Table II-2 
Control Variables and Justification for Inclusion 
Control Variable Support for Affecting Innovation 
Length of Relationship (Autry & Golicic, 2010; Krause, Handfield, & Tyler, 2007) 
Buyer/ Supplier Absorptive Capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) 
Firm Size (Cefis & Marsili, 2006; Katila & Ahuja, 2002) 
Firm Age (Cefis & Marsili, 2006; Gumusluoğlu & Ilsev, 2009; Motohashi, 2005) 
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Table II-3 
Factor Loadings 
Construct Items HC Comp Inc. Inn 
Org. 
Similarity 
Rad. Inn. 
Capability 
Rel Coe 
Pow 
Rel Leg 
Pow 
Rel Rew 
Pow 
SC 
Valuation 
HC Comp 
HCC2 0.4297 
       
HCC4 0.9989 
       
Incremental 
Innovative 
Capability 
IIC1 
 
0.6830 
      
IIC3 
 
0.7145 
      
IIC4 
 
0.8091 
      
IIC5 
 
0.7305 
      
OC 
Similarity 
OCS1 
  
0.7254 
     
OCS2 
  
0.7865 
     
OCS3 
  
0.8013 
     
Radical 
Innovative 
Capability 
RIC1 
   
0.8961 
    
RIC2 
   
0.8588 
    
RIC3 
   
0.8638 
    
Relative 
Coercive 
Power 
RCP1 
    
0.9309 
   
RCP2 
    
0.9006 
   
RCP3 
    
0.7702 
   
Legal Power 
LP1 
     
0.8107 
  
LP2 
     
0.9676 
  
LP3 
     
0.8410 
  
Relative 
Reward 
Power 
RRP1 
      
0.7167 
 
RRP2 
      
0.8705 
 
RRP3 
      
0.6841 
 
Social 
Capital 
Valuation 
TSCV1 
       
0.6636 
TSCV2 
       
0.9223 
TSCV3 
       
0.9374 
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Table II-4 
Latent Variables' Composite Reliability and Cronbach Alpha 
Latent Variable 
Composite 
Reliability 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
HC Comp 0.7140 0.5590 
Inc. Inn 0.8246 0.7189 
Org. Similarity 0.8152 0.6995 
Radical Inn 0.9058 0.8445 
Rel Coe Pow 0.9027 0.8452 
Rel Leg Pow 0.9075 0.8692 
Rel Rew Pow 0.8036 0.6439 
SC Valuation 0.8847 0.8079 
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Table II-5 
Average Variance Extracted Scores 
Latent Variable AVE 
HC Comp 0.5913 
Inc. Inn 0.5413 
Org. Similarity 0.5956 
Radical Inn 0.7622 
Rel Coe Pow 0.7569 
Rel Leg Pow 0.7669 
Rel Rew Pow 0.5798 
SC Valuation 0.7233 
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Table II-6 
Discriminant Validity (Diagonal Items are Square Root of AVE) 
 
HC 
Comp 
Inc. 
Inn 
Org. 
Similarity 
Radical 
Inn 
Rel Coe 
Pow 
Rel Leg 
Pow 
Rel Rew 
Pow 
SC 
Valuation 
HC Comp 0.7690 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inc. Inn -0.1959 0.7357 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Org. Similarity -0.2371 0.0768 0.7718 0 0 0 0 0 
Radical Inn -0.171 0.4223 0.1851 0.8730 0 0 0 0 
Rel Coe Pow -0.0488 -0.0812 -0.0801 -0.2515 0.8700 0 0 0 
Rel Leg Pow 0.0407 0.1123 -0.0874 0.0011 0.1441 0.8757 0 0 
Rel Rew Pow 0.0464 -0.1603 -0.0659 -0.2177 0.0983 -0.1547 0.7614 0 
SC Valuation -0.0042 0.3335 0.0858 0.1257 0.0039 0.1275 0.0478 0.8505 
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Table II-7 
Discriminant Validity: Cross Loadings 
 
HC Comp Inc. Inn Org. Similarity Rel Coe Pow Radical Inn Rel Leg Pow Rel Rew Pow SC Valuation 
HCC2 0.4297 0.0414 -0.1100 -0.0482 -0.0088 0.1197 -0.0125 -0.0093 
HCC4 0.9989 -0.2021 -0.2364 -0.0474 -0.1741 0.0355 0.0480 -0.0038 
IIC1 -0.1367 0.6830 0.1712 -0.0561 0.3328 0.0756 -0.1715 0.2532 
IIC3 -0.0862 0.7145 0.0319 -0.0565 0.1216 0.0615 -0.0897 0.2750 
IIC4 -0.1280 0.8091 0.0404 -0.0751 0.3206 0.0832 -0.0681 0.3739 
IIC5 -0.2080 0.7305 0.0030 -0.0514 0.4247 0.1034 -0.1449 0.1017 
OCS1 -0.2014 0.0219 0.7254 -0.0257 0.0326 0.0580 -0.1263 0.0316 
OCS2 -0.1938 0.0596 0.7865 -0.0166 0.0389 0.1164 -0.1414 -0.0215 
OCS3 -0.1750 0.0724 0.8013 -0.1121 0.2667 -0.2589 0.0446 0.1511 
RCP1 -0.0915 -0.0586 -0.1107 0.9309 -0.2781 0.1326 0.0639 0.0244 
RCP2 0.0277 -0.1112 -0.0143 0.9006 -0.2105 0.1982 0.1184 0.0172 
RCP3 -0.0666 -0.0309 -0.0873 0.7702 -0.1270 -0.0088 0.0817 -0.0670 
RIC1 -0.2375 0.3818 0.2081 -0.1878 0.8961 -0.0005 -0.1561 0.1335 
RIC2 -0.0836 0.3984 0.0976 -0.2652 0.8588 -0.0061 -0.1315 0.0979 
RIC3 -0.1344 0.3188 0.1884 -0.1982 0.8638 0.0108 -0.2947 0.0985 
LP1 0.0344 0.0435 -0.1281 0.1318 -0.0365 0.8107 -0.0699 0.1290 
LP2 0.0215 0.1395 -0.0617 0.1368 -0.0071 0.9676 -0.1911 0.1035 
LP3 0.0850 0.0475 -0.0881 0.1152 0.0581 0.8410 -0.0596 0.1419 
RRP1 -0.0329 -0.0935 -0.0362 -0.0715 -0.1371 -0.1714 0.7167 -0.0518 
RRP2 0.0411 -0.1320 -0.1287 0.1520 -0.2343 -0.1002 0.8705 0.0446 
RRP3 0.0986 -0.1440 0.0616 0.1032 -0.0942 -0.1005 0.6841 0.1161 
TSCV1 0.0955 0.1691 0.2125 -0.0174 0.0549 0.0234 0.1241 0.6636 
TSCV2 -0.0658 0.3047 0.0518 0.0241 0.0827 0.1281 0.0317 0.9223 
TSCV3 0.0015 0.3399 0.0295 -0.0042 0.1592 0.1398 0.0113 0.9374 
CHARACTERIZING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL PROPERTIES EMAN NASR 
 93 
 
 
Table II-8 
Reliability and Validity Summary 
Reliability 
Indicator 
Reliability 
Outer loadings All above 0.65 
(except HCC) 
Table II-3 
Internal 
Consistency 
Reliability 
Composite 
Reliability 
All above acceptable 
cutoff 0.7 
Table II-4 
Cronbach alpha All above 0.6 
cutoff
12
 
Table II-4 
Validity 
Convergent 
Validity 
AVE numbers All above the cutoff 
of 0.5 or higher 
(Bagozzi and Yi, 
1988) 
Table II-5 
Discriminant 
Validity 
AVE and latent 
variables 
correlations 
Fornell and Larcker 
(1981) suggest that 
the “square root” of 
AVE of each latent 
variable should be 
greater than the 
correlations among 
the latent variables 
Table II-6 
 
Cross loadings No major cross 
loadings (< 0.2 from 
main loading) 
Table II-7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
 
12 With the exception of Human Capital Complementarity as discussed in-text 
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Table II-9 
R squared, Communalities and GoF 
Endogenous Variable R
2
 Communality 
Incremental Inn. 
Capability 
0.3495 0.5384 
Radical Inn. Capability 0.3639 0.7623 
Goodness of Fit 48.1% 
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Table II-10 
Hypotheses Testing Results 
Hypothesis Path 
Path 
Coefficient 
T 
Statistics 
2 Tailed p 
Value 
1 Tailed p 
Value 
H1 
Dominant Organizational Capital -> Incremental 
Innovativeness 
-0.236 1.392 0.1642 0.0821 * 
H2 
Human Capital Related Diversity -> Radical 
Innovativeness 
-0.188 2.2458 0.0249 ** 0.0125 ** 
H3a Power Exercise -> Incremental Innovativeness -0.060 0.5711 0.5681 0.2840 
H3b 
Dominant Organizational Capital * Power 
Exercise -> Incremental Innovativeness 
-0.243 0.8427 0.3996 0.1998 
H4a Power Exercise -> Radical Inn -0.184 1.963 0.0499 ** 0.0250 ** 
H4b HRD * Power Exercise -> Radical Inn 0.175 1.8625 0.0628 * 0.0314 ** 
H5a SC Valuation -> Inc. Inn 0.287 3.6384 0.0003 *** 0.0001 *** 
H5b SC Valuation -> Radical Inn 0.194 2.3635 0.0183 ** 0.0091 *** 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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Table II-11 
Results for the Decomposed Model 
Path Path Coefficients 
T 
Statistics 
2 Tailed p 
Value 
1 Tailed p 
Value 
Total HC -> 
Radical Inn -0.102 1.679 0.0935 * 0.0467 ** 
HC Comp -> 
Radical Inn -0.17 1.308 0.1912 0.0956 * 
Org Similarity -> 
Inc. Inn 0.061 0.435 0.6637 0.3318 
OC Gap -> Inc. Inn -0.239 2.819 0.0049 *** 0.0024 *** 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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10. FIGURES 
Figure II-1 
Model Summary 
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Figure II-2 
The Two-Step Approach (Ciavolino & Nitti, 2009) 
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Figure II-3 
PLS Analysis Stage I 
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Figure II-4 
Stage II: Path Coefficients 
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Figure II-5 
Stage II: Bootstrap Results 
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Figure II-6 
Decomposed Model Bootstrap Results 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix II-A 
Invitation Letter 
How can firms in a supply chain partnership increase their innovation capabilities 
through managing their knowledge? This is the focus of a research project being conducted at 
Wilfrid Laurier University, and we invite you to participate in a survey on this topic. It is hoped 
that the results of this study will help you identify the knowledge and power properties necessary 
in your supply chain partners to increase innovation. This survey is part of a more comprehensive 
study that examines the types of knowledge that supply chain partners should have to jointly 
make innovative products and processes. This research is carried out by doctoral student Eman 
Nasr at Wilfrid Laurier University, under the supervision of Dr. Kalyani Menon and Dr. Hamid 
Noori and is supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). 
The survey should take around 15 minutes. It will ask questions regarding your 
relationships with a supplier that you are knowledgeable about and with whom there has been 
some recent joint work (or attempt for joint work) on product or process improvements. 
Questions will ask about knowledge issues related to your company and your supplier’s company 
(ex. similarity of knowledge, processes and patents), discrepancy in power that may exist between 
the two of the companies, and joint abilities to innovate. You will not be required to identify your 
supplier. Response to survey questions will be taken as your consent that your response be used 
in this research. If you do not know the answer to an item, please leave this item blank. If you 
think you do not have the kind of information asked in this survey, please feel free to pass the 
survey along to the appropriate person in your company. If you choose to participate in this study, 
you will be sent a certificate of appreciation for contributing to academic research, signed by the 
director of PhD and Research-based programs in Wilfrid Laurier University. Upon completion of 
the study, you will also be provided a summary of results. 
Your responses will be totally anonymous. Upon submitting your responses, you will be 
redirected to provide identification information required to customize and send the letter of 
appreciation. This identification will be kept completely separate from responses. Responses will 
only be used in aggregation (i.e. to compute statistics like average), with a total of around 200 full 
responses expected. Moreover, the data will be stored indefinitely on a password-protected 
computer. You have the right to decline to participate, withdraw from the study at any time, omit 
any question(s)/ procedure(s) you choose without penalty and without loss of benefits to which 
you are otherwise entitled. Please also note that the data will be collected using an online survey, 
the confidentiality and privacy of data cannot be guaranteed during web transmission. However, 
the survey provider is very well secured through Application-level, Network-level, and their 
Physical facilities. Because the survey provider is a U.S.-based company, data may be subject to 
the Patriot Act. 
For any questions about the study, please contact the researcher, Eman Nasr, Wilfrid 
Laurier University, at phone: (519) 884-0710 extension 2846, or at nasr7080@mylaurier.ca; or 
one of her supervisors: Dr. Kalyani Menon (kmenon@wlu.ca), and, Dr. Hamid Noori 
(hnoori@wlu.ca). This research has been approved by the Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid 
Laurier University, approval number #3606. If you feel your rights as a participant in research 
have been violated during the course of this project, you may contact Dr. Robert Basso, Chair, 
University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University, (519) 884-1970 extension 5225, or 
rbasso@wlu.ca. For your records, please print a copy of the information provided herein. 
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Appendix II-B  
Measurement Items 
Human Capital Complementarity: 
Please indicate the extent to which employees of the two companies (yours and your supplier's) 
have complementary expertise and skills by expressing your agreement with the following 
statements. Complementary skills are different, supplement one another, do not overlap, and co-
exist in producing multiple products (1=Strongly Disagree, 3= Neither Agree Nor Disagree, 
5=Strongly Agree) 
 Employees of the two companies have complementary types of skills. 
 Employees of the two companies are bright and creative in the same areas. 
 Our employees have expertise in jobs and functions that complement those of supplier's 
employees. 
 Employees of the two companies can develop new ideas and knowledge in exactly the same 
areas. 
 
Organizational Capital Similarity 
How do you compare your firm with the supplier on the following items? (1=Extremely different, 
2=Moderately different, 3=slightly different, 4=slightly similar, 5= Moderately similar, 
6=Extremely Similar) 
 Organizational culture. 
 Managerial structure and decision making process. 
 Fields where we patent and license. 
 Documentation style in manuals and databases. 
 
Total Social Capital Valuation 
Company Social Capital Valuation  
My company perceives higher profitability when: (1=Strongly Disagree, 3= Neither Agree Nor 
Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree) 
 The relationship with the supplier is characterized by close, personal interaction. 
 The relationship with the supplier is characterized by mutual respect. 
 The relationship with the supplier is characterized by mutual trust. 
 
Supplier Social Capital Valuation 
The supplier perceives higher profitability when: (1=Strongly Disagree, 3= Neither Agree Nor 
Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree) 
 The relationship with our company is characterized by close, personal interaction. 
 The relationship with our company is characterized by mutual respect. 
 The relationship with our company is characterized by mutual trust. 
 
Incremental Innovative Capability 
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The following items address small changes and refinements from joint projects with your supplier 
(incremental innovations). How would you rate your joint ability with the supplier to produce the 
following? (1=Very Low, 5=Very High) 
 Improvements to prevailing product/ service lines. 
 Small improvements on the current processes. 
 Extensions to your existing expertise in prevailing products/services. 
 Changes that enrich the way you currently compete. 
 Extensions to technologies in scope or type of usage. 
 
Radical Innovative Capability 
The following items address highly pronounced changes from joint projects with your supplier 
(radical innovations). How would you rate your joint ability with the supplier to produce the 
following? (1=Very Low, 5=Very High) 
 Significant changes that make your prevailing product/service lines obsolete. 
 Innovations that fundamentally change your prevailing products/services. 
 Innovations that make your existing expertise in prevailing products/services obsolete. 
 
Supplier Reward and Coercive Power 
Supplier Reward Power 
How far would the supplier do the following to encourage your company to implement ideas 
suggested? (0=N/A, 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree) 
 Supplier offers incentives to our firm when we are reluctant to cooperate with a new 
program. 
 Supplier will favor us on other occasions if we go along with their requests. 
 Supplier offers us rewards so we will go along with their wishes. 
 
Supplier Coercive Power 
 If we do not do as they ask, we will not receive very good treatment from the supplier. 
 If we do not agree with the supplier's suggestions, they could make things difficult for us. 
 The supplier makes it clear that failing to comply with their requests will result in 
penalties against us. 
 
Company Reward and Coercive Power 
Company Reward Power 
How far would your company do the following to encourage the supplier to implement ideas 
suggested? (0=N/A, 1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree) 
 Our company offers incentives to the supplier when they are initially reluctant to 
cooperate with a new program. 
 Our company will favor the supplier on other occasions if they go along with our 
requests. 
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 Our company offers the supplier rewards so they go along with our wishes. 
 
Company Coercive Power 
 If the supplier does not do as we ask, they will not receive very good treatment from us. 
 If the supplier does not agree with our suggestions, we can make things difficult for them. 
 Our company makes it clear that failing to comply with our requests will result in 
penalties against the supplier. 
 
Legal Power 
Please indicate to what extent you or your supplier refer to legal agreements by answering the 
following: (-2=Done much more by supplier; -1= Done slightly more by supplier; 0= Not done by 
any of us, Done by us and supplier equally; 1=Done slightly more by our firm; 2=Done much 
more by our firm) 
 Referring to the terms of our contract to gain compliance on particular requests. 
 Making a point to refer to our legal agreement when attempting to influence the other. 
 Using sections of our formal agreement as a “tool” to get one to agree to the other's 
demands.  
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Appendix II-C: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable #1 (Respondent Tenure) 
Count 105 Skewness -0.09105 
Mean 2.58095 Skewness Standard Error 0.23347 
Mean LCL 2.30444 Kurtosis 1.48304 
Mean UCL 2.85747 Kurtosis Standard Error 0.45392 
Variance 1.4381 Alternative Skewness (Fisher's) -0.09238 
Standard Deviation 1.19921 Alternative Kurtosis (Fisher's) -1.53236 
Mean Standard Error 0.11703 Coefficient of Variation 0.46464 
Minimum 1. Mean Deviation 1.08662 
Maximum 4. Second Moment 1.4244 
Range 3. Third Moment -0.15479 
Sum 271. Fourth Moment 3.00895 
Sum Standard Error 12.28821 Median 3. 
Total Sum Squares 849. Median Error 0.01431 
Adjusted Sum Squares 149.5619 Percentile 25% (Q1) 1. 
Geometric Mean 2.25658 Percentile 75% (Q2) 4. 
Harmonic Mean 1.92661 IQR 3. 
Mode 4. MAD 1. 
Variable #2 (Company Size) 
Count 105 Skewness -2.0979 
Mean 4.5619 Skewness Standard Error 0.23347 
Mean LCL 4.35735 Kurtosis 6.61781 
Mean UCL 4.76646 Kurtosis Standard Error 0.45392 
Variance 0.787 Alternative Skewness (Fisher's) -2.12843 
Standard Deviation 0.88713 Alternative Kurtosis (Fisher's) 3.85558 
Mean Standard Error 0.08657 Coefficient of Variation 0.19446 
Minimum 1. Mean Deviation 0.65923 
Maximum 5. Second Moment 0.7795 
Range 4. Third Moment -1.44381 
Sum 479. Fourth Moment 4.02112 
Sum Standard Error 9.09036 Median 5. 
Total Sum Squares 2,267. Median Error 0.01059 
Adjusted Sum Squares 81.84762 Percentile 25% (Q1) 5. 
Geometric Mean 4.43175 Percentile 75% (Q2) 5. 
Harmonic Mean 4.21969 IQR 0.E+0 
Mode 5. MAD 0.E+0 
Variable #3 (Company Age) 
Count 105 Skewness -1.06859 
Mean 4.15238 Skewness Standard Error 0.23347 
Mean LCL 3.87587 Kurtosis 2.79469 
Mean UCL 4.42889 Kurtosis Standard Error 0.45392 
Variance 1.4381 Alternative Skewness (Fisher's) -1.08414 
Standard Deviation 1.19921 Alternative Kurtosis (Fisher's) -0.15604 
Mean Standard Error 0.11703 Coefficient of Variation 0.2888 
Minimum 1. Mean Deviation 1.03329 
Maximum 5. Second Moment 1.4244 
Range 4. Third Moment -1.8166 
Sum 436. Fourth Moment 5.67018 
Sum Standard Error 12.28821 Median 5. 
Total Sum Squares 1,960. Median Error 0.01431 
Adjusted Sum Squares 149.5619 Percentile 25% (Q1) 3. 
Geometric Mean 3.90987 Percentile 75% (Q2) 5. 
Harmonic Mean 3.56335 IQR 2. 
Mode 5. MAD 0.E+0 
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Appendix  II-C (continued): Descriptive Statistics: Industry Distribution
13
 
Industry Code Industry Name What it includes Number of Points Percentage 
CON Construction 
Construction contractors 
(238), industrial building 
construction (236210) 
5 4.76% 
EEM 
Electrical and 
Electronics 
Manufacturing 
Computer and electronic 
product manufacturing 
(334), Electrical equipment, 
appliance and component 
manufacturing (335) 
13 12.38% 
FM 
Food 
Manufacturing 
Food (311), consumer 
packaged goods (one point) 
8 7.62% 
HM 
Healthcare 
Manufacturing 
Pharmaceutical and 
medicine manufacturing 
(325410), medical 
equipment manufacturing 
(339) 
12 11.43% 
IE 
Information and 
Entertainment 
Telecom (517), Gaming, 
tourism, restaurants 
7 6.67% 
MMM 
Metal 
Manufacturing 
Metal recycling, machinery 
manufacturing (333), 
primary metal 
manufacturing (331), 
fabricated metal 
manufacturing (332) 
11 10.48% 
OGM 
Oil and Gas 
Manufacturing 
Mining, quarrying, and oil 
and gas extraction (21), 
Power generation (221111) 
10 9.52% 
OTH Other 
Financial services, airline, 
maintenance, plumbing, 
aquaculture, transportation 
& warehousing, 
(professional, scientific and 
technical services (541), 
Shoe repair and retail, 
wholesale 
15 14.29% 
TM 
Transportation 
Manufacturing 
Transportation 
manufacturing (336) 
11 10.48% 
WP 
Wood and 
Plastics 
Plastic product 
manufacturing (3261), 
wood product 
manufacturing (321), textile 
manufacturing (313), paper 
manufacturing (322) 
13 12.38% 
                                                        
 
13 NAICS codes shown to the best of their availability 
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CHAPTER III. Strategizing Niceness in Co-opetition: The 
Case of Knowledge Exchange in Supply Chain Innovation 
Projects  
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we take a novel approach to address the dilemma of innovation 
sharing versus protection among supply chain partners. The paper conducts an 
exploratory study that introduces factors affecting a firm’s optimum supply chain 
innovation strategy. We go beyond the conventional Prisoners’ Dilemma, with its 
limiting assumptions of players’ preferences and symmetry, to explore a larger pool of 
2X2 games that may effectively model the problem. After classifying firm types 
according to collaboration motive and relative power, we use simulation to explore the 
effects of firm type, opponent type, and payoff structure on repeated innovation 
interactions (or, equivalently, long-term relations) and optimality of ‘niceness’. 
Surprisingly, we find that opponent type is essentially irrelevant in long-term innovation 
interactions, and focal firm type is only conditionally relevant. The paper contributes 
further by introducing reciprocation of strategy type (nice versus mean), showing that 
reciprocation is recommended, while identifying and explaining the exceptions to this 
conclusion. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Inter-firm knowledge sharing14 is now an integral part of organizational strategy. 
Firms pursue opportunities to increase their stock of corporate knowledge (Samaddar & 
Kadiyala, 2006) while sharing the costs and risks of knowledge creation (Tether, 2002). 
Nevertheless, the threat that unintended knowledge spillovers will diminish competitive 
advantage still persists (Ding & Huang, 2010). In particular, when “fine-grained tacit 
knowledge” is to be shared, the increasing preference for informal, as opposed to legal, 
safeguards elevates this risk (Lee & Johnson, 2010; Nair, Narasimhan, & Bendoly, 2011). 
We take the case of supply chain knowledge sharing between the participative members 
as a particular case to further discuss this dilemma.  
As supply chain knowledge exchanges have become increasingly indispensible 
(Eng, Chew, & Lee, 2014), a firm’s decision to share part of its internal knowledge with 
other members of the chain may be encouraged, but nonetheless partners must be trusted 
not to leak the shared knowledge to the competition. Thus, the risk of horizontal leakage 
of knowledge (to competition) is inherent in vertical sharing (with supply chain partners). 
In this context, the unintended knowledge spillover problem becomes each firm’s 
deliberate choice whether or not to leak its partner’s knowledge to that partner’s 
competition (e.g., a shared supplier may pass a manufacturer’s development plans to 
competing manufacturers). Because the outcome depends on the decisions of all parties, 
this multi-decision-maker problem can be effectively modeled as a game (Nagarajan & 
Sošić, 2008). We, therefore, adopt a game-theoretic perspective in an exploratory study 
of supply chain knowledge exchanges, to address whether a firm should:  
(1) readily share its knowledge with a partner; and/or 
(2) use partner’s knowledge in other linkages. 
For the most part, the literature on knowledge sharing has dichotomized this 
challenge as the choice to be a “good partner” or not (Hamel, 1991), or, more pointedly, 
as the choice to cooperate or defect (Nair, Narasimhan, & Choi, 2009). This knowledge-
sharing dilemma is also known as the “boundary paradox” (Quintas, Lefrere, & Jones, 
1997).  
                                                        
 
14 Knowledge sharing and knowledge exchange are used interchangeably. 
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We focus on a knowledge-sharing problem involving two firms (or players) in a 
supply chain. In our model, the firms have shared knowledge (e.g., innovation projects 
such as new product development), and each has the option of sharing it without the 
partner’s consent or keeping it within the partnership. Because each player must choose 
one of two alternatives, the relationship between the two players can be modeled as a 2×2 
game, in which each player chooses (simultaneously) whether to cooperate or defect. The 
best known of these games is Prisoners’ Dilemma, but there are many others in which the 
players’ values are different (Kilgour & Fraser, 1988; Rapoport & Guyer, 1978; 
Robinson & Goforth, 2005). In our view, the assumption of symmetric player 
motivations inherent in the Prisoners’ Dilemma payoff structure limits the applicability of 
the model, and does not facilitate an understanding of the relationship of partners’ 
preferences and actions. 
Our aim in this paper is to highlight a broader class of symmetric and asymmetric 
2×2 games that can model the knowledge-sharing dilemma among supply chain partners, 
in the context of joint innovation projects. Firms strive to involve supply chain partners in 
innovation activities in multiple ways including strategic commitment to price (Gilbert & 
Cvsa, 2003), subsidies provision (Kim, 2000), or direct exchanges of knowledge. We 
here focus on the latter to study decisions regarding incoming and outgoing knowledge 
flows, shedding light on how the different types of players (firms) interact by relaxing 
several of the assumptions of Prisoners’ Dilemma. For this purpose, we consider the six 
player types suggested by Perlo-Freeman (2006: 5). Cooperate-Defect (CD) Games are 
2×2 games in which  
“… for each player X, there exists a strategy of the other player, which we call ‘Co-
operate’, such that for each strategy for player X, he prefers the other player to choose 
Co-operate. We call the other strategy for each player ‘Defect’.” 
In other words, whatever X chooses, he/she prefers that partner Cooperate. 
Restricting attention to CD games enables us to classify firms along two dimensions:  
(1) Collaboration motive: What is the firm’s most preferred outcome? 
(2) Relative power: Which outcome does the firm prefer to avoid the most?  
The answers to these questions determine the player type. For example, a prisoner 
is a firm that prefers to defect (while partner cooperates, of course) and least prefers to 
cooperate (while partner defects). Thus we think of a prisoner as an aggressively 
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exploitative firm that most prefers to defect and least prefers to be suckered. The 
interaction of two prisoners is a Prisoners’ Dilemma.  The other five types are fully 
opportunistic, fearfully exploitative, fair, good and moral. 
We see CD games as particularly relevant to the supply chain knowledge-sharing 
dilemma in the short term, as each firm always prefers that its partner cooperate 
(maintain secrecy) rather than defect (expose secrets). We build on Perlo-Freeman’s 
definitions to characterize firms of different types and study their behaviors in one-time 
joint innovation projects.  
To address long-term relationships, we investigate the effect of repetition of the 
game on firms’ choices and outcomes using MATLAB simulation. We adopt Axelrod’s 
(1984) classification of long-term strategies as ‘nice’ or ‘mean’ according to their 
approach to supply chain relations, trustful or distrustful. A ‘nice’ firm never defects, 
except when provoked (defected against), whereas a ‘mean’ firm may defect without 
provocation. In particular, we are interested in conditions when sequences of cooperation 
might occur, and when they are vulnerable to unprovoked defection. 
The issue of provoked versus unprovoked defection carries a particular relevance 
to the supply chain, where communicating a policy of defection only when provoked 
would seem to signal fairness and trustworthiness, while the threat of unprovoked 
defection signals untrustworthiness. Managers tend to consider inter-firm relationships as 
polar opposites, either entirely cooperative or entirely competitive (Klein, Rai, & Straub, 
2007). In this study, we explore the conditions under which being trustful (nice) versus 
distrustful (mean) is advisable (see Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer (1998) for a 
review of inter-firm trust).  
This paper provides a relevant and timely expansion of the horizon of supply 
chain innovation games beyond Prisoners’ Dilemma. We introduce a pool of possible 
knowledge interactions by firms showing how they could be strategized in a supply 
chain. We also build on Axelrod’s (1984) findings on direct reciprocation (the famous 
TIT FOR TAT strategy) by introducing reciprocation of strategy type. One interesting 
finding is that the superiority of TIT FOR TAT is not universal, but depends on the 
relative gain from changing the opponent’s action versus the cost of changing one’s own. 
We identify seven payoff categories that help us explore the effect of different 
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motivations – gaining the greatest reward versus avoiding the worst punishment in 
exchange of knowledge between two firms in a supply chain. 
2. BACKGROUND/ LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The Joint Innovation Dilemma 
The joint innovation process (e.g., in supply chain) is a collaborative relationship 
in which organizations collectively implement a knowledge creation endeavor, sharing 
the expenses and the benefits of the newly created knowledge according to a mutually 
agreed rule (Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006). In this process, participating firms contribute 
useful knowledge to this pool, building up a “knowledge repository” retrievable by all 
members (Cress & Martin, 2006). For the endeavor to succeed, participating firms must 
allocate and share adequate resources (Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006). 
The conventional wisdom regarding collaborative knowledge creation generally 
directs firms to be “good partners” by being open and contributing knowledge to the 
shared pool. Hamel (1991) was the first to question this advice, suggesting that inter-firm 
collaboration can develop into a “race to learn”, in which a firm intends to “acquire” its 
partner’s skills as opposed to merely accessing them. The idea was that “good partners” 
with high transparency and collaborative intent tend to be exploited by opportunistic 
partners with lower transparency and competitive intent (Hamel, 1991). Larsson, 
Bengtsson, Henriksson, and Sparks (1998) build on this analysis, using a game-theoretic 
perspective, by developing a collective learning framework that explains both negative 
and positive learning processes. The authors highlight the distributive dimension and its 
effect on the appropriation of joint learning by individual organizations. 
Consequently, there is a trade-off between the integrative and distributive 
dimensions of collaborative knowledge creation (Larsson et al., 1998). Quintas et al. 
(1997) referred to this problem as “the boundary paradox”; where borders must be open 
for knowledge to flow, but core strategic knowledge, upon which survival depends, must 
be preserved. On similar grounds, Das and Teng (1998) define relational risk in terms of 
the probability that a partner does not cooperate, instead acting opportunistically and 
misusing the acquired knowledge. 
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Given the existence of both collaborative and competitive dimensions, joint 
innovation projects have often evolved into “mixed-motive” relations (Parkhe, 1993). In 
some cases, abundance of access to a firm’s knowledge has created new competitors 
(Arruñada & Vázquez, 2006). In others, leakage effects allowed the imitators to profit 
more from innovations than the original commercializers (Teece, 1986). Once a firm 
shares valuable and strategic knowledge externally, its ability to control access to this 
knowledge is severely compromised (Anand & Goyal, 2009). There is an obvious 
imperative to manage organizational knowledge strategically in order to optimize its 
flow. 
The literature suggests few ways to deal with the tension between sharing and 
protecting knowledge. Trust is one of the most significant ways of reducing partners’ 
opportunistic behavior (Das & Teng, 1998; Norman, 2004; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 
1998). Empirically, it has been shown that when firms build relational capital in 
conjunction with an integrative approach to managing conflict, they are able to 
simultaneously learn and protect (Kale & Singh, 2000). Other protection mechanisms 
include: (1) making company personnel aware of the need to protect certain knowledge 
and identifying the knowledge that needs protecting; (2) walling off critical knowledge 
from the joint project; and, (3) using contractual mechanisms that specifically identify 
proprietary data, as opposed to information that can be shared (Norman, 2001).  
2.2 Prisoners’ Dilemma: Knowledge Exchange, Co-opetition and Social 
Dilemmas 
The simultaneous motivation to cooperate and compete with the same business 
partner has been labeled as “co-opetition” (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995, 1996). 
Even though the literature has mostly, if not exclusively, referred to horizontal co-
opetition (with direct competitors), we here acknowledge the presence of competitive 
forces with supply chain partners, who typically work also with competitors, and may 
leak strategic knowledge. Heide and Miner (1992) see buyer-supplier interactions as 
competitive and best represented by Prisoners’ Dilemma, but they take an operational 
perspective (they define competition in terms of pricing decisions, inventory costs, and 
delivery terms) as opposed to the knowledge-based perspective we adopt here. The 
opportunity to create rents through simultaneous competition and cooperation has been 
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conceptually examined using a game-theoretic lens (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995; 
Heide & Miner, 1992; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997; Parkhe, 1993). 
More specifically, co-opetitive knowledge sharing interactions have been seen as 
instances of social dilemmas (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002; Quigley, Tesluk, Locke, & 
Bartol, 2007). “Social dilemmas are situations in which each member of a group has a 
clear and unambiguous incentive to make a choice that -- when made by all members -- 
provides poorer outcomes for all than they would have received if none had made the 
choice” (Dawes & Messick, 2000). In such collaborative interactions, a better-for-all 
outcome may not be fully attainable because of individual temptations to pursue “selfish” 
goals while free riding on others’ contributions (Y. Wu, Loch, & Ahmad, 2011). The 
dilemma, therefore, represents a tension between individual and collective rationality, 
where individual rationality leads to collective irrationality (Kollock, 1998; Wang, 
Gwebu, Shanker, & Troutt, 2009). Unfortunately, the solution to games involving social 
dilemmas includes at least one deficient equilibrium, i.e., there is always another outcome 
that is better for everyone (Kollock, 1998). 
Prisoners’ dilemma is the two-person social dilemma that has received the most 
attention in the context of knowledge sharing (Kollock, 1998). “The essence of the 
dilemma is that each individual actor has an incentive to act according to competitive, 
narrow self-interest even though all actors are collectively better off (i.e., receive higher 
rewards) if they cooperate” (Cable & Shane, 1997). Prisoners’ Dilemma neatly illustrates 
the rationale of innovation-related co-opetition from a game-theoretic perspective (Ritala 
& Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). In most, if not all, co-opetitive situations, it is 
advantageous for each partner to “defect” and pursue individual interests at the expense 
of others (Hennart, 1991; Kogut, 1989). Firms may defect by withholding knowledge, not 
fulfilling promises, stealing a partner’s proprietary technology, or hiring the partner’s key 
personnel (Parkhe, 1993). The complexity of the problem is exacerbated by the further 
difficulty to observe defections, i.e., partner deciding to withhold rather than share 
knowledge (Gächter, von Krogh, & Haefliger, 2010). 
2.3 Repeated/ Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma represents multiple firm interactions on joint 
innovation projects. The main significance of the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma is the fact 
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that repeated interaction exposes one’s strategy, which may overcome the dominance of 
defection, producing mutual cooperation. Players are mindful of the fact that observed 
actions will be reciprocated and are therefore motivated to signal cooperative behavior 
(Z. Wu, Choi, & Rungtusanatham, 2010). In an iterated prisoners’ dilemma, decisions in 
one round affect decisions (and outcomes) of subsequent rounds, altering the utility of 
each cooperation/ defection decision (Rokkan, Heide, & Wathne, 2003). The most 
influential work on the iterated prisoners’ dilemma is Axelrod’s The Evolution of 
Cooperation (1984). In this work, Axelrod reports on two tournaments, in which subject 
matter experts were invited to submit strategies for an iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma 
tournament. The winning strategy, TIT-FOR-TAT, carries the main message of his work: 
It is beneficial to be seen to reciprocate the actions of the partner, be they cooperation or 
defection. 
Furthermore, Axelrod delivers three more suggestions on how to do well in an 
iterated prisoners’ dilemma, namely: (1) Realize that the aim is not to destroy the 
opponent, and therefore refrain from comparing payoffs or being envious, (2) Be mindful 
of opponent’s adaptation by refraining from overly complex strategies that cannot be 
distinguished from randomness, and finally, (3) Be “nice.” Axelrod made the striking 
claim that the single best predictor of the performance of a strategy is its “niceness”, i.e., 
whether it could ever defect first. This result will be challenged and further investigated 
in this chapter. 
Although Axelrod’s work was “far and away the most influential study of 
strategic solutions to social dilemmas” (Kollock, 1998), it did receive a number of 
criticisms. The reciprocal altruism represented by TIT-FOR-TAT was found to perform 
very badly in noisy environments and to be extremely vulnerable to disturbances 
(Molander, 1985). Even though Axelrod never claimed TIT-FOR-TAT to be a 
universally superior strategy regardless of opponent or conditions, critics still argued that 
other strategies, including those that allow for mutations, forgiveness, and different kinds 
of reciprocity, frequently work better (Brams & Kilgour, 2012; Molander, 1985; Nowak, 
2006; Sigmund, 2010). Below we confirm that TIT-FOR-TAT performs well, but not 
necessarily best, in an iterated context. As will be shown later, our simulation results 
confirm that other strategies score higher on average. 
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2.4 A Gap in the Literature: Beyond Prisoners’ Dilemma  
Very few studies have gone beyond Prisoners’ Dilemma to acknowledge the 
representativeness of other 2X2 games (e.g., Chicken and Stag Hunt games) to the 
knowledge-sharing dilemma. Scholars have sometimes recognized the potential of these 
other games but there has been little further analysis (Parkhe, 1993; Ritala & 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Kollock (1998), for instance, states that the three games 
of: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken and Assurance (Stag Hunt) are the key two-person 
social dilemma games, and even argues that the latter is a more accurate model of some 
social dilemmas. The dynamics of these games have been less explored; here we take a 
step toward filling this void by applying them in the context of joint innovation practices 
in supply chains. 
The most notable work on a wider pool of relevant games that apply to the 
context of collective action (including knowledge-sharing relations) is a working paper 
by Perlo-Freeman (2006) on what he calls the ‘Co-operate-Defect’ games, as defined in 
the introduction. In such games, a player always prefers that the opponent Cooperate 
rather than Defect.  
The attractiveness of the aforementioned games lies in their relevance to several 
contexts including supply chain joint innovations, in which firms always prefer their 
partner to ‘cooperate’. Perlo-Freeman finds that players in ‘cooperate-defect’ games can 
be classified into six types based on their preference orderings: prisoner, chicken, 
deterrer, appeaser, warrior and pacifist. The author further argues that there is no 
particular reason to assume that players in a game face identical priorities and constraints 
(i.e., players are not necessarily the same type), so asymmetric games are equally worthy 
of attention. In our study, we follow Perlo-Freeman’s recommendations and consider the 
whole pool of ‘cooperate-defect’ games (symmetric and asymmetric) when two firms in a 
supply chain opt to practice joint innovation. 
3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
3.1 Player Types Framework 
Our notation for a cooperate-defect game is shown in Table III-1. The focal player 
(focal firm for which optimum decisions are studied) is the row chooser. The focal player 
STRATEGIZING NICENESS IN CO-OPETITION  EMAN NASR 
 131 
decides whether to cooperate or defect. In the context of joint supply chain innovation, 
cooperation may be viewed as sharing knowledge readily with the project partner and 
protecting partner’s knowledge from reaching its competitors, while defecting is the 
opposite. The focal player’s utilities (payoffs) are as follows: 
R: reward (payoff from mutual cooperation) 
S: sucker’s payoff (from unilateral cooperation) 
T: temptation (payoff from unilateral defection) 
P: punishment (from mutual defection) 
The focal player’s opponent is the column chooser. Each player must choose 
either to cooperate (C) or defect (D). Payoffs must satisfy two conditions (1) S < R, and, 
(2) P < T; i.e., focal player prefers opponent cooperation regardless of focal player’s 
choice. This gives rise to six preference orderings, introduced by Perlo-Freeman (2006): 
1. Prisoner: T > R > P > S 
2. Chicken: T > R > S > P 
3. Appeaser: R > T > P > S 
4. Deterrer: R > T > S > P 
5. Warrior: T > P > R > S 
6. Pacifist: R > S > T > P 
We think of Perlo-Freeman’s six preference orderings as defining six player types 
with the descriptive names given above. In the context of joint supply chain, they can be 
classified along the two dimensions of collaboration motive and power. The first 
dimension, collaboration motive, refers to the preferred outcome from the interaction 
with a supply chain partner. Three motives are identified:  
(1) Race to learn: (T > R > S & P) (orderings 1 and 2), where the focal player’s 
main goal is to induce the opponent to cooperate, yielding either the temptation payoff, 
which it prefers, or the mutual reward. Such firms are exploitative in the short term. That 
is, if they do not perceive/ plan for future projects with the partner, they tend to defect in 
a current knowledge exchange. 
(2) Mutual cooperation: (R > T > S & P) (orderings 3 and 4), where the focal 
player’s main goal is truly looking for a two-way cooperation, and if not that then the 
temptation payoff. Such firms are cooperative in the short term. That is, if they do not 
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perceive/ plan for future projects with the partner, they tend to cooperate in a current 
knowledge exchange. 
(3) Extreme motives: (either P > R or S > T) (orderings 5 and 6), where one of the 
less preferred outcomes, with payoff S or P, is second in the preference ordering. Such a 
firm’s behavior is determined, even in the long term, regardless of the opponent’s 
choices. That is, the motivation (to cooperate in case of S > T, or to defect in case S > T) 
is strong enough to dictate the same decision in both short-term and long-term knowledge 
exchanges. 
The second dimension relates to a firm’s relative power between the two supply 
chain partners. Power is a key concept that introduces new motivations to a game (Wolf 
& Shubik, 1974). It can be defined in terms of several aspects including, the ability to 
reward or punish an opponent, the cost of exercising rewards or punishments (Wolf & 
Shubik, 1974), or in terms of opponent replaceability (Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 
1995, 1998). We adopt the latter definition, which is most appropriate to supply chains, 
where power can be seen as inversely proportional to switching cost (ease and cost of 
replacing a partner) (Kumar et al., 1998). This is indicated by what a firm would mostly 
avoid from an interaction, which by assumption must be S or P.  If a firm’s least possible 
utility is P, it cannot afford to lose a deal and would rather be suckered, it signals low 
power, or a high need for its partner. On the other hand, if a firm’s least possible utility is 
S, it would rather lose the deal than be suckered, signaling higher power and less need for 
its partner. A framework for firm types is shown in Figure III-1. 
It is worth emphasizing that the firm types explained above are commonly 
encountered in supply chain innovation projects. A prisoner, or an aggressively 
exploitative partner, can be viewed as a jointly innovating firm in a race-to-patent. Such 
a firm benefits from developing a new product with a partner, but gets even greater return 
for exclusive patent privileges, and drives away its partner’s rights (T > R). A two-
prisoner interaction (i.e., prisoners’ dilemma) represents a two-way race for patent on a 
jointly developed technology or product, where the greatest payoff is for exclusive rights, 
followed by shared rights, with total loss of patent rights to partner coming as the worst 
outcome. An example is Sears Inc., which was benefiting well (by getting reward R) 
from the exclusive right to sell its supplier’s shared product innovation, the “Bionic 
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Wrench” of “LoggerHead Tools”. The company, yet, sought higher temptation payoff (T) 
from defecting by giving the idea to its offshore tool manufacturer, Craftsman (Collins, 
2012). 
A chicken, or aggressively exploitative partner, has the same motivations, except 
that it has much higher dependence on its opponent, making loss of the deal more 
destructive than giving up patent privilege altogether. In the above example, LoggerHead 
Tools illustrates a chicken being unable to replace Sears’ large orders and missing 
resources to drag out the lawsuit, leading it to tolerate a defecting partner rather than lose 
the deal and suffer bankruptcy (Collins, 2012). 
Both appeaser and deterrer, equally good and fair partners, enter into a joint 
project looking for the expanded pool of knowledge and expanded rewards. The 
difference is that the former’s low power means that it nonetheless benefits by 
contributing more knowledge to the partnership, even if the opponent misuses it (S > P). 
The latter, however, places higher proprietorship value on its knowledge, that it would 
rather lose the partnership than find that its knowledge has been leaked away (P  > S).  
On the other hand, a warrior, or a fully opportunistic partner, is a very powerful 
firm that can never be defeated. It wants only deals in which it can suck away partner’s 
knowledge. An example is the largest turbine manufacturer in China, Sinovel Wind 
Group Co. Ltd., which stopped doing business with one of its suppliers, American 
Superconductor Corp. (AMSC) after “stealing” intellectually protected technology 
related to wind turbines (Ailworth, 2011). This signals the extreme preference for 
temptation, followed by ending the deal (T and P are the greatest payoffs) as opposed to 
any cooperative outcome. Finally, a Pacifist, or moral partner, always benefits from 
cooperating. This could be a company that prefers losing patent privilege to facing 
infringement penalties (S > T). Such a scenario is common when opponents are well 
protected legally by intellectual property rights such as the series of lawsuits between 
Samsung and Apple Inc. (Carare, 2013; Duhigg & Lohr, 2012). 
3.2 One Shot Game 
How do the player types above behave in a one-shot interaction (equivalently one-
time innovation project or at least one in which there is no intent of a future interaction)? 
Nash equilibrium analysis produces Figure III-2. Only 5 games end up with mutual 
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cooperation (indicated by the green squares). As expected, a Warrior always defects, and 
a Pacifist always cooperates, because of their unconditional preference for defection and 
cooperation, respectively. Similarly, a Prisoner will always defect and an Appeaser will 
always cooperate in a one-time interaction, as their dominant strategies dictate. As we 
will show, however, there is a great difference between dominant and unconditionally 
preferred strategies in the repeated game context.  In 16 games there is defection at least 
from one side, or as part of a mixed strategy. This motivates our subsequent study on the 
effect of repeated interaction on the one-shot equilibria. 
3.3 Repeated Interactions 
In a repeated game, a player can be induced to avoid an otherwise dominant 
strategy. For example, Axelrod (1981, 1984) suggested that in repeated Prisoners’ 
Dilemma players (whom we call prisoners) can be induced to cooperate, despite their 
one-shot dominant strategy of defection.  
Similar to the logic behind a prisoner’s behavior, a chicken would prefer to signal 
cooperative intent in a repeated interaction to induce its partner to cooperate, to avoid the 
worst outcome. A deterrer can be easily induced by partner’s actions, as it prefers to 
mimic them. Therefore, it is expected that a deterrer will tend to match its partner’s 
actions. Although an appeaser has a dominant strategy of cooperation, still finds T > S, so 
it may try to take advantage. Finally, as suggested by Perlo-Freeman (2006), the 
unconditionally preferred behaviors of warrior and pacifist cannot be overcome, even in a 
repeated game. This makes the behavior of the first four types more compelling to test, 
with the latter pair representing a null hypothesis.  
In the pool of 10 games among the four inducible players, prisoner, chicken, 
deterrer, and appeaser, we are particularly interested in whether repetition of the games 
would stimulate cooperative behavior, especially as, in 8 of these games, equilibrium 
involves defection (Figure III-2). As a first step, we would like to characterize long-term 
“cooperative behavior” in testable terms, namely as “niceness”. Nice strategies are 
defined by Axelrod (1984) as strategies that never defect first. In a repeated (long-term) 
interaction, a firm that is pursuing a “nice” strategy defects only in response to 
opponent’s defection. Alternatively, a firm that employs unprovoked defection, even if it 
is only occasional, is pursuing a “mean” strategy. 
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Under what conditions is niceness advisable in repeated innovation interactions? 
The answer may involve several factors, including player type, opponent type, opponent 
strategy, payoff structure and length of relationship (number of game iterations). In the 
next section, we will test these factors to assess when nice strategies are superior to their 
mean counterparts. Simulating the different player types, strategies, and payoff structures 
will enable us to reach several managerial recommendations regarding cooperative 
behavior in repeated innovation projects. 
4. THE SIMULATION STUDY 
Simulation is widely recognized as an “effective pragmatic” research 
methodology for studying supply chain management issues, especially for problems that 
are more complex, require detailed analysis, or involve random elements (Nair et al., 
2009; Swaminathan, Smith, & Sadeh, 1998). Given the infinitely many possibilities for 
long-term interaction strategies, as well as the fact that randomness is involved in some 
of those strategies, simulation is a reasonable and feasible platform for this study. Our 
aim is to determine what behaviors of prisoner, chicken, appeaser, and deterrer maximize 
their returns in a repeated-game environment, in games that may or may not be 
symmetric (i.e., players of the same type). These four player types seem to be most 
realistic, interesting, and relevant to the supply chain context. Extreme motive relations 
where firms are completely unadaptable to partner’s actions are far from being common, 
especially in long-term relations. In addition, their lack of adaptability makes them less 
appealing for long-term analysis. 
In particular, we are interested in whether player prospects are affected by 
repetition of interaction. We use MATLAB to code the playing of the games, and twenty 
strategies chosen to be as representative as possible. The selection of strategies was 
informed by a general search on the terms ‘Iterated Prisoners Dilemma’ and ‘Repeated 
Prisoners Dilemma’.  The criteria for selection included that the strategy has been clearly 
explained in the literature, that it can be classified as ‘nice’ or ‘mean’, that it can be 
matched with an essentially identical strategy of the other classification, and that if is not 
too complex to code. Although whether a behavior is successful in a game depends on the 
payoffs, it is yet zero-independent and scale-independent (adding a constant to every 
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payoff or multiplying all payoffs by the same positive number should not change the 
results). However, it may well depend on the relative gaps between the payoffs, which we 
call the payoff structure. 
We simulated several payoff structures according to the magnitude of differences 
among the focal player’s payoffs: S, P, R and T. The structure is described in terms of the 
differences between consecutive payoffs, starting with the lowest. Gaps can be either 
‘small’, S, or ‘big’, B, giving rise to seven broad categories of payoff patterns, SSS or 
BBB, where differences are equal (we call this one EQUI), SBB, BSB, BBS, BSS, SBS, 
and SSB. We carried out several simulations in which the ratio of B to S ranged from 2 to 
400. Although in some cases, our results depended on the payoff pattern, the specific 
value of the ratio of B to S did not seem to affect our results significantly. 
The main game adapts each set of payoffs to each of the four player types: 
prisoner, chicken, deterrer and appeaser, according to the player’s preference ordering. 
Each player then plays a sequence of games with every player type, using each of the 20 
strategies defined in Table III-2. The result is shown in terms of the ranking of the 20 
strategies for each player, from best to worst. For each player, three rankings are shown: 
(1) rankings of all strategies against the 10 nice opponents only; (2) rankings of strategies 
against the 10 mean strategies only; and, (3) ranking of strategies against all 20 opponent 
strategies. Modules are subsequently programmed to assess the following: 
(1) Which factors, firm type, opponent type, and/or payoff structure, determine 
the optimum innovation strategy for firms in long-term interactions?  
(2) In what way can determinants from (1) dictate niceness in innovation 
strategies? 
Results of the above questions are discussed in section 5. 
4.1 Exploring Determinants of Optimum Strategy 
To assess whether opponent type affects advisability of strategies, we simulated 
the 10 games allowing each player type to play 600 iterations with each opponent type. 
This simulation was carried out for each of the seven payoff structures.  Note that exact 
values for each payoff structure were chosen arbitrarily, as is typical in studies on iterated 
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prisoner dilemma -- see Axelrod (1984)
15
. Further analysis also proved that within a 
payoff structure, differences are insignificant (see sub-section 4.2). Kendall’s τ (Kendall 
rank correlation coefficient) was then calculated to make 24 comparisons. Kendall’s τ 
was used as it is a non-parametric, easily calculable, and a fair measure of rank 
correlation (Kendall, 1938). For example, a prisoner is ranked when playing against the 
following: another prisoner (PP ranking), chicken (PC ranking), deterrer (PD ranking) 
and appeaser (PA ranking). Six comparisons are performed to compare each pair of the 
four prisoner rankings. The same test was performed for the other three players, resulting 
in 24 comparisons. For all 24 comparisons, rankings are highly correlated with no 
statistically significant differences.  We, therefore, conclude that, all other things being 
equal, opponent type does not matter in strategy rankings across all player types and all 
payoff structures. 
The same procedure was repeated across payoff structures to compare how player 
types perform using different strategies against the same opponent type. For example, the 
four player types were ranked when playing against a prisoner providing: PP ranking, CP 
ranking, DP ranking, and AP ranking. Six comparisons are performed to compare each 
two of the four prisoner rankings. The same procedure was applied to the other three 
players, resulting in 24 comparisons.  
4.2 Exploring Determinants of Niceness 
This module of the simulation investigates whether nice strategies are superior to 
their mean counterparts, and what the conditions for their superiority are. The module 
plays three games to capture rankings for each player across the seven categories of 
payoff structures (Note that from 4.1 opponent type does not cause any significant 
difference in rankings so only three games as opposed to ten were simulated). Two 
payoff structures were simulated within each of the categories to determine whether exact 
payoff values matter within a category. Rankings are then recorded for each player, 
throughout several iterations, 300, 400, 500 and 600, to ensure robustness of findings. 
Firstly, a test was carried out to compare rankings of each pair of payoff values within a 
                                                        
 
15 A similar argument applies to the choice of number of iterations. This is commonly arbitrary in the literature. In the 
context of long term innovation endeavors, 600 interactions readily cover what companies consider to be ‘long-term’. 
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category of payoffs. Kendall’s τ was used to make the comparison. No difference was 
significant (see Table III-A1 in Appendix). 
The lack of significant difference between payoff values within a category of 
payoffs justifies restricting our analysis to one set of payoffs in each category. Therefore, 
the nice versus mean comparison was carried out for one set of payoffs within each 
payoff category (and across player types) to test for the superiority of nice strategies over 
their mean counterparts, when playing against (1) only nice strategies, (2) only mean 
strategies, and (3) a mix of nice and mean strategies. To do so, we performed a Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon test (a non-parametric two-sided rank sum test) to compare whether 
nice strategies tend to achieve greater payoffs than their mean counterparts. 
5. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
There is no evidence that the rankings of a player’s strategies depend on the type 
of the opponent. In other words, all else being equal, a prisoner (i.e., an aggressively 
exploitative partner), for instance, has essentially the same strategy rankings whether it 
plays against another prisoner, a chicken, a deterrer or an appeaser, as long as comparison 
is made over the same set of strategies (see Table III-A2 in Appendix). This implies that, 
although in a one-shot interaction actions and outcome are sensitive to opponent type 
(Figure III-2), in a repeated interaction, advisable actions for a player do not depend on 
opponent type. 
Secondly, by taking a close look at the comparison results among player types 
(see Table III-A3 in Appendix), it is evident that different player types perform 
essentially the same in all payoffs except three: SSB, BSS, or BSB. These three payoff 
structures share the property of having a (relative) middle S, which means that there is a 
relatively small difference between T and R on one side (outcomes from opponent 
cooperating), and, S and P on the other (outcomes from opponent defecting). This means 
that within these payoff structures a player gains relatively little by ‘training’ the 
opponent to be cooperative. In this case, correlations among rankings of different players 
(when playing with same opponent) are negative and/or not significant. This implies that, 
when there is relatively little value in inducing the opponent to cooperate, each player 
type will be advised differently. Otherwise, the high value from inducing cooperation 
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unifies advisable strategies across different player preferences. These results suggest that 
both player type and payoff structure are determinants for optimum innovation strategy. 
Moreover, we notice from test results on player type that negative correlations 
and/or lack of significance are consistent along all three middle S payoff structures when 
comparison is made between prisoner and appeaser, or between chicken and deterrer. 
This result is quite intuitive, given that these are the two maximally different pairs, in 
terms of payoff preference (see Figure III-3). On one hand, a prisoner has high power and 
a Race to Learn motivation, whereas an appeaser has low power and a Mutual 
Cooperation motivation. On another hand, a chicken has low power and a Race to Learn 
motivation, while a deterrer has high power and a Mutual Cooperation motivation. It is 
not surprising that rankings are maximally different across each of these two pairs. Below 
we discuss the results of the module, which investigates whether nice strategies are 
superior to mean ones. 
5.1 General Results: Reciprocation of Strategy Type 
Testing the hypothesis that nice strategies are superior to their mean counterparts 
(at the 0.05 level), we made the following general observations: 
1. Nice strategies yield a significantly greater expected payoff compared to their 
mean counterparts against a nice opponent, regardless of opponent type. 
2. Nice strategies do not yield significantly greater expected payoff compared to 
their mean counterparts against mean opponents, regardless of opponent type. 
3. Nice strategies yield a significantly greater expected payoff compared to their 
mean counterparts against a (balanced) combination of nice and mean 
strategies, regardless of opponent type. 
According to these results, inasmuch as it can be perceived, a player should 
reciprocate his/ her opponent’s strategy type as opposed to actions (see Axelrod (1984) 
on TIT FOR TAT). Even though this reciprocation result contrasts with the underlying 
assumption of several economic models, conventional game-theoretic models in 
particular, stating that agents are self-interested, it extends results of action fairness or 
fair play. Experiments suggest that cooperative behavior in Sequential Prisoners’ 
Dilemma reflects what is known as “positive reciprocation” (Clark & Sefton, 2001). 
Moreover, in models of “reciprocal altruism”, where cooperation is a best response to 
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cooperation, and defection a best response to defection, the one-shot equilibrium involves 
matching (Andreoni & Miller, 1993). Our findings extend results from the literature 
about reciprocation of partner’s action in both repeated and sequential prisoners’ 
dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Clark & Sefton, 2001; Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross, 
1996; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Fehr & Gächter, 1998) by suggesting reciprocation of 
strategy type (niceness) as a generalized result not applying solely for prisoners but 
extended to the four player types studied herein. In other words, a firm observing a nice 
strategy from its innovation partner should also adopt a nice strategy to maximize return. 
Table III-3 shows samples of typical results for the general reciprocation rule. 
5.2 Exception: Relative Versus Absolute Gains from Inducement 
The reciprocation results, discussed above, have two main exceptions, depending 
on the payoff structure. In these two exceptions, a player may abuse nice opponents by 
pursuing a mean strategy, or may pursue a nice strategy against mean opponents. Table 
III-4 shows these exceptions, in which previously significant results (at the 0.05 level) are 
replaced by weakly significant or insignificant p-values; previously non-significant 
results are replaced by either strongly or weakly significant values of p (p < 0.1). 
These exceptions can be attributed to the relative gain from inducing opponent’s 
cooperation, that is, the benefit of changing one’s opponent’s actions relative to changing 
one’s own. In the three payoff structures of SSB, BSB, and BSS, it makes relatively little 
difference whether the opponent cooperates or defects. In this case, the player cares less 
to induce the opponent to cooperate and may, therefore, pursue a mean strategy even with 
nice opponents. However, in other payoff structures where it makes a relatively large 
difference whether the opponent cooperates or defects (namely BBS, SBB and SBS), a 
player may accommodate its (mean) opponent by pursuing nice strategies.  
For the former exception, results that originally showed nice strategies to be 
significantly better than their mean counterparts now show either weak significance (0.05 
< p < 0.1) or insignificance. And for the latter exception, results that originally showed 
that nice strategies are not significantly superior to their mean counterparts now show 
either strong or weak significance (p < 0.1). Table III-4 shows the details of exceptions.  
If we take a closer look at Table III-4, we observe a pattern in the (first) “Nice 
Abuse Exception” regarding player types. A prisoner will always be advised to abuse its 
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mean opponent when the relative gain rule applies, while an appeaser is never advised to 
follow such a strategy. This result seems quite intuitive, given the fact that a prisoner is 
both exploitative and powerful, and may therefore be abusive, while an appeaser is 
cooperative and powerless, and is not expected to be abusive (see Framework in Figure 
III-1). As for the other two players, deterrer and chicken, each is either exploitative or 
powerful, and may be well advised to abuse nice opponents in a single payoff structure. 
In the SSB payoff, a chicken’s biggest (relative) gain is from obtaining T by defecting 
against a cooperative strategy. While in the BSS payoff, a deterrer gains relatively little 
by moving from unilateral defection (T) to mutual cooperation (R), and would, therefore, 
not be advised to make the move. 
In the second exception, the gain from inducing a change in opponent’s behavior 
is substantial (SBB, SBS, and BBS). The substantial middle jump of payoffs from S and 
P on one side to R and T on the other side motivates niceness, even against mean 
strategies, hoping to prompt cooperation. A player would try hard to induce cooperation 
by defecting opponents, ending up with either R or T. In this case, we say that a player’s 
payoff may depend more on the opponent’s action than the player’s own action. In the 
BBS payoff, however, players can still achieve relatively high gains with mean 
(defective) opponents through changing their own actions and moving between S and P. 
5.3 The Prisoner Base-Case Exception 
According to the above conclusions, the base case in which payoffs are 
equidistant (SSS) should support the general result on strategy reciprocation (5.1). 
However, we still observe some (weak) evidence that nice strategies are superior to 
mean, and only for prisoner types. Although this observation is not in line with the 
relative gains rule, it does confirm the findings of Axelrod (1984), who used equidistant 
payoffs and concluded that nice strategies perform better than mean ones. We here 
contend, however, that this is a specific conclusion applicable to prisoners, and does not 
necessarily apply to other firm types. 
6. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The results presented in this paper provide several insights regarding strategies of 
managing joint innovations in supply chains, under several conditions including: (1) 
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intent of each firm from the joint innovation relation, (2) relative power of each firm, in 
terms of partner replaceability, and, (3) relative motivations of gaining most reward 
versus avoiding worst punishment (payoff structure). Together, (1) and (2) define what 
we call firm “type”, which may play a key role in determining the best strategies to 
pursue in supply chain innovation relations. In these risky venues, where firms’ strategic 
knowledge is at stake, firms may be aggressively exploitative, fearfully exploitative, 
good, fair, moral or fully opportunistic. 
Exploring advisable long-term strategies for a focal firm, one surprising result 
was the fact that partner’s intent and power (i.e., partner type) does not affect the focal 
firm’s advisable strategies. In contrast to one-shot interactions, in long-term interactions, 
opponent innovation strategy is what matters, regardless of its type or preferences from 
collaboration (Table III-5 summarizes results). On the other hand, the importance of 
intent and power of the focal firm itself in driving its decisions of what strategy to adopt, 
is contingent on its motivation to signal cooperative behavior and induce it in its partner. 
When there is relatively high gain from signaling cooperative behavior, firm type is less 
important and the different firm types are similarly advised as to what strategies to adopt. 
However, when the gain from signaling cooperativeness is relatively low, firm types are 
advised differently and may pursue diverse strategies. This latter conclusion of diversity 
in advisable strategies is most pronounced among maximally different types of firms, i.e., 
ones that are different in both power (high versus low) and collaboration intent (mutual 
cooperation versus race to learn). 
Firms that engage in repetition of innovation interactions can induce cooperative 
behavior, or niceness, in four “inducible” partner types: the fearfully exploitative, the 
aggressively exploitative, the fair, and the good partners. Our results support the 
conventional wisdom regarding action reciprocation (by, for example, TIT FOR TAT) 
and reciprocal altruism by introducing reciprocation of strategies. Companies are advised 
to pursue cooperative strategies that never defect first, i.e., nice strategies, only when 
opponents pursue similarly cooperative strategies. Otherwise, companies may be well 
advised to consider defecting.  
The above recommendation, however, is subject to conditions related to relative 
gains from attempting to change partner’s actions (See Figure III-4). A firm may abuse a 
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“good partner” when the relative gain from inducement is insignificant, and it may be 
nice to be a “bad partner” when the relative gain from inducement is significant. The 
generalizability of abuse, however, is still subject to the firm’s power and the nature of its 
collaboration motive. Finally, it is worth noting that relative gains from different 
combinations of actions can be placed into seven broad categories, where differences in 
behavior within each category are not significant, but differences in behavior across 
categories are significant. 
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This paper presents an exploratory study that highlights a pool of symmetric and 
asymmetric 2X2 games that can effectively model the knowledge-sharing dilemma 
among supply chain partners that jointly innovate. We study how the different types of 
players (firms) interact by classifying them along two dimensions: collaboration motive 
and relative power. We then proceed using a simulation to study repeated innovation 
interactions (equivalently long-term relations), exploring the effects of firm type, 
opponent type, and strategy type (nice versus mean). Our results show the complete 
irrelevance of opponent type, and the contingent relevance of focal firm type on advisable 
strategies in long-term innovation interactions. We also extend the literature on action 
reciprocation (e.g., TIT-FOR-TAT) by promoting reciprocation of strategy type (nice 
versus mean), naming and explaining three conditions as exceptions to this reciprocation. 
While this research provides some interesting results, our work provides 
opportunities for further future extension. Firstly, information about opponent’s real 
motive from collaboration may be unavailable or at least not accurate. In other words, 
companies may not know about their partner’s preferences, their real gains or losses from 
losing deals, losing knowledge, or abusing knowledge, or from mutual cooperation. 
Secondly, dichotomizing cooperation decisions may be unrealistic in cases where it is 
difficult to define cooperation as a yes or no question (Larsson et al., 1998). Moreover, 
we recognize that we considered only 20 strategies in an infinite universe -- considering 
more may lead to more robust conclusions. Finally, real supply chains involve multiple 
actors, as opposed to dyads, and other motivations such as reputation building and 
altruism may figure into decisions. 
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Our study can, therefore, be extended along several dimensions. One extension is 
to consider the “shadow of the future” or the probability of the game ending at any 
iteration. In a supply chain, this can represent the value of dealing with the same partner 
again, or the likelihood of repeated projects. Moreover, we characterized cooperative 
behavior using only niceness, but other features, such as forgiveness, can be studied as 
another dimension of cooperation. Furthermore, the fact that some interactions may 
involve elements of negotiation and can be represented as cooperative games also applies 
to supply chains, in which payoff division from joint projects are agreed upon and use of 
partner’s knowledge can be negotiated (for example, in an intellectual property 
agreement).  
Another extension may expand the level of analysis to the network, 
acknowledging both the presence of several partners in a supply chain and the possible 
evolution of strategies in the determination of which one survives as the fittest. Finally, 
supply chain decisions involve several relational elements, such as care for the other, or 
‘warm glow altruism’ (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982). Altruism is 
particularly relevant to the supply chain context as payoffs are likely interdependent. 
Further experiments can study the effect of social capital and length of previous 
relationships with partners on supply chain cooperation. 
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8. TABLES 
Table III-1 
Payoff Matrix For Focal (row) Player 
 
Opponent 
Cooperate Defect 
F
o
ca
l 
P
la
y
er
 Cooperate R S 
Defect T P 
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Table III-2 
Strategy Definitions 
Strategy 
Name 
Explanation Strategy Name Explanation 
TIT-FOR-
TAT 
Cooperate in the first round, then mimic 
opponent’s action in previous round. 
MISTRUST 
Starts with defection. If defected against, it responds with a defect. 
Otherwise, it cooperates. 
ALLC Always cooperate. ALLD Always defect. 
REVISED 
DOWNING 
Same as DOWNING, but starts with two rounds 
of cooperation. 
DOWNING 
The DOWNING player defects on the first two rounds, then decides which 
move to make on the basis of the opponent's track record: It reviews the 
game record, determining how often in the past the opponent has responded 
to defection with defection and how often it has responded to cooperation 
with defection.  It then assumes that the opponent will continue to respond 
to future acts of cooperation and defection with cooperation and defection 
in the same proportions.  Finally, DOWNING computes whether it is more 
profitable to cooperate or to defect, given the opponent's response policy, 
and makes the appropriate move.  (In cases where the strategy would be 
cooperating for the first time, it assumes that the probability that an 
opponent will respond to cooperation with cooperation is fifty percent.) 
SOFT 
MAJORITY 
Starts with cooperate. Plays the way the opponent 
has played in the majority of the previous rounds. 
A tie goes to cooperate. 
HARD 
MAJORITY 
Starts with defect. Plays the way the opponent has played in the majority of 
the previous rounds. A tie goes to defect. 
PAVLOV 
Starts with cooperation. Then cooperates if both 
players made the same move previously, defects 
otherwise. 
MEAN 
PAVLOV 
Starts with defection. Then cooperates if both players made the same move 
previously, defects otherwise. 
WILLIAM 
ADAMS 
It starts with a threshold of four defections. Once 
the threshold is crossed, it defects and then 
adjusts the threshold by cutting it in half. It 
continues calculating the threshold after it is less 
than one because it then becomes the probability 
this rule cooperates after a defection. 
MEAN 
WILLIAM 
ADAMS 
Same like WILLIAM ADAMS but this one starts with 4 unprovoked 
defections 
CCD 
Alternates cooperate, cooperate, defect, 
regardless of what the opponent does. 
DDC Alternates defect, defect, cooperate, regardless of what the opponent does 
JOSS 
Starts with cooperation. If defected against, 
respond with a defect. Otherwise, cooperate 90% 
of the time, i.e., TFT plus 10% unprovoked 
defect. 
MISTRUST 10 
Starts with defection. If defected against, respond with a defect. Otherwise, 
cooperate 90% of the time, i.e., MISTRUST plus 10% unprovoked defect. 
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Table III-2 (continued)  
Strategy Definitions 
Strategy 
Name 
Explanation Strategy Name Explanation 
CHAMPION 
Cooperates during the first ten rounds, uses the 
TFT strategy during the next fifteen rounds, and 
subsequently switches to a more complicated 
strategy: It cooperates if the other player 
cooperated in the preceding round, but otherwise 
computes a ``cooperation rate'' -- the number of 
rounds in which the other player cooperated, 
divided by the current round number.  If this 
cooperation rate is 3/5 or more, CHAMPION 
continues to cooperate; otherwise, it selects a 
random number in the range from 0 to 1 and 
defects unless this number is less than or equal to 
the cooperation rate. 
MEAN 
CHAMPION 
Defects during the first ten rounds, uses the TFT strategy during the next 
fifteen rounds, and subsequently switches to a more complicated strategy: It 
cooperates if the other player cooperated in the preceding round, but 
otherwise computes a ``cooperation rate'' -- the number of rounds in which 
the other player cooperated, divided by the current round number.  If this 
cooperation rate is 3/5 or more, CHAMPION continues to cooperate; 
otherwise, it selects a random number in the range from 0 to 1 and defects 
unless this number is less than or equal to the cooperation rate. 
GRIM 
(FRIEDMAN) 
Starts with cooperation and stays with it until 
defected against once, it then defects for the rest 
of the (iterations). 
HARRINGTON 
Plays cooperatively for the first thirty-six iterations, then defects without 
provocation. If its opponent makes its first defection on the same move, this 
strategy assumes it is playing itself unless the opponent defects again. If it 
thinks it is playing a strategy identical to itself, it cooperates. However, if it 
is not playing itself, it attempts to take advantage of the opponent. It 
decides randomly when it should probe the other strategy for weakness. If 
the opponent appears to be a consistent defector (more than 70% defects), 
Harrington's strategy will respond with continual defection. 
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Table III-3 
Typical Results: Reciprocation Rule 
Payoff 
Structure 
Player Type 
Opponent 
Strategy 
MWW Rule 
EQUI 
Prisoner 
Nice 0.0022 General Rule 1 
Mean 0.1405 General Rule 2 
Overall 0.0022 General Rule 3 
Chicken 
Nice 0.0013 General Rule 1 
Mean 0.1212 General Rule 2 
Overall 0.0013 General Rule 3 
Deterrer 
Nice 0.0028 General Rule 1 
Mean 0.1405 General Rule 2 
Overall 0.0028 General Rule 3 
Appeaser 
Nice 0.0017 General Rule 1 
Mean 0.2123 General Rule 2 
Overall 0.0017 General Rule 3 
SSB 
Prisoner 
Nice 0.1405 Nice Abuse Exc. 
Mean 1.0000 General Rule 2 
Overall 0.1405 Nice Abuse Exc. 
Chicken 
Nice 0.0640 Nice Abuse Exc. 
Mean 0.7913 General Rule 2 
Overall 0.0640 Nice Abuse Exc. 
Deterrer 
Nice 0.0028 General Rule 1 
Mean 0.1620 General Rule 2 
Overall 0.0028 General Rule 3 
Appeaser 
Nice 0.0028 General Rule 1 
Mean 0.2123 General Rule 2 
Overall 0.0028 General Rule 3 
SBS 
Prisoner 
Nice 0.0013 General Rule 1 
Mean 0.1041 General Rule 2 
Overall 0.0013 General Rule 3 
Chicken 
Nice 0.0022 General Rule 1 
Mean 0.0757 Mean Treat Exc. 
Overall 0.0022 General Rule 3 
Deterrer 
Nice 0.0022 General Rule 1 
Mean 0.1212 Mean Treat Exc. 
Overall 0.0022 General Rule 3 
Appeaser 
Nice 0.0028 General Rule 1 
Mean 0.0757 Mean Treat Exc. 
Overall 0.0028 General Rule 3 
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Table III-4 
Exceptions 
Exception 
Payoff 
Structure 
Iterations 
300 400 500 600 
Nice Abuse 
Exception 
SSB 
P, C ** N&O P INS N&O 
C ** N&O 
P INS N&O 
C ** N&O 
P,C INS N&O 
BSS 
P,D ** N&O P INS N&O 
D ** N&O 
P,D INS N&O P,D INS N&O 
BSB P ** N&O P,C ** N&O P, C ** N&O P, C ** N&O 
Mean Treat 
Exception 
SBB P ** MEAN C ** MEAN P ** MEAN  
SBS 
P,C,D ** 
MEAN 
C,A ** MEAN P,C,D ** 
MEAN 
P,D,A ** 
MEAN 
BBS  A ** MEAN  C ** MEAN 
Prisoner 
Base-Case 
Exception 
SSS 
(EQUI) 
P ** MEAN P ** MEAN P ** MEAN P ** MEAN 
BBB 
(EQUI) 
P ** MEAN   P ** MEAN 
 P: prisoner, C: chicken, D: deterrer, A: appeaser 
 INS: p > 0.1 
 ** weakly significant 0.05<p<0.1 
 N&O: results with nice strategies and overall combination of nice and mean strategies 
 MEAN: results with mean strategies 
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Table III-5 
Results Summary 
Factor Results Implications 
Partner type Not significant 
A firm’s long term strategy of cooperation does not 
depend on short term preferences of partner firm 
Firm type 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
al
ly
 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
Significant when there is 
high value in inducing 
partner’s cooperation 
When there is high value in inducing partner’s 
cooperation, a firm’s long term strategy of 
cooperation depends on its own short term 
preferences 
Insignificant when there 
is little value in inducing 
partner’s cooperation 
When there is little value in inducing partner’s 
cooperation, a firm’s long term strategy of 
cooperation does not depend on its own short term 
preferences 
Partner Strategy 
Type (nice versus 
mean) 
Significant 
A firm’s long-term strategy of cooperation always 
depends on partner’s niceness. 
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9. FIGURES 
Figure III-1 
2-Dimensional Framework for Firm Types 
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Figure III-2  
One-Shot Equilibrium for 2X2 C-D Games 
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Figure III-3 
Maximally Different Player Types (Shown in Double Arrows) 
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Figure III-4 
Joint Effect of Partner’s Strategy Type and Cooperation Value 
Partner 
Strategy 
Type 
Nice 
COOPERATION Zone 
Firm shall reciprocate 
Nice-Nice 
ABUSE Zone 
Firm may not reciprocate 
Mean-Nice 
Mean 
TOLERANCE Zone 
Firm shall not reciprocate 
Nice-Mean 
RIVALRY Zone 
Firm may reciprocate 
Mean-Mean 
 High Low 
Value of inducing cooperation 
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APPENDICES 
Table III-A1 
Comparison of Rankings within Payoff Categories 
 
 
  
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
kendall's τ 0.77573 0.66138 0.77573 0.88421 0.88421 0.88421 0.82105 0.62797 0.82105 0.91293 0.94737 0.91293 0.67019 0.78628 0.67019 0.94459 0.83158 0.94459 0.88421 0.81053 0.88421 0.96842 0.87072 0.96842
p value 2.1E-06 5.6E-05 2.1E-06 3.7E-11 3.7E-11 3.7E-11 4.6E-09 0.00013 4.6E-09 2.4E-08 3.3E-14 2.4E-08 4.3E-05 1.6E-06 4.3E-05 7.6E-09 2.3E-09 7.6E-09 3.7E-11 9.1E-09 3.7E-11 8.4E-16 1E-07 8.4E-16
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
kendall's τ 0.90526 0.97884 0.90526 0.94737 0.86316 0.94737 0.92632 0.96842 0.92632 0.94737 0.95515 0.94737 0.93684 0.97895 0.93684 0.91579 0.96842 0.91579 0.91293 0.94737 0.91293 0.88127 1 0.88127
p value 5E-12 2.3E-09 5E-12 3.3E-14 2.2E-10 3.3E-14 5E-13 8.4E-16 5E-13 3.3E-14 5.1E-09 3.3E-14 1.4E-13 -4E-16 1.4E-13 1.6E-12 8.4E-16 1.6E-12 2.4E-08 3.3E-14 2.4E-08 7.1E-08 -4E-16 7.1E-08
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
kendall's τ 0.93404 0.97884 0.93404 0.94459 0.97895 0.94459 0.9657 0.96825 0.9657 0.93404 0.96842 0.93404 0.73351 0.91579 0.73351 0.87368 0.95789 0.87368 0.94737 0.94737 0.94737 0.96842 0.95789 0.96842
p value 1.1E-08 2.3E-09 1.1E-08 7.6E-09 -4E-16 7.6E-09 3.5E-09 3.4E-09 3.5E-09 1.1E-08 8.4E-16 1.1E-08 7.5E-06 1.6E-12 7.5E-06 9.2E-11 6.7E-15 9.2E-11 3.3E-14 3.3E-14 3.3E-14 8.4E-16 6.7E-15 8.4E-16
Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All Vs Nice Vs Mean Vs All
kendall's τ 0.93684 0.96825 0.93684 0.95789 0.87368 0.95789 0.93684 0.97895 0.93684 0.96842 0.97895 0.96842 0.89182 0.81794 0.89182 0.94737 0.90526 0.94737 0.89474 0.85263 0.89474 0.91293 0.90526 0.91293
p value 1.4E-13 3.4E-09 1.4E-13 6.7E-15 9.2E-11 6.7E-15 1.4E-13 -4E-16 1.4E-13 8.4E-16 -4E-16 8.4E-16 4.9E-08 5.8E-07 4.9E-08 3.3E-14 5E-12 3.3E-14 1.4E-11 5E-10 1.4E-11 2.4E-08 5E-12 2.4E-08
SSB SBS
Prisoner Chicken Deterrer Appeaser Prisoner Chicken Deterrer Appeaser
Deterrer Appeaser Prisoner Chicken Deterrer Appeaser
Prisoner Chicken Deterrer Appeaser
Prisoner Chicken
Prisoner Chicken Deterrer Appeaser
BSB BBS
Prisoner Chicken Deterrer Appeaser Prisoner Chicken Deterrer Appeaser
SSS BBB
BSS SBB
STRATEGIZING NICENESS IN CO-OPETITION  EMAN NASR 
 156 
Table III-A2 
Opponent Type Result Summary 
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Table III-A2 (cont’d)  
Opponent Type Result Summary 
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Table III-A2 (cont’d) 
Opponent Type Result Summary 
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Table III-A3  
Player Type Result Summary 
 
   -ve correlation 
   insignificant p 
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Table III-A3 (cont’d) 
Player Type Result Summary 
 
   -ve correlation 
   insignificant p 
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Table III-A3 (cont’d) 
Player Type Result Summary 
 
   -ve correlation 
   insignificant p 
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Dissertation Conclusion 
This dissertation addresses hopes of promising opportunities and fears from 
substantial risks of supply chain innovation, utilizing three methodological approaches in 
three distinct papers. The first paper synthesizes the literature to develop the theory of 
Process Innovation Propagation (PIP). PIP creates a new profitability channel as a novel 
innovation appropriation mechanism that capitalizes on supply chain partnerships and 
positive tuning of expert and market power advantages. The second paper uses a survey 
technique to empirically test supply chain knowledge properties hypothesized to drive 
radical and incremental innovative capabilities, with moderating roles of reward, 
punishment and legal influences. Lastly, paper three conducts a simulation, designed 
within a game theoretic framework, to explore the effects of firm and partner preferences, 
strategy type (defective versus cooperative), and payoff structure on the optimum strategy 
for repeated innovation interactions. The dissertation carries significant implications and 
managerial insights in four supply chain directions: partner selection, decision making, 
reciprocal exchanges, and power tuning. 
Partner Selection 
Supply chain partners should be selected according to the type of joint innovation 
activity, be it transfer (propagation) or creation. PIP partners, for instance, must enjoy a 
high degree of strategic fit for the propagation to be successful. A propagator assesses 
potential receivers based on the similarity of organizational strategies to that of its 
business, the degree of interdependence, and the extent of incentive alignment between 
the companies. Process innovations aim at enhancing one or more competitive priorities, 
whose similarity across firms, increases the innovation’s relevance to the receiving firm. 
Moreover, a higher degree of interdependence places more stake for each firm with the 
other, making the exchange more beneficial for the propagator, and more appealing for 
the receiver. Incentive alignment translates into higher synergies from collaboration, and 
more protection against opportunism. 
On the other hand, partners for joint projects aimed at the creation of radical and 
incremental innovations should be assessed based on the properties of their 
organizations’ intellectual capital. Firstly, managers should avoid partners with large size 
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discrepancy when developing incremental ideas. Such partners are expected to employ 
maximally different organizational procedures, patenting strategies and innovation 
processes. Disparity in size leads to high gaps in institutionalized knowledge properties, 
which is the basis of incremental innovations, impeding the applicability of the change to 
parties involved. When cooperating in radical innovation projects, managers should avoid 
excessive skill diversity and largely sized teams, which may entail conflicts and 
coordination problems.  
Decision Making 
Results of this dissertation research help managers take better decisions regarding 
their long term supply chain innovation strategies, innovation selection for propagation, 
and tuning governance structure for more effective knowledge exchanges. A firm’s 
decision of whether to defect or not in long term innovation relations necessitates 
knowledge about partner’s power stance and intent from the collaboration. Companies 
are advised to pursue cooperative strategies that never defect first, i.e., nice strategies, 
only when opponents pursue similarly cooperative strategies. Otherwise, companies may 
be well advised to consider defecting. This advice, however, is subject to conditions 
related to relative gains from attempting to change partner’s actions. A firm may abuse a 
cooperative partner when the relative gain from inducement is insignificant, and it may 
be nice to a defective partner when the relative gain from inducement is significant.  
The PIP theory developed herein guides the decision on the right innovations to 
share with supply chain partners for better performance. The theory characterizes 
specificity and tacitness as elements of vertical transferability, which have opposite 
effects on the effectiveness of propagation. Managers are advised to share less specific, 
but more tacit innovations along the supply chain. Innovations that are less bound to the 
type of business are easier to transfer vertically, without affecting imitation. The 
challenge of transferring tacit innovations, on the other hand, can be solved within the 
supply chain by increasing and enhancing interactions among people of the two 
organizations, while keeping competitors away from imitation. Managers are furthermore 
advised to decrease formality of governance with the degree of radicalness of the 
propagated change. 
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Reciprocity 
This dissertation highlights reciprocity as a very important exchange rule that is 
increasingly driving outcomes from innovation relationships. Companies are advised to 
reciprocate and expect reciprocation from partners. The decision to pursue a cooperative 
or a defective innovation strategy is, at least partially, determined according to the 
partner’s strategy type. This suggests that, in extension to (short-term) reciprocation of 
actions, such as the famous game theory’s TIT-FOR-TAT, long term strategies may also 
be reciprocated. 
Moreover, managers are advised to acknowledge the economic value behind 
social ties and relationship quality with supply chain partners. Managers who recognize 
the tangible value of cultivating supply chain social capital plant the seed of open sharing 
and partner knowledge protection, expecting reciprocation. As partners reciprocate 
actions, the wheel goes on and the supply chain’s repository of shared knowledge is 
maximized and protected from competing chains. 
Power Tuning 
Power is an inevitable pillar of the inherently interdependent supply chain 
relationships. Despite its perceived negativity, power can be tuned in positive ways that 
can help otherwise passive companies to adopt successful innovations passed by PIP. 
Innovation owners are recommended to make every attempt to persuade supply chain 
members to adopt their innovations, capitalizing on their advantage as experts in the field 
when propagating downstream, or on their market power advantage when propagating 
upstream. 
Active power exercise, on the other hand, harms the generation of radically new 
ideas, and does not help incremental ones. Supply chain joint endeavors aimed at the 
creation of ideas must not employ any influential strategies. New idea development 
requires a fair degree of freedom and flexibility to match the uncertainty of the creation 
process, even for small improvements/ changes. Organizations with power advantage that 
are inclined to use it are advised to refrain from doing so, realizing the losses in joint 
innovative capabilities that will result.  
This work is not claimed to comprehensively capture supply chain innovation 
hopes and fears. As the innovation process continues to evolve, more threats and 
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opportunities will arise, raising different research questions and opening up new venues 
for research on the subject. It did, however, highlight several concerns in the area 
including: capitalizing on supply chain partners’ capabilities and knowledge, 
appropriating maximum returns on successful innovations, devising innovation strategies 
with supply chain partners, power tuning for optimum innovation performance, and, 
finally, dealing with the knowledge sharing dilemma and risk of compromising 
competitive knowledge. 
 
 
